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Abstract
This thesis uses the cohort of 2005 school-leavers in the National Pupil Database to
present an economic analysis of the effects of secondary school admissions in England
on pupil sorting and achievement.
The first part of the thesis exploits the availability of pupil postcodes to examine the
impact of current school admissions arrangements on residential and school stratifica-
tion. It produces data from a thought experiment whereby pupils currently in schools
are reallocated to a new school based strictly on proximity to school. Through this
simulation the role of the housing market in producing socially stratified schooling can
be identified. A survey of school admissions policies is used to show that religious (and
to a lesser extent Foundation) schools have intakes that are significantly more advan-
taged than their local neighbourhood, and that they achieve these intakes through the
use of explicit potentially selective admissions criteria.
The second part of the thesis adds to evidence on whether policies intended to increase
parental choice raise pupil achievement via competition between schools. Quantitative
evidence on school competition in England is evaluated alongside the existing interna-
tional literature. A regression discontinuity design is employed to examine the legacy
effects of the Grant-Maintained schools policy on area-wide educational outcomes at
age 16. Pupil fixed-effects test score growth models and historical instrumental vari-
ables are used to identify the causal impact of religious schools on their neighbouring
schools. This econometric analysis fails to lend support to claims that encouraging
schools to compete for pupils is a route to improving standards.
The thesis concludes that the current English secondary school arrangements have
resulted in a system that is stratified and inequitable, without measurable efficiency
gains induced by competition between schools for pupils.
1
Acknowledgements
I wish to acknowledge the Economic and Social Research Council for financial support
throughout my PhD. Thanks are also due to the Department for Children, Schools
and Families for facilitating use of the National Pupil Database and Anne West at
the Department of Social Policy, LSE, for providing access to her survey of school
admissions policies.
I have been fortunate to work with many academics within and beyond the Institute
of Education over the course of writing this thesis, and my discussions with them have
added greatly to my ideas.
Early discussions with Rosalind Levacˇic´ about market reforms in education inspired
me to pursue this research and I also thank her for reading a final draft of this thesis.
Anne West has been very kind to me, particularly over my final year of study, and it
would not have been possible to write Chapter 5 without her ideas and data. Simon
Burgess, Frank Windmeijer and Harvey Goldstein have provided stimulating and on-
going collaborations in the measurement of segregation that have influenced methods
used in Chapter 4. Rob French, Denise Hawkes, Ruth Lupton, and Jenny Neuburger
all read chapters at various stages of development, and I am grateful for their com-
ments. Graham Hobbs has been the perfect academic friend who is prepared to talk
about school choice for hours each week, gently pointing out flaws in my thinking and
analysis.
Special thanks are due to my supervisor, Anna Vignoles, who has influenced the devel-
opment of this entire thesis, and has been a source of both professional and personal
support throughout the last four years.
Finally, I would like to thank friends and family for their ongoing support and kindness.




1.1 Outline of thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Motivation for theoretical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Motivation for a quantitative approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Policy background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.1 1944 Education Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.2 Comprehensive schooling reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4.3 Conservative government reforms – 1979 to 1997 . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.4 Labour government reforms – 1997 onwards . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 Sources of data 27
2.1 National Pupil Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1.1 Key Stage test data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2 Indicators of pupil family background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2.1 Free school meals eligibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2.2 Indices of Deprivation and ACORN housing types . . . . . . . . 32
2.2.3 2001 Census of Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3 Annual Schools Census and Register of Educational Establishments . . . 34
2.4 Grant-Maintained Schools Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5 West 2001 school admissions survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6 Church attendance data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6.1 1851 Census of Religious Worship for Great Britain . . . . . . . 36
2.6.2 1851 to 1961 survey of religious affiliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6.3 2005 English Church Census . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3 Models of parental choice of school 38
3.1 Post-structuralist models of parental choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.1.1 Middle class advantage in school choice processes . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1.2 Middle class judgements of school quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1.3 The complexity and risk of choice for the middle class . . . . . . 44
3.1.4 Working class values and school choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
3.2 Economic models of parental choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.1 Income constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2.2 Shape of the utility function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.3 Informational advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 General equilibrium models of location choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3.1 Modelling the household utility function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3.2 Equilibrium outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Models that predict incomplete stratification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4.1 Within a general equilibrium framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.2 Limits to general equilibrium modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.3 Agent-based computational models of school choice . . . . . . . . 62
3.5 Decision-making under school choice programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5.1 Introducing school choice to general equilibrium models . . . . . 64
3.5.2 School choice in ACE models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.6 Predicting the effect of English school choice reforms . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6.1 Decision-making under uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4 Housing market and school segregation 72
4.1 Literature on changes in school segregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1.1 Main findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1.2 Gorard’s segregation index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.1.3 Stability of FSM measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2 Method and data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.2 A counterfactual to current school admissions . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2.3 Measuring differences in segregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.1 The level of pupil mobility in LAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.2 School segregation and post-residential sorting . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3.3 Explaining levels of post-residential sorting . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3.4 Post-1988 mobility and post-residential sorting . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5 School intake versus neighbourhood characteristics 96
5.1 Schools included in analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2 Current intake characteristics by school type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.3 Neighbourhood characteristics by school type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.3.1 Proximity and recruitment neighbourhoods . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.4 School intake versus neighbourhood characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
TABLE OF CONTENTS 5
5.4.1 Proximity ratio and recruitment ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.5 School admissions policies and sources of stratification . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.6 Sorting within the religious schooling sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6 School competition and pupil performance 119
6.1 Theoretical models of school competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.1.1 The school utility function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.1.2 The structure of competitive markets for schools . . . . . . . . . 123
6.1.3 The conduct of schools in a competitive market . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.1.4 The dynamics of a competitive marketplace . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.2 School competition – the estimation problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.2.1 Key measures of competition between schools . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.3 Literature on competition and pupil performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.3.1 English non-experimental evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.3.2 English quasi-experimental evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.3.3 US public school competition evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.3.4 US Charter school competition evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.3.5 International private school competition evidence . . . . . . . . . 141
6.3.6 International ‘choice’ school competition evidence . . . . . . . . . 144
6.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7 Spillover effects of Grant-Maintained schools 147
7.1 The use of the GM schools vote in a regression discontinuity design . . . 151
7.1.1 Use of the GM vote in Clark (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
7.1.2 RDD – efficiency versus bias trade-offs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
7.1.3 RDD – role of the pre-test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
7.1.4 RDD – independent causal effect of V on y . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.1.5 RDD – fuzzy versus sharp discontinuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.1.6 Using RDD in recent pupil-level data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
7.2.1 School variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.3 GM schools and cream-skimming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
7.4 GM schools and competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.5 Pupil achievement in neighbouring schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
7.6 Pupil achievement in former GM schools in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
7.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
8 Spillover effects of religious schools 179
8.1 The supply of religious secondary school places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
8.1.1 Growth and decline of church attendance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
TABLE OF CONTENTS 6
8.1.2 The supply of religious secondary schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.1.3 The distribution of religious schools today . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8.2 Competition from religious schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
8.2.1 Secondary school transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
8.3 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
8.3.1 Instrumenting Catholic school supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
8.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
8.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
8.5.1 All religious schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
8.5.2 Catholic schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
8.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
9 Conclusion 208
9.1 Parental choice of school . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
9.2 School admissions reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
9.3 The proximity oversubscription criterion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
9.4 Predicting the effects of future policy reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
9.5 School competition policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
9.6 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
List of Figures
4.1 Values of Gorard’s segregation index (GS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 Distribution of mobility levels across LAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3 Understanding why pupils do not attend their proximity school . . . . . 84
4.4 School segregation in English LAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5 Current school versus Proximity I segregation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.6 Relationship between pupil mobility and post-residential sorting . . . . 90
4.7 Sources of post-residential sorting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.1 Distribution of FSM pupils within Community, Foundation and Reli-
gious sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2 Actual versus proximity FSM composition for Religious schools . . . . . 105
5.3 Regional differences in FSM composition for Religious schools . . . . . . 105
5.4 Actual versus proximity top ability composition for Religious schools . . 106
5.5 Actual versus proximity FSM composition for Foundation schools . . . . 107
5.6 Actual versus proximity top ability composition for Foundation schools . 107
5.7 Mean FSM proximity ratio for schools grouped by admissions criteria . 110
5.8 Mean top ability proximity ratio for schools grouped by admissions criteria111
6.1 Utility function of school with respect to pupil numbers . . . . . . . . . 122
7.1 Reasons given for opting out (from Bush et al., 1993, Table 8.1) . . . . . 151
7.2 McClary’s test of manipulation of assignment variable for GM voting data153
7.3 Clark’s effect of a GM vote win on pass rates: 2 years after vote . . . . 154
7.4 Illustration of the separate effects of voting and the voting outcome . . . 159
7.5 Percentage of first ballot vote losers achieving subsequent yes votes . . . 160
7.6 Current KS2 prior attainment of intakes for GM vote takers . . . . . . . 165
7.7 Free school meals status of intake for GM vote takers . . . . . . . . . . . 166
7.8 Average capped GCSE point score by GM vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
8.1 Changes in dispersion of Catholic population across England . . . . . . 184
8.2 Proportion of pupils in RC and CofE schools across ancient counties . . 190
7
List of Tables
2.1 Summary of data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Key pupil variables in NPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Key pupil test score variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4 Governance of religious schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5 Schools in Grant-Maintained schools database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6 Governance of secondary school GM vote winners and losers . . . . . . . 35
3.1 UK surveys of parents regarding choice of school . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 Summary of general equilibrium of household location articles . . . . . . 52
3.3 Equilibrium outcomes of neighbourhood schooling model . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1 Summary statistics for LAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 Summary statistics for proximity allocation procedure . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3 Association between the quasi-market and level of mobility . . . . . . . 84
4.4 Association between school segregation and school types in LEA . . . . 88
4.5 Results from post-residential sorting regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.6 Gains from mobility as measured by change in FSM peer group . . . . . 92
5.1 Governance of religious and non-religious schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.2 Governance of grammar schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3 Characteristics of pupils in schools by analysis group (%) . . . . . . . . 99
5.4 Proximity characteristics of schools in analysis (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.5 Recruitment characteristics of schools in analysis (%) . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.6 Home-school distance (in km) for nth percentile pupil in school . . . . . 102
5.7 Correlation between alternative measures of neighbourhood characteristics103
5.8 Proximity ratios (excluding grammar schools) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.9 Use of potentially selective admissions criteria in 2001 . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.10 Cream-skimming analysis of 5 e´lite RC secondary schools . . . . . . . . 114
5.11 Cream-skimming analysis of 5 e´lite CofE secondary schools . . . . . . . 116
7.1 Differences between Grant-Maintained, Foundation and Community sta-
tus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
8
LIST OF TABLES 9
7.2 T-test of difference between means on pre-treatment GCSE scores . . . 157
7.3 Sensitivity of Clark’s main (ITT) estimates to changes in control vari-
ables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
7.4 Key descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.5 Governance of GM vote winners and losers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.6 Differences in intakes by KS2 for non-grammar schools taking GM vote 166
7.7 Differences in intakes by FSM for non-grammar schools taking GM vote 167
7.8 Ratio of current-to-proximity intake characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.9 Differences in school size between vote winners and losers . . . . . . . . 169
7.10 Effect of former GM schools on local authority pupil performance . . . . 171
7.11 Effect of GM schools on neighbouring school pupil performance . . . . . 173
7.12 OLS regression of school type effectiveness for all non-grammar schools . 174
7.13 RDD comparing non-grammar GM vote winners and losers . . . . . . . 176
8.1 Religious denomination of secondary schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
8.2 Proportion of pupils in religious schools by ancient county . . . . . . . . 189
8.3 Primary to secondary school transitions (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
8.4 Secondary school moves between age 12 and 15 (%) . . . . . . . . . . . 193
8.5 Key pupil test score variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
8.6 Key pupil-level control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
8.7 Key school-level control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
8.8 Key county-level control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
8.9 Pupil fixed effects test score growth (religious schools) . . . . . . . . . . 202
8.10 Pupil fixed effects test score growth (Catholic schools) . . . . . . . . . . 204
Chapter 1
Introduction
The debate about admissions, while often appearing to be about arcane
technicalities, does in fact go to the heart of current policies about how
best to achieve social justice, an improved education system and a cohesive
society.
(Coldron et al., 2008, page 3)
This thesis is concerned with the question of who benefits under the current system of
secondary school admissions in England, where parents are given a choice over where
their child is educated. The introduction of a quasi-market for school places has been
central to government aims to improve school standards for the past twenty years.
However, opinions remain polarised on whether these types of reforms are welfare
enhancing. Critics argue that higher-income families benefit at the expense of the poor,
because they are advantaged in their ability to exercise choice or because schools that
control their admissions ‘cream-skim’ easier to teach pupils. By contrast, proponents
suggest that it is the low income families who necessarily benefit most from the removal
of the housing market’s role as a gatekeeper to schools, because they are the group for
whom ‘the current constraints [of school allocation] are most binding ’ (Hoxby, 2003a,
page 10). Indeed, it is certainly untrue that selection by mortgage for neighbourhood
schools is more equitable or less stratified than all conceivable choice regimes. Many
advocates go further and argue that, regardless of how choice alters pupil sorting, all
pupils ultimately benefit because competition between schools for pupils induces them
to increase their effort, thus raising productivity (described by Hoxby, 2003b, as ‘the
tide that raises all boats’). This thesis examines both the theoretical basis and the
empirical evidence for these claims.
The chapters that follow focus on the sorting and achievement effects of secondary
school choice in England. Choice is a process whereby parents are first asked to
10
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express a preference for secondary schools, then school admissions criteria and practices
determine how places for 11 year olds are allocated across the English state maintained
sector, taking some account of parental preferences. Decades of cumulative reforms
have resulted in a process that is quite complex for parents, with experiences varying
considerably across the country. For example, in areas such as Cornwall, admissions
to all maintained schools are determined and administered by the local authority, with
priority essentially given on the basis of catchment areas. Therefore, choice of school
is almost entirely related to choice of residential location. By contrast, in London 50
per cent of schools determine their own admissions, either because they are Voluntary-
Aided schools with religious criteria for admission or because they opted out of local
authority control during the early 1990s and are now Foundation schools.
The means and the ends of admission policies can be investigated in terms of many
criteria, including school quality, efficiency, costs, responsiveness, accountability and
equity (Le Grand, 2007). This thesis principally assesses the effect of secondary school
admissions on equity, measured in terms of social stratification, and on efficiency,
measured by average pupil achievement in GCSE exams at age 16.
Social stratification across schools can be seen as a direct measurement of levels of
equality of opportunity in the system, defined as the extent to which a child’s educa-
tional opportunities depend upon either the parents’ economic circumstances or the
child’s location within the state (Wise, 1967). The secondary school a child attends
is an important determinant of their GCSE performance1 and the social class gap in
achievement widens as children progress through secondary school. School allocation
is one important determinant of these social class differences in educational progress.2
Indeed, these inequalities in progress are an almost inevitable consequence of social
stratification between schools if a child’s peers affect their educational success.
Average GCSE achievement captures a relatively narrow aspect of efficiency since
it ignores any possible effects of policies on educational costs and does not measure
changes in the effect of schools on other pupil outcomes, such as learning not captured
by exam papers, happiness, self-esteem and future wages. However, this focus on test
scores is justified on the basis of its likely correlation with other outcomes: if children
are happy and motivated in school, this should feed into superior GCSE achievement;
if children are more successful in the labour market as a result of their schooling, this
1Reynolds (1992) report that the variance of achievement attributable to UK schools is 8-15 per
cent. Wilson and Piebalga (2008) report that over 7 per cent of the variance in GCSE achievement is
attributable to schools, even once peer group characteristics are accounted for, although 50 per cent of
secondary schools are indistinguishable from each other in terms of quality on contextual value-added
(CVA) rankings.
2Hobbs (2007) finds around one-fifth of class differences in Key Stage 2 progress are explained
by class differences in school allocation. Sacker et al. (2002) find 25 per cent of class differences in
achievement at age 11 were accounted for by class differences in school/classroom composition, but
this estimate is likely biased upwards.
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should have also been reflected in achievement at age 16.
1.1 Outline of thesis
The thesis is divided into two separate substantive questions:
1. What is the effect of school admissions policies on patterns of school and resi-
dential sorting?
2. What is the effect of these policies on the level of pupil achievement at the end
of compulsory education?
These questions are distinct, yet closely related. However, questions of sorting and
pupil achievement are addressed separately for the following reasons. First, it is possi-
ble to identify the effect of policies on sorting, without consideration of how the policies
might influence school effort and pupil achievement. This first research question in it-
self relies on a considerable theoretical literature and methodological consideration of
the measurement of sorting. By contrast, it is only possible to conceptualise how poli-
cies are likely to influence the level and distribution of pupil achievement once patterns
of sorting are described. Thus, the ability to answer the second research question is
contingent on addressing the first. Both research questions are important from a social
welfare perspective: patterns of and reasons for changes in pupil sorting allow us to as-
sess the equity of the schooling system; the level and distribution of pupil outcomes not
only identifies whether the system is equitable, but also whether it is efficient.
Chapters 3 to 5 address the question of patterns of school and residential sorting in
the current English schooling system. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical framework for
predicting how pupils are likely to be sorted into schools under different admissions ar-
rangements. It argues that the sociological post-structuralist literature has contributed
greatly to our understanding of why choice strategies are likely to differ by social class,
but is incapable of making comparative predictions as to levels of social stratification
under alternative school admissions arrangements. By contrast, general equilibrium
models of school choice are capable of making specific policy predictions, but the liter-
ature as it currently stands is highly reductionist and not well adapted to the English
institutional environment. Chapters 4 and 5 provide descriptions of this English in-
stitutional environment, detailing how the housing market, school admissions criteria
and parental strategies interact to produce current patterns of pupil sorting. Chapter 4
measures the contribution of the housing market to producing a stratified schooling
system in England. It does so by using the availability of pupil postcodes to enact
a ‘thought experiment’ that asks by how much school segregation could potentially
reduced if a central planner intervened and allocated all pupils to secondary schools
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strictly on the basis of proximity alone. Chapter 5 builds directly on the tentative
conclusions of Chapter 4 by using a survey of school admissions policies to examine
why some schools have intakes that differ substantially in terms of social and ability
composition to the neighbourhood in which they are located.
Chapters 6 to 8 address the more broad and complex question of whether operating
a quasi-market for school places raises pupil achievement. Understanding models and
patterns of sorting is important to answering this question, for two reasons. First,
the nature of demand for schooling determines how and why schools might compete
for both quantity and type of pupils. Second, any changes in stratification as a result
of quasi-market policies will affect which pupils benefit from the reforms. Chapter 6
describes a theoretical model of how school competition is likely to work in the English
context, and it examines the existing international evidence for productivity gains re-
sulting from school competition. Chapter 7 employs a regression discontinuity design
to analyse whether the policy to allow schools to become Grant-Maintained in the early
1990s, and thus operate independently from local authority control, has been success-
ful in increasing effort focussed on pupil achievement in the long-run, both through
changes in the productivity of their successor Foundation schools and through compe-
tition effects on neighbouring schools. Chapter 8 examines whether the competitive
threat that religious schools present to neighbouring schools raises, or lowers, area-
wide academic standards. Pupil fixed-effect test score growth models are combined
with historical instrumental variables to ensure the supply of religious school places in
an area is independent of present-day demand.
1.2 Motivation for theoretical approach
This thesis draws on several theoretical perspectives, but is principally written in
an explicitly economic and quantitative tradition. The origin of the economics of
education as a significant field within economics dates back to the theoretical and
empirical developments made by American economists such as Gary Becker, Jacob
Mincer and Theodore Schultz in the 1960s (Machin, 2008). The crucial starting point
of this economic analysis is that parents and school managers are rational agents
(often given the name ‘homo-economicus’), operating with self-interested intent as
they negotiate the school admissions process (Le Grand, 2003).
The market for secondary school places has been termed a ‘quasi-market’ because
it differs in some fundamental aspects from classical free markets in respect to both
the demand and supply sides (Glennerster, 1991; Le Grand, 1991). It is a market in
the sense that parents act as consumers with a free choice of school. On the supply
side, schools have budgetary independence and are encouraged to compete for stu-
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dents through the funding formula. However, the state retains control of financing the
service, thereby divorcing the distribution of the service concerned from the distribu-
tion of income (Le Grand, 2003). Furthermore, schools cannot easily expand or exit
in response to consumer behaviour, do not earn profits and are subject to consider-
able operating restrictions via the National Curriculum and controls on teacher pay
(Glennerster, 1991).
There are two further unusual aspects of this quasi-market. The first is that the
nature of the demand for schools partially determines the quality of supply because
peer characteristics (such as ability and behaviour) are an important input to the
education production function. This means the choice of any one parent imposes an
externality on all others since the allocation of their child to a school influences the
overall distribution of peer effects. The second unusual aspect of this quasi-market is
the absence of price as a rationing device for school places. This, combined with supply
that is constrained for agency and institutional reasons, can produce a permanent mis-
match between demand and supply for places at any one school. The school admissions
policies at the centre of this study are simply the means by which places are currently
rationed in England.
There are shortcomings of allowing parents to choose school places for their children,
given the complexity and importance of the decisions to be taken. Most parents make
infrequent, but closely-spaced, choices with the implications of these decisions only
revealed in the long term, if at all (Levin, 1991). The decisions would optimally be
made with an assessment of the probability of achievement at different schools, the
relative costs of travel to schools, knowledge of school ethos or climate, the chances of
successfully securing a place at each chosen school and evidence about labour market
returns to education. However, it would be impossible for even the most well-informed
parent to collect these data. The problem of imperfect information is then compounded
by inadequacies in the ability of parents to compute information available to make the
most appropriate choice for their child.
Despite these shortcomings of parents as decision-makers, there are theoretical eco-
nomic models and empirical evidence that suggest that parents do a better job choos-
ing schools for their children than experts in government agencies (Bast and Walberg,
2004). If we believe that parents are better able to choose the highest quality schools,
this should result in the quasi-market for schooling being more allocatively efficient
than the administrative allocation of pupils to schools. Schools should adapt their
product to meet the desires of parents and popular schools would expand and less
popular ones would shrink in size. However, if parents (correctly or incorrectly) think
that peer groups form a significant part of their child’s education production func-
tion, they necessarily care who their child goes to school with. Therefore, schools with
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aﬄuent intakes will be popular almost regardless of their effort.
This has two implications. First, parents may not choose schools that are the most
productively efficient, meaning these schools do not maximise outcomes holding con-
stant a set of inputs that includes the peer group. Thus, a process by which popular
schools expand at the expense of others may be as likely to reduce productive efficiency
as it might increase it. Second, it means that schools can best ensure they survive and
prosper simply by concentrating their effort on securing an advantaged intake through
the application of certain admissions policies and procedures (i.e. by cream-skimming).
This, combined with evidence showing that family background appears to be important
in schooling decisions, suggests that a quasi-market for school places risks becoming
quite stratified.
1.3 Motivation for a quantitative approach
The empirical analysis that follows in Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 8 uses large scale admin-
istrative datasets containing information on all pupils in state maintained secondary
schools to draw generalisations about the effect of policies across England as a whole.
It is able to exploit the National Pupil Database (NPD), available from 2002 onwards,
to reanalyse policy questions previously investigated only in aggregated schools data.
Examples of this earlier work include the evaluation of changes in school segregation
carried out by Stephen Gorard and others, and economic studies of school competition
(e.g. Bradley et al., 2001; Gorard et al., 2003; Levacˇic´, 2004).
Analysis of these research questions using pupil-level data brings several advantages.
The analysis is likely to be more robust because the dataset provides variables mea-
suring the characteristics of the pupils in the schools including, most importantly, the
attainment of pupils prior to entering secondary school. Thus, the risk of confounding
the effect of policy interventions by other factors is reduced. NPD also allows analysis
to take place on a cohort, rather than whole school, basis so that the effect of changes
in policies can be cleanly identified between two years. But aside from claims of greater
validity of analysis, the pupil-level analysis also allows quite different questions to be
addressed. Examples of this are the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 that exploit the
availability of pupil postcodes to provide a description of where pupils go to school,
relative to where they live.
The research questions posed in this thesis are theory-testing rather than theory-
building and so lend themselves directly to fixed design quantitative analysis, of which
there are two distinct types in this thesis. The choice and sorting part of the thesis
uses a descriptive or correlation approach to analyse school admissions, residential lo-
cations and school stratification. It seeks to identify statistical associations between
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admissions regimes and pupil sorting. The analysis is not able, on its own, to make
causal claims about the effects of policies on sorting since there is no robust identi-
fication strategy that is able to isolate the policy intervention from the context into
which it was introduced. Where causal relationships are tentatively inferred in con-
cluding remarks, this is only possible because the research questions are grounded by a
combination of economic theory and existing smaller scale qualitative and quantitative
studies.
The second part of the thesis uses quasi-experimental methods to make causal claims
about the effect of school governance on competition and pupil achievement. It does so
by using econometric techniques – a regression discontinuity design, pupil fixed-effects
models and instrumental variables – to isolate and measure the effect of the policies on
outcomes. This type of analysis is necessarily reductionist, assuming that all ‘context’
can be cancelled out via the use of a control group or variables. This position is chal-
lenged some who argue that a constant and controlled relationship between treatment
and outcomes (known as the ‘constant conjunction’) cannot exist when dealing with
humans and social situations in which a treatment is necessarily always applied in a
unique context. Furthermore, though econometric techniques can successfully produce
quantitative verification for theory, the reverse is not necessarily true where analysis
yields equivocal results. The theory cannot automatically be rejected since the null
result might be due the nature of the implementation of the policy, the context into
which the policy was introduced or problems with the specification of the research
design itself.
The key threats to the reliability, generalisability and validity of the analysis in this
thesis are as follows. First, internal validity is threatened by complexity in operational-
ising key theoretical constructs, and in particular measuring levels of choice, compe-
tition and sorting in the system. Second, there is a risk to internal validity because
all analysis is carried out on a single national cross-section of pupils, which clearly
has major limitations when trying to describe a constantly evolving quasi-market. It
means that between-area comparisons of policies take place, as opposed to exploring
the evolution of one area over time. This makes it extremely difficult to remove context
from associations between variables, and the control variables available may not prove
sufficient to achieve this. Finally, even if we are able to claim validity to the target con-
struct – all pupils passing through the English secondary education system around the
start of the 21st century – the thesis is necessarily limited in its ability to extrapolate
findings beyond this narrow context. All causal statements are inevitably contingent,
but in education research the wide variation in persons, settings, treatments and out-
comes across countries and over time mean that evidence for a theoretical position
that is upheld in this study is of limited use in making policy predictions in other
contexts.
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1.4 Policy background
The final section of this introductory chapter gives an overview of the major policy
events that led to the current English system of school governance and admissions.
Mass secondary schooling in England is a 20th century phenomenon, and so the early
history of schooling is not covered here. However, the role of the churches in the
provision of 19th century elementary schooling is described in some detail in Chapter 8
since it is directly relevant to the estimation strategy employed in the analysis.
The current secondary school system, which children usually pass through from age 11
to age 16 or 18, has its roots in the 1944 Education Act. Prior to World War II, com-
pulsory education lasted from age 5 through to 14. Slightly under half of all children
completed this education in all-through elementary schools, with the rest transferring
at age 11 to separate senior elementary schools/departments or grammar schools. All
schools in the maintained sector – including church schools – were managed by one
of 318 Local Education Authorities (LEAs), which were established as part of the
1902 Education Act to replace the Dual System of church provision and school boards.
Only around 20 per cent of pupils had access to post-14 education via fee-charging day
grammar schools, a small number of local authority secondary schools or through the
entirely separate system of preparatory and public (private) schools (Barber, 1994).
Few scholarships existed for those families who could not afford fees.
1.4.1 1944 Education Act
The 1944 Education Act heralded the start of a system of universal, free and compul-
sory secondary education, backed by widespread popular and political support. Al-
though it took many years to be fully implemented by local authorities, it established
the principle of free education in secondary schools, rather than elementary schools,
until age 15. By 1951 there had already been a three-fold increased in numbers attend-
ing these secondary schools in England (Brown et al., 1997). The significance of the
Act in providing an enduring institutional framework for the education service can-
not be understated: most of its provisions remained actively in place until the recent
legislative whirlwind that began in 1988.
A notable feature of post-war secondary provision was the decision to establish a
Tripartite System of schools. A majority of pupils transferred to Secondary Modern
schools, with a minority of pupils pursuing a more academic curriculum at grammar
schools and a further (smaller) minority following a technical curriculum at Technical
schools. Entry to grammar schools was free after World War II, but was conditional on
passing the academic eleven-plus exam. It was recognised at the time of the 1944 Act
that age 11 was probably too young an age to determine the future careers of children,
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but the decision to make the transfer at 11 and not at 13 was largely made on practical
grounds (Barber, 1994). Elementary buildings couldn’t accommodate pupils up to the
age of 13, and building work was infeasible, particularly in the religious sector where
both the Anglicans and Catholics were in a state of financial crisis.
The Act gave LEAs considerable power to mandate diocesan education authorities,
which had dominated the early system of elementary schooling, to reform their schools
into primary and secondary schools. The negotiations with the churches are described
further in Chapter 8, but an important feature was the creation of new governance
status for church schools. They could become ‘Voluntary Controlled’ (VC), mean-
ing that the State would take day-to-day control of the school. Alternatively, if the
church wished to retain control of their school via ‘Voluntary Aided’ (VA) status, they
were required to make a 50% capital contribution to the school. In return the church
had majority representation on the governing body, giving them control over the em-
ployment of staff, buildings and repairs, and school admissions (Gay and Greenough,
2000). Thus, church and LEA schools continued to operate separately within the same
system, although most church elementary schools became primary schools resulting in
lower levels of church secondary schooling provision.
Parental choice of school was allowed, though restricted, under the 1944 Education
Act. Section 76 stipulated that pupils should be educated in accordance with the
wishes of their parents, but only in ‘so far as is compatible with the provision of
efficient instruction and training and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure’
(Ministry of Education, 1944). It has been argued that this was a relatively weak
directive (Fitz et al., 2001). In any case, choice was understood at the time to implicitly
signal denominational choice, rather than choice between secular schools since this
clause was to appease concerns of the churches regarding access to denominational
schools. Thus, choice as enshrined in the 1944 Education Act did allow a minority of
parents with sufficient information and resources to satisfy their preferences within the
state system, but the obligation to justify the selection of a non-local school still fell
entirely upon parents (Walford, 1994).
1.4.2 Comprehensive schooling reform
The single most important reform to take place in the long period between the 1944
and 1988 Education Acts was the dismantling of the Tripartite system of secondary
schooling. There was consistent opposition to grammar schools even at the time of
the 1944 Education Act, but this became increasingly vocal in the early 1960s as
the expanding middle class found their opportunities for a grammar school education
increasingly competitive and unsatisfactory due to scarcity of places (Halsey et al.,
1980).
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Early comprehensive reforms took place through local initiatives, without a need for
legislative mandates. Then in 1965, Circular 10/65 announced the Government’s for-
mal opposition to the eleven-plus exams and requested LEAs to reorganise on a com-
prehensive basis. Although the comprehensive ideal was emphasized in the Circular, it
was neither put into a Green Paper nor legislation before the Conservatives regained
power in 1970. At this time the political ground began to shift and Circular 10/65
was officially withdrawn when Margaret Thatcher became Secretary of State for Edu-
cation. In 1976, the Labour Government passed an Education Act to finally introduce
compulsory comprehensive re-organisation in LEAs. A second bill in 1978 required
LEAs to use an admissions procedure based on ‘parental preference’, thus mirroring
part of the spirit of the 1980s legislation, but it would never become law (Benn and
Chitty, 1996). Although these Acts were reversed by Conservative bills after 1979, the
new Government failed to prevent more local authorities from going comprehensive
and phasing out selection even as late as the 1980s. Thus, the comprehensive sector
had successfully grown from educating just one per cent of children in 1951 to 90 per
cent in 1981.
1.4.3 Conservative government reforms – 1979 to 1997
Le Grand (2003) describes the English schooling system prior to the 1980s as a non-
market trust model: local authorities exercised considerable influence in the allocation
and spending of school funds and in the assignment of pupils to schools, yet teachers
were given extensive freedoms to determine curricula and teaching methods. Critics of
this model argued that government failure and agency problems surrounding teacher
incentives meant that reform was needed. Pugh et al. (2006) describe the government
failure argument as follows:
Governments’ desire to retain power leads to an emphasis upon short-term
costs and benefits, time consistency problems and a preference for policies
that have concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. Even in the absence of
explicit corruption, public providers face incentives to favour government
supporters and the interests of employees rather than cost reduction and
innovation.
(Pugh et al., 2006, page 20)
This non-market trust model of began to change over the course of the 1980s, starting
with the 1980 Education Act and ending with the 1988 Education Reform Act. The
1980 Education Act made only modest changes of the right of parents to choose a
secondary school for their child. It allowed parents to ‘express a preference’ for a
school, but considerable LEA powers remained to manage falling school rolls and the
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overall provision of places, taking into account benefits of the community as a whole
(Department for Education, 1980). Nevertheless, they were required to make the
means available for parents to express preferences for maintained schools, which shifted
the burden of justification from parents to LEAs, who would now have to explicitly
deny a preferred school if the parent requested one (Department for Education, 1992).
However, choice was not perceived as existing in the many LEAs where parents were
informed of their designated catchment area school first, with details of how to request
an alternative place left as small print on the designation letter (Stillman and Maychell,
1986).
A more radical aspect of the 1980 Act was the introduction of the Assisted Places
Scheme, which provided financial support to low-income parents to allow them to
send their children to private schools. By 1987 almost 27,000 pupils were holding
assisted places at an annual cost of some £48 million to the state and the scheme
was not dismantled until Labour returned to power in 1997. However, very few of
participants actually came from working class backgrounds: two-thirds of the mothers
of the participants had themselves attended selective or independent schools (Edwards
et al., 1989).
The quasi-market in its current form really emerged with the controversial 1988 Edu-
cation Reform Act for England and Wales. The major thrust of the Act was designed
to increase competition between schools and to encourage parents to make choices
between schools. It was introduced against a backdrop of large demographic changes:
by 1987 the number of ten-year olds had plummented by 30% from their peak in 1975,
producing an abundance of surplus places in secondary school (Walford, 2003). This
surplus capacity brought with it both the desire by parents to choose, and the ability
for choice to be exercised in many areas. The 1988 Education Reform Act states that
‘no child should be refused admission to a school unless it is genuinely full ’, and locally
assessed admissions numbers were introduced to ensure LEAs could not retain empty
places at popular schools (Department for Education and Science, 1988). The Act
came into effect for admissions to schools from 1990 onwards, ending the dominance of
formal catchment areas and proximity criteria as the principal administrative devices
for the allocation of pupils to schools. Choice was initially restricted by LEA bound-
aries, but the 1989 Greenwich Judgement removed the right of LEAs to deny access
to pupils on the basis of these boundaries in cases of reasonable proximity.
A separate part of the 1988 Education Reform Act established a formal National
Curriculum Assessment, with new tests to be taken at ages 7, 11 and 14. These
tests resulted in nationally published data on schools that, along with the standard
GCSE and A level ‘league tables’, contributed to a new transparency in terms of school
performance in public examinations. During the same period, Local Management of
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Schools funding reforms turned budgets over from LEAs to schools, with 80 per cent
of funding determined solely by pupil numbers (Levacˇic´, 1998). This gave schools
a stronger incentive to attract and admit more students. It also had the effect of
weakening the power of the local authorities and teacher unions traditionally allied
with the Labour party (Walford, 1994).
A second major policy theme running through Conservative education reforms was
the creation of new sets of schools operating outside LEA control. These schools were
designed to act as beacons of excellence for local LEA schools with the aim of raising
standards (Department for Education and Science, 1986). The first of these policies
was the creation of City Technology Colleges in the 1986 (No. 2) Education Act.
They were directly modelled on American Magnet Schools, but never really took hold
in England, with just 14 being created in total.
The Grant-Maintained schools policy, explained in some detail in Chapter 7, was a far
more successful exercise in school autonomy. The 1988 Education Reform Act enabled
existing maintained schools to hold a parental vote to opt out of local authority control.
Over the course of the 1990s, one-in-six secondary schools achieved Grant-Maintained
status. One key consequence of independence from LEA control was that they could
administer and change their admissions policies and just over one-in-ten choose to
apply to the Secretary of State for Education to select as much as 30 per cent of their
intake by ability.
The 1993 Act introduced a further policy to encourage diversity in school provision.
Schools were able to apply for additional funding to acquire a Specialist status and, if
successful, were also able to select up to 10 per cent of their intake based on pupil ability
in subjects such as technology, music, drama, and sport. Attracted by the additional
funds that Specialist status brought, this was a popular policy with schools, although
most did not take advantage of the opportunity to introduce selection. However, these
three policies in school autonomy, introduced alongside a set of legacy grammar schools
and a large number of religious schools, meant that the quasi-market for school places
in England, rightly or wrongly, became associated with schools choosing pupils as much
as parents choosing schools.
1.4.4 Labour government reforms – 1997 onwards
The Labour Party had originally opposed many of the quasi-market reforms to edu-
cation, yet in Government from 1997 they demonstrated strong support for parental
choice and school autonomy, with few of the 1980s reforms being reversed. The 1998
School Standards and Framework Act enabled existing selection to remain, though it
curbed the introduction of new selection policies (only specialist schools are allowed
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to introduce selection by ‘aptitude’ for 10 per cent of pupils). The Assisted Places
Scheme was abolished, as was Grant-Maintained status, but these schools did not
return to LEA control, with most becoming Foundation schools (see Chapter 7 for
details). Thus, a party committed to ‘standards not structures’ in education quickly
moved towards introducing a series of structural reforms in the areas of diversity of
provision and school admissions policies.
Diversity of provision
A series of reforms over the past decade have focussed on changes in school type
and governance away from the traditional Community school model. City Technology
Colleges, Specialist schools and now, Academies, all form part of this current policy
trend towards diversity of secondary school provision. The policy of diversity is seen to
simultaneously achieve two policy objectives: it is consistent with the right of parents
to educate their children according to their views and beliefs and it is a pre-requisite
of an effective education market where genuine diverse choice facilitates competition
between schools.
These policies – particularly the Specialist schools program – have altered schooling
in every local authority in England. However, the most radical changes have been
deliberately focussed on urban areas where schools were perceived to be failing. Most
Academies – publicly funded independent schools under private or voluntary manage-
ment that are allowed to select pupils – have been opened in disadvantaged urban
areas. In doing so, they have been introduced against the policy backdrop of Excel-
lence in Cities (funding targeted at pupils in schools located in disadvantaged areas)
and Education Action Zones (which allow some schools to work with business spon-
sors). However, West and Pennell (2002) argue these programs have done relatively
little to alter the urban schooling structure generated by the 1988 Education Reform
Act.
Experience in secondary schools for the pupils under analysis in this thesis is still
highly dependent on region and local authority. Almost all – 93 per cent – began
their secondary school careers in year 7 at age 11 (and the number of middle schools
has continued to decline since 2000) and most will continue in the same school until
age 16 or 18. Two-thirds will be educated in a Community (or Voluntary Controlled)
school that is controlled by the local authority. About 15 per cent will be in Voluntary
Aided (VA) schools that are mostly owned by churches or charities and control staffing,
capital spending and pupil admissions. Two-thirds of these are Roman Catholic and
the majority of the rest are Church of England. Around 16 per cent will be admitted to
Foundation schools, most of which are former Grant-Maintained schools. These schools
are usually officially owned by the Governing Body of the school, and again control
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staffing, capital spending and pupil admissions. Very small numbers of pupils are in
technically ‘independent’ state-funded City Technology Colleges or Academies, where
the local authority has no representation or monitoring function over the school.
School admissions codes
The Labour Government has introduced a series of legislative reforms to tighten the
rules regarding how schools and local authorities may allocate their places to pupils
each year. The 1998 School Standards and Framework Act established a new le-
gal framework of regulation for admissions along with a revised Code of Practice for
September 2000 admissions, designed to alleviate some of the problems arising from
a largely unregulated education market (Department for Education and Employment,
1999). The new measures created included a new Adjudicator position for resolving
local admissions disputes, as well as a prohibition on any new selection by ability in
schools other than by a process of ability banding (DfEE, 1999). The 1999 Code of
Practice stipulated that secular schools should not interview parents as part of their
admission process, and that religious schools should interview only to establish an ap-
plicant’s religious denomination and commitment, but there continued to be concern
that this right to interview was being used for the purposes of social selection. It
was under this admissions framework that the pupils in this study were admitted to
secondary school.
Concerns over the fairness of school admissions continued and so in 2003 a new Code
of Practice (Department for Education and Skills, 2003) was introduced with three
mutually reinforcing measures intended to regulate admissions authorities:
• the requirement to consult;
• the requirement to have regard to the published guidance; and
• the opportunity to object to the Schools Adjudicator.
The 2003 Code of Practice continued to give schools considerable discretion in deciding
their own over-subscription criteria, provided that they were lawful, impartial, pub-
licly known and geared towards providing all local children with a suitable education.
Schools were obliged to provide information and guidance for parents on admissions
procedures and oversubscription criteria. Schools and local authorities were not al-
lowed to apply criteria that had the effect of disadvantaging certain social groups. An
adjudication process exists as part of the code to resolve disputes and there are rights
of appeal to a Schools Adjudicator.
However, this Code was not legally binding on schools and so its success was mixed.
For example, the 2003 Code extended the interview ban to include children, except for
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boarding schools, but was unsuccessful in preventing the London Oratory (an inner
city Catholic school) from holding pre-admissions interviews with prospective pupils.
The quality of information provided by schools also failed to meet the requirement of
the Code. So, although schools should report the ‘number of places and applications for
those places in the previous year ’, Coldron et al. (2008) report that is was not possible
to tell if the school was over- or undersubscribed at 42 per cent of schools.
In February 2007, the new School Admissions Code came into force, with even greater
powers than either previous Code (Department for Education and Skills, 2007b). It
introduced a number of strong measures that admission authorities must, or should,
follow. Its requirements on admission authorities concerning such details as permissible
oversubscription criteria, the prohibition of giving higher priority to those who place a
school higher on their application form (usually referred to as first preference first) and
requirements to publish certain admissions information should significantly impact on
practice (Coldron et al., 2008).
The role of local authorities (LEAs were re-labelled LAs as part of the 2007 legisla-
tion) as co-ordinators has also simplified school admissions and prevented parents from
holding offers for places from more than one admissions authority, thus denying other
pupils places. They act as admissions co-ordinators who invite parents to express a
preference for a minimum number of 3 schools (with 27 per cent of LAs inviting 6 or 7
preferences). This information is used in one of two ways. For the 101 authorities that
use an equal preferences ranking system, the LA (or a pan-London body for the capi-
tal) asks all admissions authorities in the area to rank all parents who have expressed a
preference for their school in order of priority based on published oversubscription cri-
teria. A two-sided matching model known as the Gale-Shapley algorithm is employed
to reconcile the preferences of parents for schools with the ‘preferences’ of schools for
parents (Gale and Shapley, 1962).3 This is a complex procedure whereby parents are
given the best place possible for them, given the expressed preferences of others, in a
series of rounds. In the 47 authorities that still used a first preference first system (now
ruled out under the 2007 School Admissions Code), the authority asks schools to only
consider the first stated preference of the parents, and to firmly allocate places where
possible. Second preferences of parents are only considered where the first preference
cannot be met. This makes it imperative that the parent acts strategically to ensure
that they are highly likely to gain a place at their first preference school, since if they
do not, their second and third preference schools are likely to be already filled by other
parents who listed the school in first place.
Current knowledge about secondary school admissions is largely based on two surveys
of school admissions criteria and practices. Anne West and colleagues collected survey
3There is a large economics literature on the stability and efficiency of two-sided matching mecha-
nisms (see, for example, Roth, 1984).
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data on over 95 per cent of comprehensive schools for the 2001 cohort entry (West et al.,
2004). John Coldron and his team documented 2006 admissions for all state maintained
secondary schools (except CTCs and academies) (Coldron et al., 2008). From these
surveys it is known that twice as many schools now determine their own admissions as
did at the time of Education Reform Act: 30 per cent compared to 15 per cent in 1988
(West and Hind, 2003). Nevertheless, catchments or distance to school criteria have
roles of continuing significance in much of the country (Jowett, 1995; Mayet, 1996).
Typical oversubscription criteria cited by schools in the study of all comprehensive
schools by West et al. (2004) include siblings (mentioned by 96% of schools), distance
(86%), medical/social needs (73%), and catchment areas (61%).
Grammar schools remain in 43 LAs, 20 of which have over 10 per cent of places available
on the basis of ability selection. In addition, the 1998 Standards and Framework Act
allows schools to continue with pre-existing selection arrangements. Coldron et al.
(2008) found 10 ‘comprehensive’ schools that selected more than 10 per cent of their
intake. The number of school selecting 10 per cent of their intake on the basis of
‘aptitude’ for a subject has increased from 1.3 per cent in 2000, to 3 per cent in the
2001 admissions survey, to 4 per cent in a study of 2006 admissions. These partially
selective schools are mostly VA or Foundation schools with a Specialist status.
Aside from explicit ability selection, opportunities for more covert social selection did
exist in the 2001 and 2006 survey (and may still do so). They are described in more
detail in Chapter 5. For example, own-admission schools were far less likely to give
priority to children in public care, or children with medical or social needs for 2006
entry (Coldron et al., 2008). Four per cent of schools used criteria in 2006 relating
to ‘associated adults’ and 9 per cent refer to proof of parental commitment in such a
manner that would also now be unlawful.
Coldron et al. (2008) report that 29 per cent of non-Community schools were still
using supplementary forms in 2006. Pennell et al. (2007, page 1), in their survey
of London secondary schools, concluded that ‘the supplementary forms used by some
schools provide opportunities to select more desirable pupils’, with schools asking par-
ents to provide information that did not seem to be related to the school’s admissions
critieria (e.g. whether parents were living in bed and breakfast accommodation or par-
ents’ occupations). They were also concerned that the length of some forms and the
requirement, in some cases, that parents and children write extensively about their
reasons for wanting a place at the school, could systematically deter some parents or
carers from applying and such information could only be judged subjectively. The
2007 School Admissions Code now prohibits the use of supplementary forms which ask
any personal information that is not relevant to applying acceptable oversubscription
criteria.
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Having documented these continuing concerns about the fairness of school admissions,
it is easy to overstate the extent to which the current system of secondary school ad-
missions is in a state of flux and crisis. Coldron et al. (2008) report that 85 per cent
of parents gained their first expressed preference of secondary school in 2006, a similar
figure to 2000. In addition, just 5 per cent (8 per cent in the Flatley et al., 2001,
survey) of parents surveyed reported that there was another school they would have
liked their child to attend, but did not even apply to. Of course, patterns of satis-
faction with the current arrangements vary across the country and it is no surprise
that the percentage expressing satisfaction is lower at around 70 per cent in London.
It is generally lower in more urban areas and in areas with greater numbers of VA or
Foundation schools or Academies (Coldron et al., 2008). Where parents reported dis-
satisfaction, this generally focussed on the outcome of the admissions process, rather
than perceived unfairness in the process itself. This apparently high level of satis-
faction with current arrangements contrasts with a report in 1996, which highlighted
considerable difficulties in the management of the process of choice, with many par-
ents feeling dissatisfied with both the process and the outcomes (Audit Commission,
1996). It is not clear whether the system has actually significantly improved, whether
parental expectations have adapted, or whether the sampling strategy and questioning
is responsible for these apparent rises in parental satisfaction with school choice.
Chapter 2
Sources of data
This chapter provides details of the data sources used throughout the thesis. A cohort
of 2005 school leavers, taken from the National Pupil Database (NPD), is central to
all empirical analysis in these chapters. It is supplemented by other datasets for three
main purposes:
1. Small area statistics are attached to each child’s postcode or output area as
indicators of the type of street or area the child lives in. These are intended to
proxy for the socio-economic circumstances of the pupil’s family, given the lack
of good variables for pupils’ social background in the National Pupil Database.
2. Variables describing the historical and current characteristics of the local author-
ity or county the pupil lives in are used as descriptive statistics and as control
variables in regression analysis.
3. Surveys detailing school governance and admissions policies supplement the main
dataset as explanatory variables of interest.
The remainder of the chapter describes each data source in turn. These are summarised
in Table 2.1.
2.1 National Pupil Database
The main source of data in this thesis is the Department for Children, Schools and
Families’ (DCSF) National Pupil Database. This administrative dataset combines
attainment data for pupils in Key Stage tests at ages 7, 11, 14 and 16 with a limited
range of pupil characteristics, collected from maintained schools via an electronic return
that includes named pupil records in January each year (since 2002, and termly from
2007 onwards).
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Table 2.1: Summary of data sources
Source Unit of observation
DCSF National Pupil Database (2005 school leavers,
linked to 2003 KS3 tests and 2000 KS2 tests in primary
school)
Pupil
Indices of Deprivation 2004 Output area
ACORNTM indicators of household type Output area
Office for National Statistics Census of Population 2001 Output area
DCSF Annual Schools Census (1999 to 2005) Secondary school
DCSF Register of Educational Establishments (EduBase)
(2004, 2005)
Secondary school
Grant-Maintained Schools Database Secondary school
2001 survey of secondary school admissions policies Secondary school
2005 English Church Census Local authority
1851 Census of Religious Worship Ancient counties
1851-1961 Survey of religious affiliations Ancient counties
It is a statutory requirement on schools to submit this information under section 537A
of The Education Act 1996 since it forms the basis for allocating funding to local
authorities and schools. Its status as a statutory process means there are not significant
ethical issues surrounding parental consent for collection of the data since it is not
sought by schools. However, DCSF makes modifications to the database to ensure
that researchers cannot identify individual children. This includes removing full names,
recoding the Unique Pupil Number with a Pupil Matching Reference, replacing date
of birth with month of birth, and restricting access to the pupil postcode field.
Pupil data are collected to identify gender, date of birth (month of birth is used), name,
ethnic group, first language, special educational needs (SEN) categorisation, eligibility
for free school meals (FSM), home postcode and status as a boarder or part-timer.
Sweeps from years 8, 9 and 11 are used in this thesis. Key statistics for the main
variables from the year 11 sweep are shown in Table 2.2
The pupil postcode can be used to place each pupil’s home address on an Ordnance
Survey (OS) grid location to within 1 metre of the mean postcode position and within
100 metres of the pupil’s home address. This provides a relatively precise measure of
where the pupil lives, relative to where they attend school.
Pupil postcodes also enabled small area data to be attached to the child’s street or
immediate neighbourhood, as described in the next section. The All Fields Postcode
Directory provides codes for statistical areas which are used to merge these data (Of-
fice for National Statistics, 2004). The smallest statistical area is called an output
area (OA), which contains approximately 150 households (an average of less than 4
cohort pupils). OAs are non-overlapping geographical areas which are generated by a
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Table 2.2: Key pupil variables in NPD
Variable Number of pupils Proportion
Female 573, 227 49.6%
FSM 570, 949 13.3%
SEN statement 570, 828 2.5%
SEN action 570, 828 9.3%
SEN action plus 570, 828 4.1%
English not mother tongue 569, 841 7.4%
Ethnicity white British 570, 951 83.3%
Ethnicity asian Indian 570, 951 2.3%
Ethnicity asian Pakistani 570, 951 2.3%
Ethnicity asian Bangladeshi 570, 951 0.9%
Ethnicity black African 570, 951 1.5%
Ethnicity black Caribbean 570, 951 1.5%
14 ethnicity indicators in total and 14 age indicators
computer so that, as far as possible, they are wholly contained within the 2002 ward
boundaries and minimise geographical area covered. OAs are combined (typically five)
to create ‘lower-layer super output areas’ (Lower SOA) with a mean population figure
of 1500 (an average of 17 cohort pupils). These can be again be combined to create
‘middle-layer super output areas’ (Middle SOA) containing an average of 78 cohort
pupils. These statistical areas are more appropriate to use for analysis than wards,
districts or counties because their boundaries are permanently fixed and they contain
similar sized populations.
In theory, inaccuracies and missing data should not be a major issue in the dataset.
However, they arise for four main reasons. First, although it is a duty of schools to
ensure they find out the Unique Pupil Number for new children joining the school,
in practice some schools use newly issued or temporary numbers that make matching
prior attainment data impossible. Second, individual fields such as the pupil postcode
or child’s ethnicity can be missing, and again this is most likely in children who have
recently moved schools. Third, Key Stage attainment data will be missing where a
child did not sit a particular test, as discussed below. Fourth, Key Stage attainment
data will also missing for children who have spent time out of the state maintained
system because they were abroad or in private schools.
These administrative datasets are usually described as populations, rather than sam-
ples, meaning that no discussion of sampling technique and validity is needed. How-
ever, large groups of pupils are either missing or dropped from the analysis. Most
importantly, data on private school pupils is not used in any analysis in the thesis.
These pupils do appear in NPD on each occasion that the pupil takes a nationally ad-
ministered test (i.e. KS4, KS5 and other Key Stages for a sub-set of private schools).
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However, private schools do not submit pupil-level records as part of the annual census
of schools, so NPD lacks almost all pupil background indicators. This is a clearly an
issue in the analysis of school choice since parents who have exercised the choice to
attend a private school are ignored, even though they may have actively sought, and
failed to gain, a place at a particular state school.
Other pupils are included in NPD, but are excluded from the analysis chapters. Pupils
in non-standard secondary education (special schools, hospital schools, detention cen-
tres) are never included in analysis. In addition, the analysis of sorting of pupils into
schools excludes the very small number of pupils who are registered as borders and
pupils on the Isles of Scilly and Wight where no pupils make daily journeys to the
mainland.
2.1.1 Key Stage test data
Pupils in maintained schools are statutorily assessed, using national tests, at the end
of three Key Stages (KS) at ages 7, 11 and 14. They are awarded a level on a scale
of 1 to 8 plus ‘exceptional performance’ on each occasion, with expected performance
rising from levels 1 to 3 at KS1, levels 2 to 5 at KS2, and levels 3 to 8 at KS3. Analysis
in this thesis uses data from KS2 and KS3 (matched KS1 data was not available for
this cohort). In addition, all pupils in the dataset have taken national GCSE tests at
age 16 (also known as KS4).
The expectation is that all pupils will take all Key Stage tests, but approximately 10%
of pupils have some missing data. A minority of pupils are exempt from a test because
they are working at a level below that assessed by the tests, or they are disapplied
(exempt from the National Curriculum under Section 364 or 365 of the 1996 Education
Act). A larger group of pupils will miss one or more subject tests. Rather than lose
these pupils from the analysis, their missing scores are imputed where possible, using
a single inputation method, using test score information from the other test papers
that they sat in the same subject. A further group of pupils will have taken the tests
but will not have been assigned a level because they only achieved a very low score.
However, their mark on the paper is available and so an approximately equivalent level
is imputed.
The prior attainment of pupils on entry to secondary schools is measured using Key
Stage 2 (KS2) test scores in maths, English and science. These are sat in primary
school at age 11, so scores are independent of secondary school effectiveness. Infor-
mation on levels and marks achieved by pupils are available, so the mark data are
re-calibrated as fractional equivalent of levels to produce three continuous prior at-
tainment variables. This re-calibration takes place by identifying the lowest mark for
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each level and applying a linear recalculation of level for all pupils within each level.
For example, if the lowest test scores for level 4 and 5 are 45 and 65 marks respectively,
a pupil with 55 marks will be assigned a level 4.5.
Key Stage 3 (KS3) test data are also available in maths, English and science, and a
similar process is used to re-calibrate the marks data into fractional equivalent levels.
This process is slightly more complicated as pupils are entered into different tiered
papers depending on the expected achievement. The range of marks at each level
therefore varies for each of the tiered papers.
Pupil achievement in GCSE exams (KS4) is summarised by the total points achieved
by pupils over their best 8 GCSE/GNVQ or equivalent examinations. The GCSE
exam is graded from A* (58 points) to G (16 points), with 6 point increments between
grades. The typical pupil achieves around 4 Cs and 4 Ds. In addition, grades achieved
in maths, English (language) and science (best science score across any exam) are used.
Data for all these Key Stage tests is summarised in Table 2.3. These pupils sat KS2
in the year 2000, KS3 in 2003 and GCSEs in 2005.
Table 2.3: Key pupil test score variables
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
KS2 English score 552,375 4.374 0.861 0.000 6.000
KS2 maths score 551,899 4.377 0.878 0.000 6.000
KS2 science score 551,904 4.662 0.701 0.083 6.000
KS2 total z-score 552,213 0.000 1.000 −6.011 2.055
KS3 English score 560,721 5.401 1.254 0.000 8.000
KS3 maths score 562,018 5.858 1.342 0.000 8.981
KS3 science score 561,981 5.512 1.088 0.000 8.000
KS3 total z-score 559,111 0.000 1.000 −4.641 2.405
GCSE English score 573,227 4.543 1.870 0.000 8.000
GCSE maths score 573,227 4.288 1.966 0.000 8.000
GCSE science score 573,227 4.218 2.016 0.000 8.000
GCSE capped score 573,227 290.604 105.379 0.000 540.000
GCSE capped z-score 573,227 0.000 1.000 −2.758 2.367
2.2 Indicators of pupil family background
The socio-economic circumstances of the child’s family – including household income,
parental education and occupation – is central to the analysis in this thesis since it is a
key determinant of child’s educational achievement and degree of choice of secondary
school. This section describes the relative merits of the alternative measures of family
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background used in the thesis.
2.2.1 Free school meals eligibility
The main drawback of using NPD is that it does not provide a good indicator of the
socio-economic status of the child: the only available metric within the dataset is the
child’s eligibility for free school meals (FSM), an indicator of low income. Children are
classified as ‘eligible’ for FSM only if they are both eligible for and claiming FSM. It
is intended to proxy for low income since eligibility is contingent upon the family re-
ceiving other benefits/tax credits, such as Income Support, Income Based-Job Seeker’s
Allowance and Child Tax Credits.
However, according to Hobbs and Vignoles (2007), there is a poor relationship between
FSM ‘eligibility’ and net household income. They find that only 23-55% of the 16%
of children ‘eligible’ for FSM are in the bottom 16% of the distribution of household
income in 2004/5. This is principally because the receipt of means-tested benefits (and
tax credits) pushes children eligible for FSM up the income distribution. There is also
a concern that the pupil’s probability of applying for FSM eligibility status depends,
in part, on the culture of the school (Croxford, 2000).
2.2.2 Indices of Deprivation and ACORN housing types
Two deprivation indices are attached to the Lower SOA for each pupil to proxy for
the child’s socio-economic circumstances. These are important additional indicators
of SES, given that FSM is an imperfect measure of income and cannot distinguish
between the large majority of pupils who are not FSM eligible.
The two continuous measures of a deprivation used are the Index of Deprivation 2004
and the Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI) (The Office of the
Deputy Prime Minister, 2004). They were produced by the Social Disadvantage Re-
search Centre at the University of Oxford to update the Indices of Multiple Deprivation
2000.
The Index of Deprivation 2004 is a Super Output Area (Lower SOA) level measure of
multiple deprivation and is made up of seven Domain Indices which relate to:
• income deprivation;
• employment deprivation;
• health deprivation and disability;
• education, skills and training deprivation;
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• barriers to housing and services;
• living environment deprivation; and
• crime.
The IDACI measure of income deprivation affecting children is a sub-domain of the
education, skills and training deprivation domain. Both these indices are imperfect
indicators of the child’s social background to the extent that they measure average
social characteristics of households in the SOA. There is a specific problem with this in
the context of choice and sorting analysis, which is why they are not used in Chapters 4
and 5. For example, the presence of a faith school in a town might allow a church-going
family to purchase a less expensive house in the catchment area for a Community
school with a deprived intake, knowing that their children would attend the faith
school. Geo-demographic data are therefore likely to systematically underestimate the
socio-economic characteristics of this family, thus biasing all parameters of interest in
sorting models.
In addition to the deprivation indices, 57 dummy variables indicating household type
are included as control variables in pupil achievement models. These ACORN (acronym
for A Classification Of Residential Neighborhoods) dummies were devised by CACI
Limited as a means of classifying areas according to various Census characteristics.
These are attached directly to the child’s postcode, thus being more disaggregated
than the deprivation indices. They have been shown to explain a significant proportion
of the variance in pupil achievement at GCSE (Webber and Butler, 2007). However,
because they are produced by an organisation who will not describe their construction
for commercial reasons, there has been little independent academic evaluation of their
validity or appropriateness for use in analysis.
2.2.3 2001 Census of Population
Both the deprivation indices and the ACORN indicators are principally variables de-
rived from data collected as part of the 2001 Census of Population. In addition, local
authority level data are extracted directly from census returns to facilitate additional
analysis. In Chapter 4 the population density of the area, the proportion of families
that are lone parent households and the proportion of families where no parent is em-
ployed are used. In Chapter 8 the proportion of the population reporting that they
are Christian, Hindu, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist and Sikh are used as control variables
because other religious sources are restricted to Christian denominations.
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2.3 Annual Schools Census and Register of Educational
Establishments
The secondary schools in this analysis are named in the Register of Educational Es-
tablishments and are classified in terms of their school governance, religious affiliation,
selective policy (indicating the 164 grammar schools), and sex of intake. The Annual
Schools Census also provides information on school size, aggregate pupil characteristics
and basic staffing information from which the pupil-teacher ratio can be calculated.
The school postcode is used to give each school easting and northing OS grid references.
School governance and religious affiliation are summarised in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Governance of religious schools
Non-religious Religious Total
Academy 10 4 14
CTCs 14 0 14
Community 1961 0 1961
Foundation 492 9 501
Voluntary-Aided 42 480 522
Voluntary-Controlled 55 38 93
Total 2574 531 3105
Academies and City Technology Colleges are not specifically analysed in this thesis
since they are few in number and the Academies program was very new at the time
these pupils started secondary school. Voluntary Controlled secondary schools are also
relatively few in number, and are often grouped with Community schools in analysis
since they do not control their own admissions.
A detailed description of the institutional differences between Community schools,
Foundation schools and Voluntary-Aided schools can be found in Chapter 7 (Founda-
tion schools) and Chapter 8 (Voluntary-Aided schools).
2.4 Grant-Maintained Schools Database
The Grant-Maintained Schools Database is used in Chapter 7 to extract voting data
from the 1990s for all schools who held a parental ballot to opt-out of local authority
control. The database was compiled by the Department for Education and is now
archived in the National Digital Archive of Datasets. It provides details of all GM
status ballots taken by schools, and the outcomes of these ballots. It also gives details
of major changes to the status of GM schools, such as requests to change admissions
policy or introduce a sixth form.
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Table 2.5 shows that around one quarter of secondary schools in existence today held
a parental ballot in the 1990s. One-in-six achieved independence from local authority
control, including just over 10% of schools which had lost their first parental ballot to
opt out and held a second or third re-ballot.
Table 2.5: Schools in Grant-Maintained schools database
Won vote Lost Never
first time first vote took vote
Number of pupils 111,840 47,541 413,846
Number of schools 618 233 2,257
Won subsequent re-ballot 10.8%
Table 2.6 shows the current governance of former Grant-Maintained schools. The
majority were designated with the new Foundation status, but those who were formally
Voluntary-Aided status were able to revert back to this status.
Table 2.6: Governance of secondary school GM vote winners and losers
Final GM Final GM GM ballot
ballot won ballot lost never taken
Grammar 94 8 70
CTC/Academy 0 0 14
Community (non-grammar) 12 162 1750
Foundation (non-grammar) 404 1 22
Voluntary-aided (non-grammar) 133 26 331
Voluntary-controlled (non-grammar) 0 11 69
Total 643 208 2256
2.5 West 2001 school admissions survey
A survey of school admissions criteria used by state maintained secondary schools for
pupils entering year 11 in September 2001 was carried out by Anne West and others
at LSE. A database was created with details of admissions criteria used by 95 per cent
of comprehensive secondary schools in England and was made available in electronic
format. LEA and school admissions brochures were used as the principle source of
information for the study. The pupils analysed in this thesis actually began secondary
school one year earlier, in September 2000. However, there were no major changes in
admissions policies across England and the website of the Schools Adjudicator confirms
that no schools applied for major changes to their admissions during this period.
Full details of the survey and its main findings can be found in West et al. (2004).
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In this thesis these data are principally used in Chapter 5 to look at the association
between school admissions criteria and pupil sorting. The dataset is also used to
supplement incomplete data on levels of selection in former Grant-Maintained schools,
as documented in the Grant-Maintained schools database.
2.6 Church attendance data
This section describes the three sources of information regarding the historical and
current religious composition of the population in England. These data are principally
used in Chapter 8 as explanatory variables to predict the supply of religious schools
across England, and also as control variables in analysis.
2.6.1 1851 Census of Religious Worship for Great Britain
The 1851 Census of Religious Worship for Great Britain was taken alongside the pop-
ulation census and an educational census on the night of Mothering Sunday (30th
March). It was the first census of its kind to ask British churches of all denominations
to report their number of places of worship, sittings (space in church) and levels of
attendance at worship that Sunday. Data from this census are used in Chapter 8 to de-
scribe the historical sizes of the Anglican, Catholic and non-conformists denominations
at a time when mass education was being established.
Data from the Religious Census were summarised by registration district, of which
there were 4,542 in Great Britain, and deposited electronically on the National Digital
Archive of Data by Paul Ell as part of his doctoral work whilst at the University of
Leicester and University of Birmingham. This data deposit provides users with the
uncorrected figures, as originally published by Mann in the Census of Great Britain
1851 (1960).
There are serious concerns regarding the accuracy of the census, which partially ex-
plains why the process was not repeated until recently (Pickering, 1967). The data are
subject to serious measurement error because some churches failed to return surveys
(and some returned more than one) and attendance is a poor measure of size of the con-
gregation (in non-conformists congregations it was particularly common for members
to attend twice on Sunday, thus inflating the congregation size statistics). Neverthe-
less, despite these data quality issues it is able to provide a rough description of the
relative size of religious groups across Great Britain in the mid-19th century.
In Chapter 8, the dataset is aggregated to ancient county level and the relative sizes of
the denominations are described across areas. Although there are adjusted statistics
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of congregation size available from historians, the uncorrected figures as calculated by
Ell directly from the Census are used.
2.6.2 1851 to 1961 survey of religious affiliation
The main source of historical religious population information is a survey of the UK
between 1851 and 1966, collated by M. Hechter of the University of Washington and
deposited in the UK Data Archive at the University of Essex (Hechter, 1976). The pur-
pose of the original survey was to collect social, demographic, electoral and linguistic
data for each of the 118 British and Irish counties (now known as ancient counties). His
sources included data from general elections, population censuses and other published
survey sources.1
Variables used in Chapter 8 describe the proportion of the ancient county population
who are Church of England, non-conformist or Roman Catholic. These are reported
once every 10 years, from 1851 to 1961 (excluding 1941). These data are used as
background to describe the growth and decline of church attendance across regions
and denominations. In addition, the variable indicating levels of Catholic affiliation
in 1931 is used as an instrument to predict the modern-day distribution of Catholic
secondary schools in England.
2.6.3 2005 English Church Census
The most recent English Church Census was carried out by Christian Research (with
support from the University of Manchester) in 2005. It is a survey of church attendance
over the weekend of the 7th/8th May across all Christian denominations. Church
leaders were asked to fill in questionnaires detailing type of Christian denomination
and mission, the size, age and ethnicity profile of the congregation present, and the
types of activities the church is currently engaged in.
These modern English Church Censuses from 1979 onwards have presented an overall
picture of quite dramatic decline in church attendance in England, with just 6% of the
population estimated to have been at church over the weekend in question in 2005.
The data are summarised by local authority in Brierley (2006), and is used in the
thesis as descriptive and control variables in Chapter 8.
1The quality of these data was evaluated by Derek Unwin of the University of Bergen in 1977 and
his comments are available in the UK Data Archive. He notes that the religious data should be ‘treated
with caution’ because there appears to be significant variation in church attendance levels over time.
Chapter 3
Models of parental choice of
school
The next three chapters provide explanations as to why English secondary schools
are socially stratified, with children from socially disadvantaged backgrounds unevenly
distributed across schools. There are two distinct potential causes of stratification
arising from the supply of, and demand for, school places:
1. schools use overt admissions policies, such as selection by ability or religious
adherence, or more covert procedures to ‘cream-skim’ more able or easier to
teach pupils;
2. the actions of parents from different social backgrounds somehow lead to differ-
ences in how school choice and house location decisions are made.
Investigating the former suggestion that schools are incentivised to cream-skim as a
result of institutional structures and the nature of demand for school places requires
a detailed discussion of the nature of the utility function for the various agents in
schools; this is set aside until the analysis of competition in Chapter 6. The purpose
of this chapter is to examine the theoretical basis for arguing that parental school
choice strategies differ by social background and the implications of this for developing
models of school choice to predict levels of school stratification.
The observation that parents’ school choice strategies differ by social class can be
witnessed and measured across different types of institutional settings. For example,
studies of the impact of the 1988 Education Reform Act showed that families already
advantaged were more likely to gain places at desirable schools than disadvantaged
families (Conway, 1997; Levacˇic´ and Hardman, 1998; Reay, 1998). Burgess and Briggs
(2006) show that free school meals eligible pupils attend worse schools than pupils not
eligible for free school meals who live in the same street. In the US, Hastings et al.
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(2006) have shown that low income families are less likely to exercise choice in a public
school lottery system. And of course, where choice is only possible through house
moves in a strict neighbourhood schooling system, it has been shown that children
from low income and less-educated backgrounds experience poorer than average school
peer groups (Black, 1998; Bayer and McMillan, 2005).
However, these empirical observations contribute little to our understanding of why this
relationship between school choice and social class exists. Without an understanding of
the household decision-making processes that contribute to this differential behaviour,
researchers cannot predict the magnitude of the change in sorting that is likely to result
from a particular policy implementation, with the result that it is not possible to devise
the optimal policies that are likely to be successful in lowering social segregation and
increasing educational equity.
The first part of this chapter draws on the English sociological choice literature, de-
veloped within a post-structuralist tradition, to describe how the middle classes and
working classes interact with the school choice process. This is a descriptively rich
literature that illustrates the complexities involved in the way choice is offered, un-
derstood and actualised within families, and its claims are largely backed by small
scale qualitative and larger scale surveys of parents. However, it is not able to make
strong predictive claims about the effect of policy on stratification. This is because,
while it can demonstrate how working class families are disadvantaged in the English
system, it has no means of assessing whether they are better or worse off than un-
der policy counterfactuals such as strict catchment area systems versus more radical
reform programs.
By contrast, economists are particularly well-equipped to build theoretical models to
predict the effect of policy changes. The next part of the chapter introduces gen-
eral equilibrium models of household decision-making, first under a neighbourhood
schooling model and then with various school choice programs. Compared to the rich
post-structuralist accounts of the household behaviour, these models appear overly
simplistic: they do not necessarily contradict post-structuralist models, they simply
ignore most of the nuanced descriptions of behaviour. These models tend to suggest
that (some) lower income families benefit from choice reforms (at least they do so more
than wealthy families), but this is an almost trivial claim since the models tend to rely
on the income constraint of families as the main variable for producing stratification
in the neighbourhood schooling system.
The chapter goes on to evaluate the extent to which economic models that bear little
resemblance to how parents actually make choices may lead to incorrect inferences.
Box (1979) famously said: ‘all models are wrong, but some are useful ’. The extent to
which simplifications might pose a problem depends entirely on the research questions
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demanded of the model. One general consequence of simplification is omitting key
parameters so that the models, when calibrated with real data, might lead to biased
estimates of the parameters in the utility function (Goldstein and Pauly, 1981). More
seriously though, there must be a concern that certain modelling simplifications and
unrealistic underlying assumptions will produce incorrect inferences as to the direc-
tional effect of changes in school admissions on stratification.
In its evaluation of the current general equilibrium of school choice literature, this chap-
ter argues that it is of little use in assessing whether recent choice-based reforms in
England are likely to be successful in altering the sorting of pupils into schools. Specif-
ically, economists (such as Hoxby, 2003a; Burgess et al., 2005b) who make predictive
claims that choice must lower school stratification because it removes constraints from
the low income families who are most constrained by a neighbourhood school model
are doing so only contingent on a narrow set of assumptions within very reduction-
ist theoretical models drawn from a literature with little applicability to the English
choice system.
The chapter concludes by describing how economists might proceed in terms of creat-
ing models of English-style school choice that could usefully predict how the system
might respond to policy interventions. It emphasises how different the English school
admissions system is to current economic models of choice: partly because parents are
forced to purchase a home in the presence of considerable uncertainty about the out-
come of a subsequent school admissions process, and partly because of the widespread
prevalence of over-subscription criteria that are based on individual attributes such as
religious adherence and child’s ability.
3.1 Post-structuralist models of parental choice
The purpose of this section is to provide a rich description of how the social class of
families shapes the manner by which they interact with the school choice process. The
sociological literature on parental choice, as developed by Pierre Bourdieu, Stephen
Ball, Diane Reay and others, is capable of doing this, using small-scale qualitative
studies for the purpose of building and illustrating theories of choice and social class.
Although certainly not individualist in its approach, it is a particularly useful literature
for economists to read and incorporate into their models of decision-making. This
is because, while it recognises that individuals are thoroughly embedded in social
relations, it accepts that actual behaviour takes place at the level of individual actions.
So, the research tends to focus on the ‘micropractices of social reproduction, and on the
situated enactment of class skills, resources, dispositions, attitudes and expectations’
(Ball, 2003a, page 3).
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Social class, as an attribute of individuals that is distinct from income and educa-
tion level, is not a description widely used in economics, but it is central to the
post-structuralist literature summarised here. There is a degree of fuzziness in the
categorisation of class. Ball describes his focus as being class as ‘an identity and a
lifestyle, and a set of perspectives on the social world and relationships in it ’ (Ball,
2003a, page 6). However, in the empirical work described below, class positions are
analogous with social relations in economic life or, more specifically, from employment
relations. So, the classification of social class is consistent with Goldthorpe’s theory
and measurement of social class, i.e. working class means blue collar or routine service
sector jobs and middle class means skilled non-manual work (Goldthorpe, 2000).
3.1.1 Middle class advantage in school choice processes
An important part of class analysis is the Bourdieu framework of analysis that holds
that each new choice is confronted with assets or capital (economic, social and cultural)
to be exchanged or invested (Bourdieu, 1986). Thus, middle class advantage in the
school choice process comes via economic capital (advantage in terms of financial assets
and income); social capital (the social networks relied upon to inform school choice
decisions) and cultural capital (the attitudes and knowledge, defined by those in power,
which makes the education system a comfortable familiar place in which they can
succeed easily). The key claim of the sociological literature is that social reproduction
– the maintenance of power and privilege between social classes from one generation
to the next – lies at the heart of middle-class existence (Savage et al., 1992); and
that:
The market works as a class strategy by creating a mechanism which can be
exploited by the middle class as a strategy of reproduction in their search
for relative advantage, social advancement and mobility.
(Ball, 1993, page 117)
The middle classes clearly have many advantages in non-choice systems of school allo-
cation, and this post-structuralist literature does not attempt to measure the advan-
tages of the middle class in choice systems relative to non-choice alternatives. Instead
they provide a description of the two processes that lead to middle class advantage
over working class families within a choice-based system. First is the suggestion that
choice has different meanings in different class contexts because it is a socially and
culturally constructed phenomena (Gewirtz et al., 1995). This means that families of
different social class backgrounds engage in the choice process differently. Second, and
building on the first argument, the choice mechanism that exists in England has been
constructed in such a way that it requires time, effort, expense and skill; i.e.:
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[Resources and capital] that are unevenly distributed across the population
but with which the middle class are particularly well endowed. The educa-
tion market with all its risks is well accommodated to the dispositions and
interests of the middle class.
(Ball, 2003a, page 173)
Thus, this literature recognises that choice policies do not emerge from a social vacuum,
and Ball (2003a) argues that these education policies are developed by the middle class
to pursue their own advantage and interest.
A good example of this is how the middle class draw on their skills and social capital
to gain information on school performance and admissions policies. This is not just
through informal social networks. West and Pennell (1999) show that high socio-
economic groups appear to have better information on, and understanding of school
performance via league tables. Coldron et al. (2008) also report a social gradient in
terms of the use of formal sources of information regarding schools. Mothers who had
qualifications at level 4 or higher (degree level) were found to be three times as likely to
use formal sources as those who had no qualifications. Also, families with parents who
were in employment were more likely to use formal sources than either lone parent
families or two-parent families where one or both parents did not work. They also
report that internet access was important to a family’s ability to access information
about schools, which may place lower income families at a disadvantage in the process.
Overall though, the most highly valued information was obtained informally, through
school visits and talking to other parents and staff. Thus, parents with stronger social
networks were more likely to gain more useful information about local school quality
and admissions.
Coldron et al. also document the explicit means by which the cultural, social and
economic capital of a family can be used to maximise chances of securing a place
at a preferred school. They report that 8% of parents with children now at state
maintained secondary schools admitted to coaching children for entrance tests; 5%
reported ensuring their child was in the correct feeder primary school; 4% reported
paying for extra tuition; 4% reported arranging extra-curricular activities; 3% reported
moving or renting a house in the correct catchment area; 1% reported joining a church
or place of worship; and 1% reported asking someone with influence in the process to
recommend the child.
3.1.2 Middle class judgements of school quality
The middle class are not just characterised as being advantaged in the process of secur-
ing a place at a good school, they also have a very specific notion of what constitutes
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‘good’, and this is crucial to understanding why markets are likely to become stratified.
Ball characterises middle class choice as being dominated by maximising the child’s
likely exam results where ‘the school is not represented as an independent variable with
qualities of its own separate from its intake’ (Ball, 2003a, page 169). In other words,
they have a narrow conception of quality as being analogous with expected test scores,
and believe that the quality of school largely depends on the school peer group, almost
irrespective of the quality of instruction.
The characteristics of a child’s peer group at school have been shown to be an impor-
tant input into an education production function, that also includes teacher quality, the
quality of the headteacher and the financial resources or assets of the school (Robertson
and Symons, 2003; Dills, 2005; Ammermueller and Pischke, 2006).1 The interpreta-
tion of a ‘peer effect’ need not be restricted to the direct impact of a child and their
family on other children’s education achievement: we may also think that resources
such as teacher or headteacher quality are sorted among schools according to school
composition. Thus, a family seeking to maximise their child’s achievement will, ceteris
paribus, seek the school with the superior peer group. They may also be using the ob-
served peer group of the school as a proxy for school quality given a complex education
production function. This would be consistent with the observation that consumers in
markets for complex goods and services over-rely upon simple accessible signals.
Survey evidence shows that parents report valuing qualities of schools beyond the basic
peer characteristics of the school. However, from a modelling perspective, proxying
parental perceptions of school quality using peer characteristics may be sufficient if
the correlation between the two is reasonably high. Furthermore, it is important to
interpret all of the reported surveys somewhat cautiously because survey responses
may not give an accurate estimate of parents’ true preferences. For example, stated
preferences may be altered to fit social norms, emphasising a high value for education
quality and child’s happiness and potentially downplaying concerns for a school’s social
and racial composition.
There is considerable variation between the different studies in the responses of par-
ents, as shown in Table 3.1, although proximity, discipline, exam results and child’s
preferences all regularly feature. The variation in responses is, perhaps, not surprising
as the studies differed considerably in their methods. For example, some asked parents
to choose reasons from lists while others used open interviews; the social class make-
up and geographical location of the samples were different; they were carried out at
different points in time, and so on. It is noteworthy that the most recent survey claims
few parents (36% of all those who looked at performance tables) report an interest in
value-added scores, arguably the most accurate published measure of school quality
1Ammermueller and Pischke (2006) estimate primary rather than secondary school peer effects, but
the study is of interest because it distinguishes between school and classroom level effects.
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(Coldron et al., 2008). The majority (80% of all those who looked at performance
tables) are interested in the GCSE/A-level results of the school, even though the over-
whelming determinant of these is not the quality of instruction but instead is prior
attainment of intake and therefore the quality of peers.
3.1.3 The complexity and risk of choice for the middle class
Although the sociological studies claim the market favours the middle class, they also
report a pessimistic view of the process of choice from this group. By constructing
a belief that a child’s educational success is crucial to their maintenance of social
position, and in believing that educational success is largely determined by school peer
group quality, the risks for the middle class associated with choosing an inappropriate
school might be low probability but high consequence.
The risk in the choice process emerges from 3 sources:
• the risk from probability of not securing school of choice;
• uncertainty about actual school quality; and
• risk/uncertainty about the child’s likely outcome within that setting.
Much of this risk arises because:
Knowledge is increasingly indeterminate and contingent. Complete and
completely reliable information may be an impossibility in human process-
ing institutions, and the perceived adequacy or reliability of information
available both undermines parents’ trust of pay and expert actors and ex-
acerbates anxieties.
(Ball, 2003b, page 166)
He describes this as leading ‘to a collecting, sifting, advertising and hearsay. In a
sense, all information is considered but none, or almost none, is trusted ’ (Ball, 2003b,
page 167).
Thus, the economics perspective that individuals can calculate expected school quality
based on a set of known probabilities is perhaps unrealistic, even as a representation
of middle class decision-making. Crook argues that ‘information overload leads to
arbitrariness and necessary imcompleteness of even the most assiduous individual risk
calculation’ (Crook, 1999, page 180). Because it is not clear what the ‘right’ choice
is, for middle-class families school choice is ‘a matter of uneasy compromises. Indeed,
there is currently a kind of moral panic around schooling and school choice, particularly
in metropolitan settings’ (Ball, 2003b, page 165).
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Table 3.1: UK surveys of parents regarding choice of school
Author Sample Findings
Elliott (1982) Ex-post interviews with
parents at one secondary
school
Proximity (1st); children given an im-
portant say (2nd); providing a bal-




216 Inner London par-
ents
Proximity (33%); reputation (31%); re-
lations went there (29%); good disci-
pline (23%)
Alston (1985) Ex-ante interviews with
Inner London parents in
primary schools
Child’s view (65%); proximity (53%);





Large scale ex-post sur-
vey across 4 LEAs




Ex-ante survey with list
of 4 items
Thought child would be happiest there
(1st); child’s preference (2nd); disci-




Ex-ante survey of 222
families asked for most
important factor
Proximity (32%); sibling attends
(16%); friends attending (15%); child’s
choice (10%); best educationally (10%)
Hunter (1991) Ex-post interviews with
Inner London parents
Good discipline (47%); proximity






Child’s choice (71%); good discipline





70 Inner London parents




Ex-post and ex-ante sur-
veys of c. 3,000 parents
Academic outcomes (43%); siblings or
proximity (40%); child’s choice (31%);
ethos (15%); quality of staff (14%); fa-
cilities (13%); behaviour (10%)
Bradley and
Taylor (2007)
Ex-post (yr 9) interviews
with c. 3% of secondary
aged pupils
Views of family and friends (66%);
school’s location (63%); exam perfor-




of 2,215 parents in 59
schools.
Good reputation/Ofsted (40%); good
exam results (33%); child’s choice
(31%); sibling goes there (28%); facil-
ities are good (22%); friends are going
there (20%); local school (20%); disci-
pline/behaviour (19%)
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3.1.4 Working class values and school choice
By contrast, according to Reay and Ball, ‘working-class patterns of educational choice
are characterised by ambivalence, and appear to be as much about the avoidance of
anxiety, failure and rejection as they are about choosing a good school for my child ’
(Reay and Ball, 1997, page 93). There are two parts to this argument. First, the am-
bivalence is consistent with working class families viewing their child’s characteristics
as ‘fixed’ and not susceptible to school effects. According to the school effectiveness
literature there exists variation in school quality of the order of 8-15% of total variance
in attainment (Reynolds, 1992, page 70), which means this perception is incorrect.
However, the working class probably underestimate the extent to which school mat-
ters only as much as the middle class may overstate its importance in determining
educational success.
The second part of the argument emphasises the contradictions and compromises in
making choices because of the potential negative consequences of entering a middle
class school.
Such choices could set working-class children to fail in individualised, pub-
licly humiliating ways in predominantly middle-class, high-achieving schools
as opposed to the more masked, shared processes through which they fail
(or are relatively successful) in local, inner city comprehensives.
(Reay and Ball, 1997, page 97)
Rather than choosing popular, high reputation schools, working class preferences are
strongly shaped by the parent’s own (often negative) experience of school (Woods,
1993). They tend to value the accessibility and friendliness of teachers and rely on
‘gut feeling’/intuition or favouring a sense of ‘being at home’. Indeed, often working
class parents were impressed when schools gave positive attention to less academically
inclined pupils rather than focusing primarily on able students (Reay and Ball, 1997).
Surveys show that in lower social class families the child’s wishes are often decisive
while for middle class parents the child’s input into the process is limited (Coldron
and Boulton, 1991; Ball, 1993). The result is that within middle class norms, working
class families may appear to be ‘bad choosers’, but this is entirely a cultural judgement
(Reay and Ball, 1997).
Several US studies are able to robustly show that low-income parents place lower values
on academic characteristics when choosing schools (Fossey, 1994; Armor and Peiser,
1998; Schneider and Buckley, 2002; Jacob and Lefgren, 2007; Hastings et al., 2006).
This is broadly consistent with the UK survey literature described earlier. However,
Coldron et al. use their survey findings to temper the ‘deficit model’ of parents from
lower socioeconomic groups being disadvantaged in the choice process, as is preva-
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lent in this literature that contrasts between ‘skilled choosers’ versus ‘disconnected
choosers’ (Gewirtz et al., 1995) and ‘alert’ versus ‘inert’ (Echols and Willms, 1992),
stating:
It is a widespread assumption that parents from lower socioeconomic groups
are being denied access because they are less able to understand the ad-
missions process and therefore less able to successfully negotiate it. We
found no evidence to support this. While more educated parents were
likely to access more information very few parents felt they were lacking
basic information about secondary schools and there was no evidence that
parents who were less educated had any reduced chance of gaining their
first preference.
(Coldron et al., 2008, page vii)
However, it is not clear that this should be taken as contradicting the work of Diane
Reay and others: Coldron et al. simply confirm that the working classes do not want
to engage in the school choice process in the same manner as the middle classes do,
and that they have different aspirations in terms of schools they wish their children to
attend.
3.2 Economic models of parental choice
In contrast to the sociological literature presented, the economic paradigm is limited
in its ability to explain why strategies differ by social class because it lacks a proper
concept of ‘class’ and in particular is incapable of explaining how and why social class
norms and practices emerge. However, it can incorporate systematic differences in
human behaviour into decision-making models in a variety of ways. In the economic
models currently prevalent in the school literature, all parents act in a rational manner,
making a choice of school from a well-defined choice set with the goal of maximising
household utility based on fixed preferences and subject to a budget constraint. Within
this framework, it is possible to model parents as differing according to social class, or
socio-economic status, which is usually classified as being analogous to differences in
human capital, measured using parental occupations or (more usually here) parental
education levels.
The economic models of parental decision-making, described in some detail for the
remainder of this chapter, appear very reductionist and overly simplified compared to
the rich descriptions of human motivations and behaviour used by post-structuralist
sociologists. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with this process of simplifying de-
scriptions of society within economic models; indeed it is generally necessary in order
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to build models capable of predicting the effects of a change in policy. However, the risk
is that simplifying assumptions substantively alter the predictions the model makes,
and so the reduced model causes us to make incorrect inferences as to the effect of a
policy implementation were it to take place in the real world.
One criticism commonly made of these models is that they contradict the wide body
of experimental evidence demonstrating that human behaviour deviates in systematic
ways from the idealised behaviour attributed to expected utility maximisers (Tversky,
1996). However, this observation is not enough to dismiss economic theory building.
Roth (1996) argues that most economists view the rational model as a useful approxi-
mation, rather than as a precise description of human behaviour. In fact, arguably the
school choice decision is better described in terms of this economic decision making
than so many other decisions in life: it is usually a conscious, deliberate and consid-
ered decision, made in the presence of considerable information. But it is worth noting
that there is a growing attempt by economists to move away from an overdependence
on idealised models of hyper-rationality. The emergence of agent-based computation
(described later in the chapter), which is able to explicitly model myopic behaviour,
satisficing, and so on, within the field of economics is one example of the development
of new tools to facilitate this.
There are three distinct explanations economists are able to give for why parents of
different social classes choose different schools, described below.
3.2.1 Income constraint
In modelling social class differences in school choice decisions, the first perspective is
that the tighter budget constraint of low income families is sufficient to explain their
inability to purchase houses next to popular schools, pay for private tuition for entrance
tests, or take long journeys to school. Under this account, the underlying preferences
of lower and middle class families for schools are no different. The policy implications
of this would be that social stratification between schools could be significantly low-
ered by reducing the costs of accessing schools for low income families, for example, by
designating places at schools for out-of-catchment children or by subsidising transport
to school. This type of explanation for class differences is similar to that of sociolo-
gists Breen and Goldthorpe (1996), who suggest that class differences in educational
experiences and outcomes are a reflection of the objective differences in the material
situations of families in different class situations.
However, the econometric estimates of house location decision suggest this explanation
is not sufficient on its own to explained observed school stratification. Bayer and
McMillan’s work takes an area (San Francisco) where choice of school is only possible
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by moving house because strict residence requirements are in place and estimates a
random coefficient, discrete choice model of elementary school ‘choices’ by parents.
They find significant evidence for differences in preferences in the sense that more
educated parents are willing, ceteris paribus, to spend more for high quality schools
(Bayer, 2000; Bayer and McMillan, 2005). This finding is confirmed by Nesheim (2002),
who uses a similar approach to estimate a correlation between parental education and
willingness to pay for school quality (given income) of 0.59.
3.2.2 Shape of the utility function
The second explanation given by economic models is that preferences for school quality
differ by social class, with the utility derived from greater school quality being lower for
low social background families. This might manifest itself in many ways. The family
may be less willing to substitute consumption for school quality ‘purchased’ through
the housing market or transport costs. Alternatively, the family may calculate that the
utility gain from superior school quality is not enough to offset utility loss from longer
journeys to and from school. Furthermore, other aspects of the school environment
may enter the utility function, and they might place significant utility on the child’s
own expected happiness at secondary school, thus favouring allowing their child to
continue to be educated with friends.
The post-structuralist theories described in the previous section argue strongly that
utility functions do differ by social class in this manner. However, the problem with
these types of ‘explanations’ within an economic model is that they fail to explain where
these preferences come from. This is because economists treat social norms and culture
as arbitrary preferences of the individual and thus provide no mechanism for explaining
how they emerge and change over time. This limitation may be crucial in the context
of education policy. For example, it is possible that the publication of league tables in
1992 altered some families’ perceptions of school quality, leading them to place a great
emphasis on GCSE results than (for example) behaviour or ethos in a school. Thus, a
policy intended simply to improve the quality of information in the marketplace may
have altered the nature of some families’ utility functions. As a further example, given
that we know social networks are crucial in the transmission of information on school
quality, it is also possible that conversations with social neighbours can alter one’s own
willingness-to-pay for school quality or other aspects of the utility function. Thus, a
family’s utility function is partially shaped by their neighbour’s utility function.
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3.2.3 Informational advantages
The third explanation for differences in school choice strategies is that higher social
background families are endowed with an informational advantage (from social net-
works, for example). This manifests itself in several ways. First, it gives them better
measures of school quality. Second, they select a school from a larger choice set.
Third, they have a superior ability to estimate the probabilities of acceptance at dif-
ferent schools, which is particularly important under a First Preference First choice
system. The empirical evidence in the previous section suggests all these advantages
are likely to be present. However, this explanation is, again, necessarily partial because
we need a model of the costs of obtaining information for different groups, relative to
their own perceived benefits in holding this information. It is perfectly possible that
working class families place less value on this information, thus information differences
actually result from differences in the shape of household utility functions.
3.3 General equilibrium models of location choice
Having shown the three ways by which economists can incorporate social class dif-
ferences in household decision making, the remainder of the chapter now examines
actual economic models of school choice in detail. The purpose of this section is to
provide an overview of existing general equilibrium models of location choice where
school assignment is decided strictly via a residence requirement restriction and thus
households purchase homes and public school access as bundles. This is the traditional
means by which parents ‘choose’ schools in the United States and is similar in nature
to catchment areas or proximity oversubscription criterion in the UK context. The
models discussed are all hedonic pricing models, following those first developed by
Tinbergen (1959) and Sattinger (1980). A central feature of the models is that peer
groups, and thus school quality and the value of housing, are endogenously determined.
The models match consumers to locations and find prices that separate people based
on willingness to pay for locational quality, of which local school quality is one dimen-
sion. Econometric studies have consistently shown that parents are willing to pay for
school quality through the housing market (Black, 1999; Bogart and Cromwell, 1997,
2000; Goodman and Thibodeau, 1998; Sieg et al., 1999; Gibbons and Machin, 2003;
Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995; Leech and Campos, 2003; Rosenthal, 2003).
The hedonic pricing models are, as with all models, necessarily reductionist. They sim-
plify the consumer decision-making process and utility function; they emphasise homo-
geneity rather than heterogeneity of households and location characteristics; and they
analyse outcomes solely in equilibrium. The advantage of these models are the strong
predictions they are able to make about the effect of policy changes. However, they
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treat global regularities (concepts that are not reducible to micro-phenomena) such as
social norms and culture as arbitrary preferences of the individual. The methodological
individualist approach where all social phenomena are explained in terms of individ-
ual actions, need not understate the importance of these global regularities; it simply
provides no mechanism for explaining how they emerge and change over time.
All models of location choice with neighbourhood schooling are some variant on the
Epple and Romano (2003) model. They set up a simple locational choice model for
households, with entry to schools restricted by a neighbourhood residence requirement
and all students attending a public school. Overall land capacity in Epple and Ro-
mano’s economy is constrained to the level of the population (relaxing this assumption
introduces additional equilibria) and neighbourhoods are equally sized to avoid multi-
ple equilibria. This seems a reasonable starting assumption in the UK context, where
land in towns is highly constrained (a more complex approach would be to follow Epple
and Platt (1998) who have a house supply function that allows a community to grow).
Papers containing developments on the Epple and Romano model that are referred to
in the remainder of this chapter are summarised in Table 3.2.
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3.3.1 Modelling the household utility function
The elements and shape of the household utility function are the key determinants
of the nature of stratification and house price differentials in equilibrium. In the
basic Epple and Romano model, preferences of households are assumed to be fixed,
meaning that there is no mechanism by which preferences can change in response to
their environment, and households have only two attributes: household income, y, and
child’s ability, b, with a correlation between y and b that is either positive or zero.
Households purchase a dwelling with annualised amortised house price, p, and derive
utility from consumption (income after tax and housing costs) and final educational
achievement of the child, a. Education achievement is the outcome of an education
production function containing initial ability (which we can take to mean measured
test score at age 11), b, and school quality, q. School quality is in turn a function of
the per pupil expenditure, X, and the average ability of peers in the school, θ.
Epple and Romano model the peer effect in district j as mean ability of peers, in-line
with much of the existing empirical literature (Feinstein and Symons, 1999; Ammer-
mueller and Pischke, 2006). However, there are alternative models where it is a function
of parental income or education (e.g. Fuchs, 2005; Nesheim, 2002); others claim peer
effects are non-linear (e.g. Summers and Wolfe, 1977). It matters how we choose to
model (parents’ perceptions of) peer groups in terms of equilibrium outcomes. Within
a simple model of neighbourhood schooling that predicts complete income stratifica-
tion, the resulting variance in school quality would be highest where an income peer
effect is modelled and lowest with the child’s ability peer effect.
In the UK context it is unnecessary to model Tiebout sorting whereby a one-school
district can vote for a tax and raise revenue directly to fund that school’s expenditure.
Voters can, and do, also influence the level of education funding in the local authority,
but the magnitude of this funding difference is very small compared to the variation
in per pupil funding distributed to schools to compensate for educational and social
disadvantage (Levacˇic´ et al., 2005). This differential per pupil funding and its effect
on school quality can be treated as dampening the effect of the peer group, θ, which is
redefined as entering the educational production function as the totality of the direct
effect of the peer group on school quality less the indirect effect of the differential
per-pupil funding.
The household utility model (often with Cobb-Douglas form imposed) can be generally
written as:
U(b, y) = U(y(1− t)− p, a(θ, b)) U1, U2, a1, a2 > 0
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3.3.2 Equilibrium outcomes
General equilibrium models make end-state predictions that are computed or solved
mathematically and are independent of starting circumstances of the model. These
models always have at least one equilibrium because there always exists the trivial
(unstable) equilibrium where all districts have identical peer groups such that there
is no gain from moving district (Nesheim, 2002). Nesheim shows that for his utility
function that is linear in consumption, there is a separating equilibrium (i.e. an equi-
librium where peer groups are not identical) if and only if the correlation between the
attribute that produces the peer group (in his case parental education) and willingness
to pay for school quality is greater than zero.
In the Epple and Romano equilibrium there exists a strict hierarchy of house prices and
the allocation exhibits boundary indifference and strict household preference within
boundaries for their own neighbourhood. The elasticity of the price premium with
respect to neighbourhood quality is solely a function of:
1. the elasticity of child’s schooling attainment with respect to school quality (where
school quality is solely determined by mean child’s ability in the school);
2. the correlation between willingness to pay for school quality and child’s initial
ability, b.
If the first elasticity is large, then large proportionate differences in price are needed
to segregate people. If the second correlation is high then a small difference in price is
needed to segregate people.
The key outcomes of interest for these chapters are always the levels of income and
ability stratification in the model and, as a consequence of these, the extent to which
quality varies across schools. Epple and Romano use a somewhat non-standard defini-
tion of stratification that is renamed to maintain consistency with later chapters:
Partial income stratification: for any given ability child, only higher income house-
hold pupils attend higher quality schools.
Partial ability stratification: for any child with given household income, only high
ability pupils attend higher quality schools.
The equilibrium properties of the basic neighbourhood schooling model are shown in
Table 3.3. The first row shows the equilibrium outcomes where child’s ability is as-
sumed to be uncorrelated with household income. In this situation, schools would
not become stratified, provided that willingness-to-pay for school quality was not re-
lated to the child’s initial ability. The second row shows the equilibrium outcomes
where income and ability are positively correlated. In the absence of Tiebout sorting,
variation in school quality, q, is entirely driven by differences in the mean ability of
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peer groups between schools. Even without partial ability stratification, differential
school quality can result, but only if household income and child’s ability are positively
correlated.
Table 3.3: Equilibrium outcomes of neighbourhood schooling model
δ( δU/δqδU/δy )/δb = 0 δ(
δU/δq
δU/δy )/δb > 0
E[b|y]
constant
No partial income stratification
No partial ability stratification













It is impossible to describe the qualitative nature of the equilibrium prices and sorting
in more detail without imposing some assumptions about the distribution of param-
eters and the functional form of the utility function on the model. For example, the
distribution of income and child’s ability are crucial determinants of the shape of the
equilibrium because they determine both the relative supply of consumer types and
relative demand for locations in the economy (Nesheim, 2002).
3.4 Models that predict incomplete stratification
The simplicity of the basic Epple and Romano model allows the relationship between
the model parameters and the equilibrium properties to be clearly understood. How-
ever, the basic model described predicts complete income stratification between schools
under a neighbourhood schooling system, meaning (for example) that rich families live
in one district entirely separated from poorer families. This is clearly not consis-
tent with real world data from the US or the UK. For example, in areas of the UK
where most pupils attend their catchment area school and there are no own admissions
schools, free school meal segregation is only around 0.2 on the index of dissimilar-
ity.
This section introduces potential modifications to the model that are intended to allow
it to mimic the real world social processes that generate incomplete income stratifi-
cation across neighbourhoods. First, a set of new parameters are introduced that
make this possible within a general equilibrium framework. While many different ap-
proaches are discussed, they are not mutually exclusive, and it is likely that the real
world displays all these features to some extent.
Following these new general equilibrium parameters, a set of further explanations for
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incomplete income stratification across neighbourhoods are given, all of which are ei-
ther very difficult or impossible to incorporate into a general equilibrium framework.
To overcome the modelling restrictions of general equilibrium, agent-based computa-
tions models are introduced as a more flexible and dynamic approach to modelling the
house purchase decision.
3.4.1 Within a general equilibrium framework
Three new types of parameters are discussed here that have the potential to generate
incomplete income stratification in a neighbourhood schooling model. The plausibility
and usefulness of each new parameter can be evaluated in two ways. First, does the
existence of the parameter correlate with a real world phenomena that we know to
be present in the UK context through evidence presented earlier? Second, does the
parameter generate the patterns of price differentials and income stratification that we
know exist in parts of the UK where catchment areas dominate?
Heterogeneous housing and location characteristics
Epple and Romano assume that housing plots are perfectly malleable in the long term;
so all plots within a neighbourhood command an equal price, therefore differential
school quality is the only parameter driving between-neighbourhood price differen-
tials. However, at least in a UK context, it seems important to treat housing plots
as heterogeneous, even in the very long term (given planning restrictions). They are
uneven in size, so offering different square footage, number of bedrooms and sizes of
gardens, and so on. Nechyba’s set of general equilibrium models of location choice
incorporate 15 different housing types, h, that can be placed in the utility function as
one dimension of location characteristics, l (Nechyba, 2000, 2003a,b, 2004).
Location characteristics will also differ, even within a school catchment area if families
derive utility from particular locations for reasons that are unrelated to schooling. If an
entire school district or catchment area is desirable, for example, because of closeness
to a railway station, motorway or amenities, this would only serve to enforce complete
income stratification and lead to a unique equilibrium in the neighbourhood schooling
model. However, if parts of a neighbourhood have desirable amenities but the rest does
not, this would produce heterogeneous within-neighbourhood prices. These location
amenities must be those that can be treated as fixed and therefore exogenous to the
assignment problem. Railway stations and motorways would be good examples of
this; restaurants and shops would not since their own location decision depends on
local neighbourhood family attributes.
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Location amenities, r, and housing types h would then both enter the utility function
as follows:
U(b, y) = U(y(1− t)− p, a(θ, b), l(h, r))
However, this specification would imply that all individuals placed the same utility
on each amenity. In reality, we probably believe there exists systematic variation
in willingness to pay for amenities across individuals. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that all individuals rank the desirability of amenities identically (for example, some
families would prefer to be closer to the motorway than the railway station, and vice
versa). Indeed, introducing both these adaptions to the model would again lower
income stratification.
Characteristics of neighbours
If households derive utility from a neighbourhood effect of families living in close
proximity, say within a sub-district, we could allow this extra parameter to enter the
utility function directly. Neighbours might be valued for social network reasons, or
because of the local amenities they attract. We could assign each school district, j, k
sub-districts, which would need to be non-overlapping to make the equilibrium solution
tractable. Neighbourhood effects, nk, might be represented as the mean income, y, of
households in the sub-district, or some other function, and would enter the utility
function as follows:
U(b, y) = U(y(1− t)− p, a(θ, b), l(h, r, nk))
However, while this specification could explain within-district price heterogeneity on
its own, it does not explain incomplete income stratification as required. Nevertheless,
it is still important to form a view of the extent to which the neighbourhood peer
group enters the utility function because this parameter affects the extent to which
school choice models reduce residential stratification.
Variation in demand for schooling
The basic neighbourhood model described in the previous section does allow demand
for schooling to vary across individuals. First, the willingness to pay for school quality
via house prices is always modelled as increasing in income y. Second, in some speci-
fications the willingness to pay for school quality increases with child’s ability b. The
first assumption – that schooling is a normal good – seems relatively uncontroversial.
However, it is less clear that it is desirable to model the second. This implies that par-
ents of higher ability children value a good peer group more than those parents with
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lower ability children. This would be the case, for example, if the capacity to benefit
from a more able peer group is greater for higher ability children. The only econo-
metric study to support this modelling approach is Hastings et al. (2006), who use a
natural experiment created by the re-zoning of school catchments following the dis-
mantlement of bussing to show that preferences for measures of academic achievement
are increasing in both income and baseline academic ability.
Given limited evidence for preferences varying by ability, the following two approaches
to modelling variation in demand would seem to be more relevant. If we believe that
demand for schooling varies by household ‘taste’, τ , (where τ and y are not perfectly
correlated) we can achieve an incomplete sorting of households by incomes. Epple and
Platt (1998) model this for a general (non-school) location decision. Nesheim (2002)
also incorporates a preference for schooling parameter, and describes it as the level
of parental altruism or parental perceptions about their child’s expected return to
education and the effect that differential school quality is likely to have on a child’s
education outcomes. Once again, adapting the basic model:
U(b, y) = U(y(1− t)− p, a(θ, b, τ), l(h, r, nk))
If τ1 < τ2 , we can interpret this as meaning parent 1 underestimates the effect of
school quality on their child, relative to parent 2; or that parent 1 correctly identifies
that their child would not benefit as much as parent 2’s child from higher quality
education; or that parent 1 places less value on the final educational achievement of
their child.
An alternative modelling approach to variation in demand for schooling is to assume
that some households value certain aspects of schools that are unrelated to pupil out-
comes. For example, some parents might particularly care about the child’s enjoyment
of school; strict discipline; sports or music facilities. Alternatively, it might be the case
that all households solely maximise child’s outcomes, but have different beliefs about
the best means to achieve it. For example, Maria Ferreyra (2005) models idiosyn-
cratic preferences for religious schools. We can model this diversity of preferences for
school types (assuming they have no impact on school quality) as a characteristic of
the school in district j, with households having idiosyncratic preferences, sj , for these
characteristics:
U(b, y) = U(y(1− t)− p, a(θ, b, τ), l(h, r, nk, sj))
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3.4.2 Limits to general equilibrium modelling
The general equilibrium models can achieve incomplete income stratification in mathe-
matically tractable models, as we require, but we may not believe the assumptions they
make reflect the true causes of this phenomenon. This section explores a set of issues
that might lead us to favour a computational, rather than an analytic, solution to our
model. A computational model is still simply a formal representation of a theory about
some empirical system, but it is usually a set of algorithms in a computer program
with model behaviour explored by running a program over a parameter space.
Some issues described below can be dealt with within a computational general equi-
librium (CGE) approach. CGE takes a set of equations and computes equilibrium
solutions for a set of parameter values. It is therefore a similar, but more flexible,
approach to traditional deductive general equilibrium modelling. Maria Ferreyra has
built CGE models of school and neighbourhood choice. Those modelling assumptions
that cannot be addressed within a CGE approach can be incorporated into the more
flexible agent-based computational models described in the next section.
Complex neighbourhood effects
In the previous section utility models were described where households derived a utility
from living with neighbours in a sub-district, where sub-districts are not overlapping
and are nested within districts. CGE models can deal with this type of sub-district, as
shown in Ferreyra (2005). However, suppose we wanted to make the concept of ‘neigh-
bours’ more complex so that each household had a uniquely defined set of neighbours.
This set might be the characteristics of the immediate neighbours in houses contiguous
to theirs (known as the ‘Moore’ neighbours) or a complex decay function of decreasing
utility placed on the characteristics of households the further away they live.
The consequences of this ‘overlapping’ perspective on neighbourhoods are two-fold.
First, each cell or house has to be modelled as having unique characteristics, so house-
holds choose houses and not school districts. This requires a modification of CGE
algorithms such as those used in Ferreyra (2005). More fundamentally though, these
types of neighbour preferences ensure interdependent decision making that is capable
of setting up an out-of-equilibrium dynamic whereby sorting emerges from an initial
random allocation. Schelling (1971, 1978) shows how stark patterns of segregation
emerge from local migratory movements among two culturally distinct, but relatively
tolerant, types of households. In fact, even where households have strict preferences
for integration, segregation still emerges (Pancs and Vriend, 2003). Thus, a Pareto
optimal equilibrium can never be achieved due to its inherent instability (so CGE is
unworkable with these types of preferences).
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There is empirical literature that supports the needs for more complex modelling of
neighbourhoods. The literature on the UK housing market stresses that the behaviour
of house prices appears to be complex and non-linear as a result of preferences for
neighbours. Galster (2002) and Galster et al. (2000) stress the importance of thresholds
as one form of non-linear behaviour: neighbourhoods do not start to decline or gentrify
until they pass some trigger-point. But, once neighbourhoods pass a certain threshold,
their character can very quickly change (Meen and Meen, 2003).
Bounded rationality and psychic costs of moving
Some might argue that, rather than households choosing houses on the basis of hyper-
rational decision-making (optimising a utility function with precise information and
cognitive ability), households actually ‘satisfice’ when making choices. Satisficing refers
to a behaviour which attempts to achieve at least some minimum level of a particular
variable, but which does not necessarily maximize its value. The word satisfice was
coined by Herbert Simon (1947) who pointed out that human beings lack the cognitive
resources to maximize: we usually do not know the relevant probabilities of outcomes,
we can rarely evaluate all outcomes with sufficient precision, and our memories are
weak and unreliable. A more realistic approach to rationality, known as bounded ra-
tionality, takes into account these limitations. Satisficing can actually be modelled as
an optimisation problem for a household, where all costs, including the cost of the op-
timisation calculations and the cost of getting information for use in those calculations,
are considered.
There are, of course, very real financial costs associated with the transaction of a house
purchase (stamp duty, lawyers’ fees and removal costs). However, another important
cost (that it is quite difficult to monetise) is the psychic cost associated with moving
away from the social networks developed in an area over time. A third cost is the
information cost associated with gathering the information necessary to optimise. This
includes school quality, neighbourhood amenity qualities and house prices for all houses
in the economy. ‘Satisficing’ could therefore be a strategy that households use to
balance search costs against potential gains and might explain why households would
limit their search field to, for example, just the nearest 10 school districts. Meen and
Meen (2002) report that 60 per cent of moves in England take place over less than 5
miles. However, the increase in information on the internet is substantially lowering
costs of searching for both schools and homes. Coldron et al. (2008) report that two-
thirds of parents find information on schools to be readily accessible, with internet
sources used by many (including 44% accessing achievement and attainment tables,
29% reading Ofsted inspection reports and 25% looking at school websites). This
represents a substantial change from the start of the 1990s, when a parent would often
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have to write to each school individually to collect information on exam results.
The second type of cost described above – the psychic cost – can actually be modelled
in a CGE model as an idiosyncratic preference for a particular district. However, the
transaction costs associated with an actual move are fundamentally in conflict with
the concept of an equilibrium analysis of house location decisions because equilibrium
models are not dynamic models of house moving decisions and do not rely on initial
locations. By contrast, a more realistic way to model the house purchase decision might
be as a two-stage decision-making approach by households. In the first a (myopic)
couple without school aged children choose where to live on the basis of neighbour
characteristics, locational amenities, house quality, but ignoring school quality. In the
second stage, the households need to send their children to secondary school. They
then incorporate school quality into their optimisation problem and look at utility in
all possible locations (in the economy or a closer area). They then decide whether to
move or not, but only doing so if the benefits to moving outweigh the psychic and
financial costs.
Disequilibrium and dynamic models
GE and CGE models are capable of telling us about the potential state of the world
in equilibrium, but not at any other point. Equilibrium refers to a set of prices where
the market ‘clears’, such that the houses supplied in each district match demand for
homes, and specifically this literature uses a variation of a Nash equilibrium which
takes place when no household can improve their utility, given other household’s choices
(Nesheim, 2002). Assuming an equilibrium state exists, it would only be of particular
interest, over and above disequilibrium states, if the following properties held. First,
the equilibrium is more interesting where is it unique. Uniqueness means that there is a
single global equilibrium, with an absence of other local equilibria. Proving uniqueness
in GE theory is never straightforward (e.g. Kamiya, 1984). However, in general, the
greater the weight attached to the actions of others compared with one’s own actions
(i.e. the greater the importance of externalities), the more likely is the possibility
of multiple equilibria. Second, the equilibrium should be stable. Where there are
threshold effects, even though there may be a unique equilibrium with a given set
of parameters, a small stochastic change in these parameters might ‘tip’ the model
towards a completely different state. Third, the equilibrium should be achievable with
rapid speed of convergence towards it.
This third condition is certainly not met in the context of housing and schooling
markets. At any point in time, it is possible that the separating equilibrium is not
actually obtainable giving the starting conditions. More likely, it is obtainable in
theory, but the system remains out of equilibrium for long periods of time. Indeed,
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where conditions in the market constantly change as a result of demographic changes,
it is possible that equilibria are never reached. This is the situation in the US housing
market, where Krupka (2008) has argued the data show that observed income mixing in
cities is indeed unstable, but that the process of adjustment to a separating equilibrium
is very slow.
Even if market conditions are held constant, we can only estimate the length of time
until equilibrium is reached using a dynamic model of the actual house purchase pro-
cess. By contrast, GE models employ the use of a Walrasian Auctioneer (or equivalent
clearinghouse construct) that determines prices to ensure each market clears (Katzner,
1989). An actual housing market bears no resemblance to this since it has finite sub-
sets of households willing to buy and sell at any particular point in time; the need
for most households to buy and sell simultaneously, resulting in chains of house trans-
actions; and local estate agents acting as negotiators of the local market, but not as
clearing houses since they never hold property themselves. All this explains why global
equilibrium may not be met in practice, or may take years or decades to emerge.
3.4.3 Agent-based computational models of school choice
Agent-based computational models are introduced briefly here as a particularly flex-
ible and dynamic modelling strategy that can overcome the limitations of GE and
CGE solutions described in the previous section. It provides a means of modelling
repeated local interactions between a very large number of micro-agents – in this case
households buying and selling houses. The term “agent” refers broadly to an individ-
ual or physical entity that is represented as bundled data and behavioural methods
within a computationally constructed world and can be an individual, institution or
physical entity (Tesfatsion, 2006). As opposed to traditional models that assume ei-
ther a small number of dissimilar or numerous identical actors, agent-based models
normally include large numbers of heterogeneous agents. Interactions between them
give rise to global regularities such as peer groups, house price differentials and strat-
ification. These global regularities in turn feed back into the determination of local
interactions.
Agent-based systems are said to be complex, meaning that they are composed of in-
teracting agents with system-wide properties (such as segregation) exhibited that arise
from the interactions of the units and that are not properties of the individual units
themselves (Flake, 1998). Agent-based systems are also said to be adaptive, meaning
they include goal-directed agents that are capable of reacting to their environment and
directing this reaction towards the achievement of built-in (or evolved) goals (Tesfat-
sion, 2006).
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Agent-based computational modelling is a particularly flexible form of simulation. It
can facilitate the modelling of complex interactive processes involving kinks, jumps,
and other forms of discreteness imposed or induced by empirical constraints. It can
also deal with bounded rationality, asymmetric information, strategic interaction, ex-
pectation formation on the basis of limited information, mutual learning, social norms,
transaction costs, externalities, market power, predation, collusion and the possibility
of coordination failure.
In agent-based simulations, the finite number of agents (households) are created with
attributes (such as income, initial ability, tastes, as in GE models) and behavioural
methods, which are rules for how they interact. For example, agents would need to be
able to:
1. calculate their utility;
2. decide when and where to look for a new house;
3. negotiate a house price with another agent;
4. and move house.
Agent-based computational modelling requires the construction of dynamically com-
plete economic models. Simulations are run from a set of initial conditions of house
assignments and prices and must permit and fully support the playing out of agent
interactions over time without further intervention from the modeller. Rather than
try to calculate the equilibria states of the system, the focus is often on dynamics and
transient trajectories. This all means that modelling can proceed even if equilibria
are computationally intractable or non-existent. The stationery-state form tends to
be emphasised rather than the equilibrium. In our case, this could be defined as the
point of continual market clearing, of unchanging structure or of unchanging global
regularities.
The literature on agent-based computational modelling in economics stretches back to
Schelling’s famous model where segregation emerges from residential location models
with agents who have preferences for integration (Schelling, 1971). However, applica-
tions to school choice decisions are all very recent (and US-based) and are mentioned
in the next section.
3.5 Decision-making under school choice programs
All models presented thus far have sought to make stratification predictions where
school assignment is decided by strict residence requirement restrictions. Even under
this very simple assignment criteria, models that adequately reflect the salient features
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of households, locations and outcomes (i.e. heterogeneity of preferences and housing
types both contributing to incomplete stratification in equilibrium) quickly become
quite complex. This section looks at the implications of modelling greater complexity
to the supply of schools via school choice programs. These models are important
because in the absence of large scale real life experiments that alter school assignment
rules, the models offer a clear framework for predicting the effects of school choice on
student sorting.
Models of quite simple public and private sector choice programs that exist in the
general equilibrium literature are described. Next, two attempts are made to model
some aspect of choice using the agent-based computational approach described in the
previous section. In both these fields, the literature is relatively recent and therefore
under-developed, and in any case is entirely dominated by US researchers. Never-
theless, each model is assessed in terms of applicability to the English institutional
structure.
3.5.1 Introducing school choice to general equilibrium models
There are two main developments in terms of modelling school choice within a general
equilibrium framework. The first set of papers adopt models of choice in the public sec-
tor to a scenario whereby public schools make places available for non-neighbourhood
families and these are allocated by lottery. The second set start with a strict neigh-
bourhood schooling model, but allow households to use vouchers to purchase schooling
in the private sector. The latter models are of limited applicability to the UK where
private school vouchers have not recently been used (although Direct Grant school
places and the Assisted Places Scheme were examples of this).
Universal lotteries for school places
Epple and Romano (2003) develop a basic model of school choice within a public school
system. Schools have no neighbourhood residency requirement, no priority places for
local residents and no capacity constraints. Given this, the cost of transport between
districts is the key determinant of stratification. Where transportation costs are set
to zero, all neighbourhoods and schools are perfectly integrated with identical house
prices because schooling is entirely costless. Subsequent models introduce a simple flat
rate inter-neighbourhood transport cost to a school in any other neighbourhood. Epple
and Romano show that this once again creates stratified schooling (of the same nature
shown in earlier sections where the residence requirement drives stratification).
For a separating equilibrium in a two neighbourhood example, house prices would be
higher in neighbourhood 2 than neighbourhood 1 to reflect the higher school quality.
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Some, but not all, households in neighbourhood 1 will choose to exercise choice and
travel to school in neighbourhood 2. This model makes it clear that it is only the higher
income families from the poorer neighbourhood 1 that will exercise choice where there
are transport costs. The winners and losers from this type of choice system (relative to
strict neighbourhood schooling) are complex. Higher income households find it cheaper
to buy a house in neighbourhood 2 (but their house price would fall if they already
live there). However, they would see some deterioration in their child’s peer group.
The lower income families in neighbourhood 1 unambiguously lose since they will see
a deterioration in their local school’s peer group, and it is not utility-maximising for
them to pay the transport costs to neighbourhood 2. It is the group just below the
median income that gain since they are now able to live in neighbourhood 1, yet access
a higher quality school by paying the transport costs that are lower than the house
price differentials between neighbourhoods 1 and 2.
The transport costs in these models can reflect both the disutility experienced by the
child through long school journeys and the financial cost incurred by the household.
Bearing this in mind, a flat rate transport cost is unrealistic in several respects. The
cost of transport between any two districts depends on the distance between those two
districts and public transport availability. This would have implications for patterns of
stratification across a city. Also, we might want to argue that not all families face the
same cost of transport. It would be higher where a family do not have a car available
at that time of day, or where parents are working and cannot transport their children
to and from school. If the cost of transport for any particular journey was decreasing
in income, this would again serve to reinforce stratification.
Brunner and Imazeki (2005) add to the findings of Epple and Romano models by
calculating who benefits from universal choice programs. They emphasise that the
sizes of gains and losses under a universal voucher depends on changes in peer group
composition and changes in housing values. In markets where Tiebout sorting was very
high under the neighbourhood schooling model – meaning households actively selected
homes located close to good schools – potential changes in peer group composition and
therefore loss in housing values create an incentive for high income households to vote
against choice reforms and low income households to vote in favour of reforms.
Vouchers for private and religious schools
The next set of choice models introduce a voucher program for private schools into a
neighbourhood school system. Once again, it is Epple and Romano that produce the
first model on which all others are based.
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Epple and Romano (1998) contrast a neighbourhood schooling system of public schools
with a model of competitive, tuition-financed private schools (with no public schools).
In this model, private schools are able to charge differentially priced tuition based on
the peer characteristics of students. The result is a strict hierarchy of school qualities
with stratification by ability and income. In the private school model, high-ability,
low-income students receive tuition discounts, while low-ability, high-income students
pay tuition premia. The beneficiaries of this system are high-ability students relative
to low-ability students, so the extent to which lower-income families benefit depends on
the correlation between ability and family income on entry to secondary school.
Nechyba (2000) introduces private school vouchers into a public school system where
there are heterogeneous housing types within each neighbourhood and thus incomplete
stratification. Private schools are restricted in offering a single tuition price to all
students, but they are able to choose whom to admit based on child’s ability. He
contrasts vouchers restricted to low income families or low income neighbourhoods with
universal vouchers. In simulations he is able to show that residential stratification falls
following the introduction of vouchers. Once again, the beneficiaries are high ability
students, particularly those from poor households.
Ferreyra (2005) compares two choice systems to a neighbourhood schooling model. In
the first, universal vouchers are issued that can be used in any private school. In the
second, the vouchers are restricted to the non-sectarian (i.e. non-religious) schooling
sector. She shows that both programs increase private school enrollment and affect
household residential choice. However, under non-sectarian vouchers private school
enrollment expands less than under universal vouchers. The effect of the vouchers on
school quality and social welfare depends on the size of the voucher which is financed
through taxation. The majority of the population benefits, slightly, from low value
vouchers, but the proportion benefiting falls as voucher size increases. In simulations,
the average winner is less wealthy yet more strongly prefers Catholic education than
the average loser. Wealthy households, who already enjoy a high level of school quality
before vouchers, tend to lose under high voucher levels regardless of their school choices
due to their high income tax burden and capital losses in the housing market.
3.5.2 School choice in ACE models
An independent literature is being developed (mostly by non-economists) that mod-
els choice programs in an agent-based computational environment. These are non-
equilibrium models, so changes in patterns of stratification over time as a program
is introduced are of particular interest. Also, since they are entirely computational,
spatial aspects of the models (such as where schools are located in relation to each
other) are more explicitly considered.
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Lauen (2003) uses an agent-based modelling approach to examine enrollment flows
among eight public schools operating a choice program. Households live in a fixed
location with a neighbourhood school, but are able to attend an alternative schools if
there is spare capacity. They choose a school based on a utility function that includes
distance of school to a fixed home address and the mean achievement level of the school.
An important feature of the model is that schools are able to expand, contract and
close, and the paper shows that the rules by which schools choose to change capacity
have important effects on measures such as distance travelled, between-school variance
in achievement, and between-school variance in enrollment. This dynamic of changes
in school capacity on the supply side is interesting. However, the major drawback of
this paper is that households are not able to move house because the price mechanism
in the market for housing is not explicitly modelled.
Abernathy and Mackie (2002) construct a model of school choice between public (non-
selective) schools and private schools that can select-out lower ability pupils. In each
round of the simulation, households are able to apply to public and private schools
with assignment based on chance (public schools) or ability of child (private schools).
They are guaranteed a place at the neighbourhood school. The characteristics of this
model appear similar to those of Nechyba and Ferreyra, but they are able to observe
net gains in social welfare through the sorting of pupils over time. However, as with
Lauen, the major drawback of this simulation is that they do not incorporate a price
mechanism for housing that determines neighbourhood assignment in the public sector.
Therefore, in the context of the English schooling market, it is not clear how interesting
this model is.
One reason why hedonic markets for housing have not yet been modelled in an agent-
based context is that they are very difficult to mimic realistically in a simulation.
Economists computing general equilibrium employ a Walrasian auctioneer approach,
with all households simultaneously able to bid on all houses to achieve a Nash equilib-
rium. In the real world, few households are actively seeking to move at any one time;
bidding on several houses at once is complex because only one can be purchased; chains
develop whereby a contract to exchange on one house is contingent on another contract
completing; and precise locational characteristics cannot be known because they are
contingent on the house moves of others. However, modelling this process is impor-
tant because the general equilibrium approach necessarily ignores the ‘stickiness’ that
results from the transaction process and cannot be used to assess how quickly markets
are likely to change.
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3.6 Predicting the effect of English school choice reforms
One purpose of the previous section was to show how few theoretical models of school
choice programs currently exist in the literature. None appear to be capable to con-
tributing significantly to the debate about the effects of UK-style choice programs on
school and housing stratification. In England, local markets for secondary school places
are highly heterogeneous and so it would be impossible to develop a stylised model
that is suitable for making generalised claims about the consequences of choice in all
areas. However, one key feature is that proximity to school or catchment areas play an
important role in house location decisions of almost every parent in every region.
This section explores the distinctive characteristics of the English schooling market and
discusses how they might be translated into a stylised model of household choice. This
market is characterised as being one where most houses have a ‘de facto’ neighbourhood
school, with a very high probability of acceptance at that school, but also choice
appears to be possible without moving house. This means that households purchase
a joint bundle of a home, plus a set of probabilities of acceptance at schools given the
house location. At the time of the house purchase, the outcome of the subsequent
school admissions process is highly uncertain.
The significant choices available to parents arise via spare places at adjacent neighbour-
hood schools, allocated by some proximity criteria or catchment area priority; places at
Voluntary-Aided schools, assigned using a religious adherence measure; and places at
a small number of neighbourhood schools, made available to non-residents on the basis
of aptitude for a subject. So, a model of school choice would need to incorporate these
three school types, with schools and households located on a grid since geographical
position is such a key determinant of the probability of admission. The grid should
contain some heterogeneity in housing type and little spare housing capacity to reflect
the constraints present in most of England. In this type of simple model there is no
mechanism by which schools can choose to change their capacity or admissions policies
because no school decision-making function is explicitly modelled.
Households in the model would need at least three attributes:
• income, y;
• child’s initial measurement attainment, b, that is increasing in y;
• religious adherence indicator, r, where it is also likely that E[r|y] is increasing.
This determines the probability of acceptance at the religious school and also the
utility derived from a religious education.
At its most basic, the household utility function (including a constant disutility from
making long journeys to school, d, and a utility derived from the religious education a
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school offers, s) would be:
U(b, y, r) = U(y − p, a(θ, b), l(h), s(r), d)
It might also be desirable to consider the effects of the following attributes:
• a taste for educational achievement, τ , that is increasing in y (and even in b);
• a disutility for making long journeys to school, µ, that is decreasing in y;
• an additional group who acquire the religious adherence indicator at a cost, ω,
but derive no utility from religious education.
The additional attributes would produce:
U(b, y, r, τ, µ, ω) = U(y − p, a(θ, b, τ), l(h), s(r, ω), d(µ))
When, how and if households optimise is crucial to deciding whether it is appropriate
to model the English system in an equilibrium framework. This is because the house
moving process is very costly in a variety of respects, as described earlier, and this
means that households may appear to act in a myopic fashion with respect to house
purchases. In practice, secondary school quality enters the household utility function
at different times for different households: it could be as early as a first house purchase
prior to having children for some couples and as late as the point where choice of school
must be expressed on an official admissions form for others.
3.6.1 Decision-making under uncertainty
We require households to optimise – choose their location on the grid – without knowing
for certain the outcome of the subsequent school assignment process. This uncertainty
requires individuals to act on the basis of current fixed beliefs about the chances of
various outcomes taking place. There are several sources of uncertainty in the school
choice process for parents in England, but it is the first that is arguably the most
unique and complex:
Market uncertainty means that everyone is fully certain about their own prefer-
ences and endowments, but is unsure about the supply-demand offer of other economic
agents. Specifically in the case of schools, they are uncertain about which schools are
likely to offer them a place under different location options, in part because this is
itself contingent on the preferences and endowments of other households.
Event uncertainty derives from exogenous occurrences as they affect the household.
An example would be the risk inherent in a child sitting an exam as a test of aptitude
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for entry to a school.
Information uncertainty would include lack of knowledge about their own child’s
ability, school qualities, probabilities of gaining places at schools, and even imperfect
knowledge about other parent’s preferences. In short, it is any ignorance that indi-
viduals can attempt to overcome by ‘informational’ actions designed to generate or
otherwise acquire new knowledge.
Formally, we can conceptualise each household as having a set of possible acts (x),
which are the purchase of each house-type in every district. The states of nature (z)
are all the combinations of being offered or not offered a place at each of the schools in
the model. For each combination of x and z there is the consequence c(x, z) of choosing
to live in that house-type in that district given z combination of schools offer places to
the child. The consequence is the utility the household derive from their most preferred
school offer in z, given their location in x. In general, the expected utility derived from
an act x is the utility (consequence) derived from each state of nature multiplied by the
expected probability, pi, of that state of nature occuring (with probabilities summing
to 1). But in the case of school choice this expected utility is very complex because
the probability of states occuring and the utility derived if they do occured are both
entirely contingent on the act of the individual. The probabilities alter because some
schools offer priority to neighbourhood residents and the utility derived from states of
nature vary by x because distance to school enters the household utility function.
In order to compute this model it is necessary to have household estimates of the prob-
abilities of states of nature occurring, given x. It would be meaningless for households
to be able to compute pi[z|x] perfectly so we need approximations to make the model
plausible. The most reasonable assumption is that households rely on the past year’s
school admissions information in some imperfect manner. They may, for example,
know the proportion of applicants accepted to schools in the past year or may acquire
information based on the secondary school destinations of other children in their neigh-
bourhood or their child’s primary school. However, all these sources of information
are highly imperfect.
It becomes obvious under this type of allocation why all households will treat the
neighbourhood school as a type of ‘insurance’ policy since they are guaranteed a place.
We might believe that some households are more risk averse than others in this decision-
making process. A risk-averse household would strictly prefer a certainty consequence
to any risky prospect whose mathematical expectation of consequences equals that
certainty. However, deciding what type of households should have this risk-averse
attribute is difficult because we can only empirically measure the revealed, inseparable
blend of their valuations of the consequences and their attitudes towards risk.
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3.7 Discussion
Devising a more efficient and equitable system of school admissions for England is ex-
tremely complex. Developing a model, suitable for the English context, that is capable
of predicting the effect of changing admissions policies on housing and school stratifi-
cation would seem to be a crucial tool to make available to policy-makers. Through a
review of existing models of parental choice of school in the literature, this chapter has
argued that there still needs to be considerable progress made before we have models
that are useful to policy-makers who wish to make equitable and cost-effective deci-
sions regarding admissions regulation, transport subsidies, the employment of choice
advisors, and so on.
The sociological literature is descriptively interesting but appears reluctant to move
towards making predictive claims about specific policies relative to well-defined coun-
terfactuals. By contrast, the economics literature is capable to making very specific
predictive claims, but is not yet well-adapted to the English context. In any case, it
is currently so reductionist in terms of its perspective on human behaviour that it is
unlikely to be making accurate predictions about the effects of policies on stratifica-
tion. Given the rich sociological descriptions of parental decision-making described
at the start of the chapter, economic models might be enhanced by modelling human
behaviour in a more complex fashion than the current optimisation problem of simple
maximisation of peer quality given a budget constraint.
Progress in economic modelling can only take place via a more detailed description
of the current institutional environment and apparent household behaviour within the
English context. Providing some of this contextualisation in terms of the importance
of the housing market and specific admissions criteria in determining school allocations
is the purpose of the next two chapters. However, many questions will remain unan-
swered. For example, we need a detailed understanding of why schools and housing
are currently so much more integrated than basic models of catchment area schooling
predict. Given this relatively high social integration we should be cautious about mak-
ing claims that choice programs must, a priori, lower segregation. It is not impossible
that they set in place a dynamic whereby a previously stable and integrated system
becomes more stratified. As part of the development of this literature, economists
should remain open to the possibility that inertia in the housing market, myopia by
households, path dependency and psychic attachments to locations all mean that out-
of-equilibrium analysis, as used by agent-based computational models, is an important
counterpart to general equilibrium models.
Chapter 4
Sources of school stratification I:
The role of the housing market
The analysis in this chapter is based around a thought experiment:
What would happen to school compositions if we removed all pupils from
their current secondary schools and reallocated them based strictly on a
policy of proximity to school?
The research question has not been devised to provide causal estimates as to sources
of stratification, described in the previous chapter. Instead it is intended to provide
a rich description of sorting in both the school and housing market. Pupil postcodes
in NPD are used to simulate this thought experiment, showing the current role of
the housing market in contributing to school segregation by indicating the amount of
current school segregation that is attributable to residential segregation. It also pro-
vides an estimate of the extent to which pupils do not attend their proximity school,
giving an upper bound on the amount of choice exercised by parents. The simula-
tion therefore helps us understand how this pupil mobility affects the stratification of
pupils across schools. Through additional simulations it also identifies areas where the
post-1988 choice policies might have resulted in increasing school segregation. In this
way it contributes to the school segregation literature on the effects of the Education
Reform Act using a technique that avoids the problems associated with longitudinal
measurements of school segregation, described in the next section.
Unfortunately, the simulated proximity allocation used in this study, while insightful in
certain respects, is a poor proxy for the real world experiment for one principal reason:
if we abandoned school choice and non-proximity admissions criteria in England today,
we would expect some reallocation in the housing market as parents move house to
attempt to achieve their desired choice of school. In other words, residential levels
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of segregation are endogenous to the policies under examination in this study, but
no estimates exist as to the size of the endogeneity bias on residential segregation in
our data.1 Specifically, it is not clear the extent to which school choice reduces the
need for parents to locate close to a good school, given the outcome of the English
school choice process is highly uncertain for a family (as discussed in Chapter 3).
This means that when an association between a policy and the size of post-residential
sorting is measured, we can go no further than infer that the policy has increased
school segregation or reduced residential segregation (or both).
The chapter begins by describing the school segregation literature in order to document
recent changes in segregation, motivate the choice of segregation index used in this
chapter and discuss the advantages of using the free school meals measure in cross-
sectional rather than longitudinal data. The chapter then goes on to describe the
simulation method and present findings from the simulation.
4.1 Literature on changes in school segregation
The main body of literature that measures the effect of changes in school admissions on
the sorting of pupils calculates segregation indices for local authorities and describes
how these indices change over time. Until relatively recently in England, the only
data collected on the demographic composition of schools was via the Annual Schools
Census, where schools declared the number of pupils known to be eligible for free
school meals (FSM). This was used as a proxy for social disadvantage to compare the
distribution of pupils who were eligible for FSM, versus those who were not, across
state schools.
4.1.1 Main findings
The first major research programme using large-scale longitudinal quantitative data
measured secondary school segregation in the years 1989 to 1999. It claimed to show
that, contrary to popular opinion, school segregation actually fell in the period imme-
diately following the Act and has risen slightly since then (Gorard et al., 2002b, 2003).
This finding, shown in Figure 4.1, prompted a fierce debate as to whether the large fall
in segregation between 1991 and 1993 should be causally attributable to choice policies
‘unlocking the iron cage’ of neighbourhood catchment areas, or alternatively whether
there were technical reasons for the fall in their measure. The two technical arguments
1A fifth of parents had taken account of catchment areas the last time they moved home and those
who hadn’t done so were more likely to take other special actions to further their application (Coldron
et al., 2008).
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regarding their choice of index and stability in the FSM measure are discussed here
since they are directly relevant to methods chosen for this chapter.
Figure 4.1: Values of Gorard’s segregation index (GS)
All researchers, using very different measures of segregation, agree that secondary
school segregation, measured using FSM, has been increasing very slowly from 1994 to
2007 (Allen and Vignoles, 2007; Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2008a;
Goldstein and Noden, 2003; Noden, 2000). The increases in school segregation have
been fastest in London (Allen and Vignoles, 2007) and in areas with high proportions
of pupils in VA schools (Allen and Vignoles, 2007; Goldstein and Noden, 2003). How-
ever, these are measured associations and there is no suggestion that these are causal
relationships.
4.1.2 Gorard’s segregation index
The first technical argument relating to the validity of Gorard et al.’s findings relate to
their choice of a non-standard segregation index. The formulae for Gorard’s segregation
index (GS) and the index of dissimilarity (D) for segregation in an LA with I schools
and where FSM pupils are eligible for free school meals, NONFSM pupils are not
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Allen and Vignoles (2007) argue that the GS index is not the optimal way of measuring
changes in school segregation because:
1. GS is not bounded by 0 and 1: the upper boundary varies according to FSM eligi-
bility, making comparisons across LAs with varying levels of deprivation difficult.
GS is better described as an ‘indicator’ rather than an index of segregation;
2. GS is not symmetric, meaning that it is capable of showing that FSM segregation
is rising and NONFSM segregation is falling simultaneously; and
3. GS is actually systematically variant to changes in overall FSM eligibility, except
in the most stringent and unlikely of circumstances. It has a tendency to fall
as FSM eligibility rises, regardless of the change in the unevenness of school’s
shares of FSM and NONFSM pupils.
D and GS are closely related and measure similar aspects of unevenness segregation,
but it is substantively important which index is selected. D and GS will only be
highly correlated where levels of FSM eligibility do not vary greatly, and this is not
the case across schools data. So, for example, Allen and Vignoles (2007) argue that
GS overstates the magnitude of the fall in segregation after 1989 by 100 per cent,
compared to D.
Noden (2000) and Goldstein and Noden (2003) also provided different criticisms of
Gorard et al.’s work. However, the index of isolation, chosen by Noden, and the
index that is implicit in the multilevel modelling approach are both also systematically
variant to changes in overall FSM eligibility and are not 0-1 bounded. For example,
the index of isolation has a tendency to rise as overall FSM eligibility rises, regardless
of the change in the unevenness of schools’ shares of FSM and NONFSM pupils. This
chapter therefore uses the index of dissimilarity (D), which is a 0-1 bounded index,
thus measuring the relative level of segregation compared to complete evenness and
complete segregation.
4.1.3 Stability of FSM measure
The fall in all segregation indices in the early 1990s, illustrated in Figure 4.1, shows
a pattern of two years of falling segregation up to 1993 followed by a rapid levelling
out of the level of segregation. This particular pattern of data seems inconsistent
with an explanation whereby a policy change produces a change in the sorting of
pupils into secondary schools because secondary schools have five cohorts of pupils at
any one time. Therefore, a one-off policy change should produce five years of falling
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segregation (at roughly the same rate) as the cohorts of pupils who entered the school
under the previous regime gradually reach the age of 16 and leave the Census.
The large fall in FSM segregation between schools between 1991 and 1993 coincided
with a serious recession in England, and most researchers now agree that this was
responsible for the changes in measured segregation between schools. The problem
with the FSM measure is that FSM eligibility is not a fixed attribute of the child, but
changes as the economic circumstances of the family change. So, it is possible that
segregation can change from one year to the next as pupils switch their status from
NONFSM to FSM, and vice versa, even if there is no change in the actual composition
of the school. A recession would produce falling school segregation, for example, if
the incidence of unemployment disproportionately affected families with children in
relatively aﬄuent schools. Recessions cannot, of course, affect the FSM status of pupils
who are already eligible and this is why the relative deprivation of already deprived
schools tends to fall.
If we accept the argument that the fall in school segregation in the early 1990s was due
to the recession, it is also possible that the more recent rise in school segregation has
simply been the product of an improving economic environment. Given the suscepti-
bility of the FSM status indicator to changes in economic circumstances, Gibbons and
Telhaj (2006) use a measure of KS2 attainment from NPD to show there was very little
change in ability segregation between 1996 and 2002. However, ideally we also want a
method for measuring FSM segregation without the problems described above. This
chapter, by using a counterfactual in the same time period, overcomes the question of
stability of the FSM measure.
4.2 Method and data
4.2.1 Data
The analysis in this chapter draws data from the National Pupil Database, Annual
Schools Census and the 2001 Population and Housing Census of the UK, described
more fully in Chapter 2. The 463,117 pupils in this analysis were in year 9 (age 13/14)
in 2002/3. There is no postcode relating to year 6 or year 7 for this cohort in NPD, so
there is a risk that the pupil has moved house since year 7 and the postcode used in
this study will not relate to residential location at the point choice was made. Using
a cohort in year 9 (rather than year 7) has one advantage that it means every student
in England will have completed the secondary admissions process.2
27% of this year group transferred to secondary school at the end of year 7 or year 8
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Key descriptors of all variables used in this study are in Table 4.1. Pupil social back-
ground and prior attainment are measured in four different ways in this chapter. First,
social background is assessed using the FSM indicator. Second, high ability children
are identified using an indicator for whether a child scored in the top quintile in KS2
tests at the end of primary schools. Third, a separate low ability indicator of whether
the child scored in the lowest quintile in KS2 tests is used. This is relatively highly cor-
related with FSM. Finally, the child’s total KS2 score is used as a continuous measure
of ability on entry to secondary school.
Table 4.1: Summary statistics for LAs
Weighted by pupil numbers
Description Mean S.D. Min Max
Number of pupils in LA 5,139 3,559 361 13,157
Number of schools in LA 34 25 3 101
Average population density in LA 0 1 -0.77 5.82
% of pupils in LA at grammar schools 4% 9% 0% 42%
% of pupils in LA at VA comprehensives 14% 10% 0% 65%
% of pupils in LA at foundation comprehensives 16% 19% 0% 100%
% of pupils eligible for FSM 13% 9% 3% 64%
% of lone parent families 7% 1% 5% 14%
% of families with no parent in work 13% 6% 4% 49%
Mobility (pupils who move schools in simulation) 52% 14% 15% 86%
Median pupil’s simulation journey as % of actual 64% 12% 31% 95%
FSM segregation (D) in real data 0.29 0.07 0.13 0.54
FSM segregation (D) in Simulation I 0.24 0.06 0.07 0.45
FSM post-residential sorting 0.05 0.05 -0.17 0.38
FSM post-residential sorting not due to grammars
and VA (segreal − segproxIII)
0.03 0.04 -0.11 0.20
Top 20% ability segregation (D) in real data 0.27 0.14 0.06 0.71
Top 20% ability segregation (D) in Simulation I 0.16 0.03 0.04 0.27
Top 20% ability post-residential sorting 0.11 0.14 -0.05 0.58
Top 20% ability post-residential sorting not due to
grammars and VA (segreal − segproxIII)
0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.28
Low 20% ability segregation (D) in real data 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.51
Low segregation (D) in Simulation I 0.16 0.04 0.01 0.29
Low post-residential sorting 0.07 0.07 -0.05 0.40
Low post-residential sorting not due to grammars
and VA (segreal − segproxIII)
0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.22
Ability (cont.) segregation (ICC) in real data 0.12 0.10 0.01 0.47
Ability (cont.) segregation (ICC) in Simulation I 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.13
Ability (cont.) post-residential sorting 0.09 0.10 -0.02 0.45
Ability (cont.) post-residential sorting not due to
grammars and VA (segreal − segproxIII)
0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.18
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4.2.2 A counterfactual to current school admissions
The policies we label as ‘school choice’ policies in the UK are all intended to reduce the
strength of the relationship between place of residence and school attended. Therefore,
one possible counterfactual to these policies is the administrative allocation of pupils
to school based solely on a proximity admissions criterion. This study tests two key
propositions. First, that the amount of pupil mobility in an LA depends on the ability
of parents to access a non-proximity school. This in turn is related to:3
• population density in the LA, which indicates the size of the potential choice set
for parents;4
• the proportion of lone parent families and families where no one works in the
household;
• the proportion of schools in the LA who may be using non-proximity oversub-
scription criteria, i.e. grammar, Voluntary-Aided (non-grammar) and Founda-
tion (non-grammar) schools.
Second, that the difference in the level of current school segregation relative to segrega-
tion under the proximity allocation will be greatest where grammar, VA and Founda-
tion schools exist. This may be because oversubscription criteria at these schools tend
to favour higher income or ability pupils. Alternatively, this may be because school
choice strategies differ by social background of family.
If this second proposition holds, we can then infer that the potential to reduce school
stratification via a policy intervention that institutes a strict proximity policy is great-
est in areas with many grammar, VA and Foundation schools. However, we must accept
that residential sorting may rise in response; therefore gains in school integration may
represent an upper bound.
The proximity counterfactual is created by computer using the OS grid references for
pupil and school addresses in the dataset using the following rules:
1. all schools must fill their places on the basis of proximity, with a strict preference
for pupils who live closer to the school. All other school admissions criteria at
schools are removed (though single sex schools remain single sex);5
2. school capacity is set as either the current official school capacity or the size of
3Spare capacity in the LA was also tested but never significant, so is not reported here
4Population density is used as a proxy for the size of the parents choice set. Alternatives such as
average number of competitor schools within a certain radius (Levacˇic´, 2004) or drive-time (Burgess
et al., 2007) are relatively highly correlated at LA level with average population density.
5The simulations retain single sex schools since gender is considered a fixed non-SES characteristic
and so to avoid an upward bias on the effect of population density on mobility levels and a downward
bias in the effect on sorting
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the current pupil intake, whichever is greater;6
3. no parents will be allowed to exercise choice to attend another school, even if
that school has spare capacity;7
The simulation presented in this report is essentially a Priority Matching Mechanism,
one of several two-sided matching mechanisms described in Chapter 1.8 The method
in the simulation is as follows:
• The first round identifies each pupil’s nearest school and distance from home and
pupils are allocated to it, provided that there is enough spare capacity for them.
If there are more pupils for whom it is the nearest school than there are places
available, only those nearest are allocated.
• At the end of the first round, 84 per cent of pupils have been allocated to their
nearest school. Forty-one per cent of schools (1,271 of 3,071) are full to capacity
and will therefore be excluded from future iterations.
• The second round is similar, but with fewer spare places left at schools and only
16 per cent of pupils. The nearest school (with remaining space) is identified
for each unplaced pupil. Again, pupils are allocated to the nearest school if
there is enough space to accommodate them, with priority given in strict order
of proximity.
The process must be repeated 9 times to allocate all pupils to a school. At the end
of the process there are still 33,845 empty spaces at schools (7 per cent of all places
available at the start of the allocation) because there is spare capacity in the system.
Table 4.2 summarises the key details of distances travelled by pupils who are allocated
at each stage of the procedure.
The simulation does not intend to replicate a real-world situation since this type of
strict proximity allocation, without grammar schools and church schools, has never
existed in England. Even where proximity is now the over-riding allocation principle
in an area, many LAs continue to use catchment areas to aid planning and certainty of
the allocation process for parents. It is simply suggested that this simulation provides
6Because of the need to exclude certain pupils from the allocation process, e.g. borders, the %
capacity utilisation for 2000 is first calculated on the basis on total pupils at school. Where it is
greater than 100%, it is reset to 100%. Simulation school capacity = pupils currently at school who
are in simulation / % capacity utilisation
7The capacity constraint is significant in the simulation to the extent that if every pupil were
allocated to their nearest school, 41% of schools would exceed their current capacity. Furthermore, if
every school is filled to its current size but on the basis of proximity, 23% of pupils are allocated to
more than one school and 27% of pupils are not allocated at all.
8Many alternative specifications were tested, but do not alter the substantive findings of this chap-
ter. These specifications include allocation to nearest school without constraining capacity and an
allocation mechanism whereby priority to oversubscribed schools is given to the pupils for whom the
next nearest spare place is furthest from their home.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for proximity allocation procedure
Round Pupils Pupils placed Minimum Median Maximum
needing in round journey to journey to journey to
places allocated allocated allocated
school (km) school (km) school (km)
1 463,117 388,311 (84%) 0.0 0.9 38.8
2 74,806 47,107 (63%) 0.2 2.4 25.5
3 27,699 16,690 (60%) 1.0 3.6 35.9
4 11,009 6,619 (60%) 1.3 5.2 43.8
5 4,390 2,798 (64%) 2.5 6.3 44.7
6 1,592 802 (50%) 4.1 7.4 46.3
7 790 464 (59%) 6.2 8.9 82.2
8 326 256 (79%) 8.3 13.3 15.8
9 70 70 (100%) 13.0 14.4 16.1
a valid mechanism for examining the stratification implications of current student
sorting. This claim is made on the basis that only a tiny proportion of the 463,117
pupils are required to make unreasonable journeys in the allocation.9
Given that almost all grammar and VA schools existed prior to the 1980s, two ad-
ditional simulations are used to provide a better indication of the possible role of
new choice or post-1988 policies in changing pupil sorting. The three simulations are
referred to as:
Proximity 1: the proximity allocation where no schools retain current pupils (this is
the principal simulation and is described above)
Proximity 2: a proximity allocation where grammar schools retain current pupils (to
generate an estimate of between-comprehensive pupil sorting)
Proximity 3: a proximity allocation where grammar and VA schools retain current
pupils (to generate an estimate of between non-faith comprehensive pupil sorting)
4.2.3 Measuring differences in segregation
Since the outcome of interest in this study is the stratification of a local education
market under different scenarios, it is necessary to geographically define the market.
This study principally relies on LAs as the area of analysis, despite the high levels of
cross-LA movement between certain LAs, particularly those in London. The simulation
allows pupils to attend their nearest school, even if it is in a different LA to their
9For example, 449 pupils would be required to travel more than 5 times their current journey
distance; 730 pupils would be required to travel over 10 km (though for some this is their nearest
school)
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home or current school. However, the measurement of LA-level segregation in the
actual data versus the proximity allocation will often involve slightly different sets of
pupils.10
Segregation between schools in an LA is measured using the index of dissimilarity
(D). Segregation by FSM eligibility, by top 20% ability and by the lowest 20% ability
is calculated using D. In addition the intra-class correlation (ICC) of a continuous
measure of KS2 ability between-schools in an LA is used as a further estimate of
segregation, where ICC = 1 indicates that schools are fully stratified because there
is no within-school variation in ability and ICC = 0 indicates that schools are fully
integrated by ability because there is no between-school variation in ability.
This study seeks to account for differences in the level of actual segregation between
schools, segreal, versus the level of segregation under the proximity allocation, segproxI .
It is hypothesised that the size of this difference will relate to the level of pupil mo-
bility (i.e. the proportion of pupils who are not currently educated in their proximity
allocation school) in LA i, but also structural features of the quasi-market:
segreali − segproxIi = β0 + β1mobilityi + i
segreali − segproxIi = β0 + β1grammari + β2V Ai + β3foundationi + i
Given the segregation index is 0-1 bounded, there is no clear a priori reason to favour
the measurement of post-residential sorting as the absolute difference in the value of
the segregation indices (segreal − segproxI) over the proportionate difference in the
value of the segregation indices (segreal/segproxI). A problem with (segreal/segproxI),
particularly if D is used, is that it will have a very high value if an LA with very low
levels of segregation experiences a small absolute increase in segregation that we might
think has little effect on social welfare (e.g. the value of D doubles). It would be greater
in this case, for example, than a higher segregation LA that experiences quite a large
absolute, but smaller proportionate increase in segregation. The rank of LAs on both
the absolute and proportionate measures of post-residential sorting will be sensitive
to the segregation index chosen. So, both are tested and the absolute difference is
selected on the basis that it provides more consistent regression results.
There are two properties of D that are highly relevant to its use as a dependent variable
in a regression and therefore warrant mention here. First, D incorporates a linear
payoff criterion to unevenness in the distribution of FSM pupils across schools (Zoloth,
1976). If we believe that the effects on social welfare of schools having different FSM
10Alternative specifications of all regressions were tested using 105 areas created by combining LAs
where there are significant cross-LA movements, but did not alter the substantive findings. Results
are available for this specification of the model.
Chapter 4. Housing market and school segregation 82
proportions are non-linear, then D can provide us a broadly acceptable ordinal ranking
of segregation but an inappropriate cardinal measurement of amounts of segregation.
The robustness of results to this issue can be mitigated to some extent by replication of
results using an index, such as the Square Root index (Hutchens, 2004), with a highly
non-linear payoff criterion.11
A second issue is that the value of segregation under a random allocation of pupils to
schools will be significantly greater than zero because a single school cohort is quite
small, and this is generally an issue where a segregation index is used as the dependent
variable in a regression (Carrington and Troske, 1997). This is known as the random al-
location bias, the size of which is a function of the size of the LA, the number of schools
in the LA and the overall FSM proportion in the LA (Cortese et al., 1976). Randomi-
sation tests (presented in Allen et al., 2008) show that the variation in the size of the
random allocation bias between LAs is substantial in all single cohort NPD datasets
and therefore potentially invalidates all existing NPD segregation research that cannot
account for this. The random allocation bias is overcome in the specifications described
above because the size of the bias will be almost identical for segreal and segproxI (since
their margins should be approximately the same in the LA), thus removing most of
the influence of the bias on the dependent variable segreal − segproxI .
Because this chapter compares school segregation to a counterfactual proximity alloca-
tion of pupils, it is similar in its strengths and limitations to Burgess et al. (2007). They
try to explain why the magnitude of the difference between residential and school segre-
gation (post-residential sorting) differs substantially between LAs. However, because
residential segregation is measured using wards as sub-units, which vary systemati-
cally and substantively in size across England, the random allocation bias is serious
and confounds their measured association of post-residential sorting with population
density.12 This study moves beyond the scope of their work by analysing the role of
own-admissions authority schools in contributing to sorting and also overcomes impor-
tant methodological concerns regarding a random allocation bias, as described above,
on their measure of post-residential sorting.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 The level of pupil mobility in LAs
The term mobility in this analysis means the extent to which pupils attend a different
school to their current school in the proximity allocation. If the year 9 pupils in this
11These robustness tests are not reported in this chapter, but are available.
12Urban LAs tend to have more schools, relative to the number of wards, which increases their
post-residential sorting ratio under a random allocation.
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simulation were re-allocated to schools on the basis of strict proximity, 52% of pupils
would be placed in a different school to their current school. This is consistent with
the Burgess et al. (2007) indication that approximately half of all pupils currently
attend their nearest school. The median pupil’s distance to school under a proximity
allocation would be just 64% of the length of their current journey.
Levels of pupil mobility differ substantially by LA, as shown in Figure 4.2. Not surpris-
ingly, high mobility LAs are largely located in or around London, with 86% of pupils
in Lambeth schools, for example, not attending the school they would be under the
proximity allocation. Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham also have high levels of
pupil mobility. By contrast, areas where very little pupil mobility currently appears to
be exercised are more rural, for example Leicestershire (mobility = 15%), East Riding















Percentage of pupils who are not at their proximity school 
Figure 4.2: Distribution of mobility levels across LAs
Table 4.3 shows the estimates from the regression to test whether pupil mobility in an
LA is associated with particular school or population characteristics. The overall model
explains 75% of the between-LA variability in the proportion of pupils who are not at
their proximity school; population density and all school type variables are significant
at 1%. The size of the effect of grammar schools and VA schools is approximately
the same, which is logical since neither tends give priority to pupils on the basis of
proximity. Though the Foundation school coefficient is significant, the size of the effect
on pupil mobility is very small: if 25% of pupils in an LA are at Foundation schools,
mobility would be estimated to increase by just 2.5 percentage points. The effect of
population density is so strong that an urban LA with only community comprehensives
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might have higher pupil mobility than a very rural area with grammar schools.13
Table 4.3: Association between the quasi-market and level of mobility
Dependent variable mobility
Number of observations 147, weighted for no. of pupils in LA
Adj.R2 75%
Coeff. t-stat P > |t|
Proportion of pupils at grammar schools 0.6999 10.43 0.001
Proportion of pupils at VA schools 0.6147 8.31 0.001
Proportion of pupils at foundation schools 0.0987 30.06 0.003
Population density 0.0513 5.49 0.001
Proportion of lone parent families 1.1384 1.82 0.071
Proportion with no parent in work 0.0831 0.53 0.594
Constant 0.2927 7.04 0.001
Fifty-two percent of pupils do not attend their proximity school, yet Figure 4.3 uses
additional simulations and analysis of the pupil’s neighbourhood to establish that the
destinations of only around one in five pupils might have been affected by post-1988
choice policies (this estimate ignores the possibility that changes in capacity at schools
have altered the ‘neighbourhood’ school for some pupils). It estimates this because
many of these sorting pupils are at grammar or VA schools or are likely to be at the
de facto neighbourhood school, but this is not identified by the simulations.
At proximity allocation 
school 48% 
At their proximity non-
faith comprehensive 6% Probably at the 
neighbourhood school 
5% 
Possibly at the 
neighbourhood school 
4% 
At a non-proximity 
grammar school 3% 
At a non-proximity VA 
school 12% 
Pupils for whom we 
cannot explain why they 
do not attend their 
proximity school 22% 
Figure 4.3: Understanding why pupils do not attend their proximity school
13These findings are very similar to those of Taylor (2001), who uses earlier data from six local
authorities and finds that the proportion of parents who reject their nearest school is greatest in the
more urban LAs.
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Fifteen per cent of pupils in England are attending a grammar (3%) or VA school
(12%), and this is not their proximity school. Six per cent of pupils attend their
proximity non-faith comprehensive (or secondary modern) school, i.e. the proximity
school in Proximity I is actually a grammar or VA school. Five per cent of pupils are
attending the same school as the majority of pupils living in their Middle SOA (or
neighbourhood). We can assert that these pupils are highly likely to be attending a
designated catchment area school, or they are attending a school under a proximity
criterion. An additional 4 per cent of pupils are probably at their school on the basis
of catchment/proximity criterion because they attend the same school as the majority
of pupils in the Lower SOA where they live. Since the Lower SOA is smaller than
the Middle SOA, this identifies a set of pupils where the Middle SOA is crossing the
catchment boundaries for more than one school. However, the use of the lower SOA
(which is a small area so can have a homogenous social mix) presents a risk of mis-
classification of pupils, so it might be the case that all the pupils in the SOA are
successfully ‘exercising choice’ to attend a school far away from their homes.
This analysis shows us that more than half the pupils who are not attending their
proximity school are either highly likely to be at a neighbourhood school or they are
choosing not to based on criteria available to parents before 1988 (i.e. grammar and
faith schools). Whereas Burgess et al. (2007) suggested that there is a high level of
choice in England because 50% of pupils are not at their nearest school, this research
places an upper bound on pupil mobility due to the new choice policies of 22%. This
appears to be more in-line with the only existing study to model exact catchment areas,
which found pupil mobility of around one-third in an LA with some grammar schools
(Parsons et al., 2000). It is also consistent with a nationally representative survey where
25% of parents report they chose not to apply to their nearest maintained school in
2006 (Coldron et al., 2008).
Unfortunately, this analysis allows us to do no more than speculate about why the
remaining 22% of pupils are not at their proximity school. These pupils are more
likely to live in London (where they make up 34% of all London pupils) and are not,
on average, attending schools with a superior social mix or ability of intake to their
proximity allocation school. We can hypothesise that these 103,223 pupils are not at
their proximity school for the following reasons:
1. Edge of catchment. Some pupils are attending the same school as pupils in
the neighbourhood, but the SOA categories could not identify this (for exam-
ple, because catchment boundaries cross the SOA). Half of these unaccounted
for pupils are attending the same school as over 50% of pupils in the Output
Area (but this statistical area is very small, so we cannot be certain that it is a
neighbourhood school).
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2. Family relocation. Some pupils may have gained their place at the school on
the basis of a sibling policy, where other members of the family were allocated
a proximity place because the family used to live the area. Alternatively, the
family may have moved house since gaining a proximity place in Year 7.
3. LA-wide ability banding. Some pupils are attending a school on the basis of
a banding system in an LA or school: this may, or may not be, their first choice
school. The four London LAs who were operating LA banding at the time these
pupils entered secondary school do have relatively high degrees of unexplained
mobility.
4. Choice without displacement. Some pupils are exercising choice to attend a
school other than the proximity school, and have gained a place at their chosen
school via a proximity criterion (or other means) because all pupils who live
closer either gained a place at the school or did not wish to attend it.
5. Choice with displacement. Some pupils have successfully exercised choice,
having been allocated a place at the school via a non-proximity criterion such
as aptitude (or as the sibling of a child who gained a place via an aptitude
criterion), thereby displacing pupils who live nearer to the school than they do.
There is some evidence for this phenomenon in the data: 23% of the unexplained
mobility pupils are attending Foundation schools, versus 18% of the population
and West et al. (2004) note that Foundation schools are more likely to have
selective admissions criteria than community comprehensives.
6. Displacement due to others’ choice. If we believe that choice with dis-
placement explains a significant proportion of this unexplained sorting, then we
should expect a significant number of pupils to be not attending their (non-faith
comprehensive) proximity school because they are rejected in favour of pupils
who live further away from the school than they do, but who gain places on
non-proximity criteria.
4.3.2 School segregation and post-residential sorting
In this dataset, the weighted mean school segregation in LAs, measured by the dis-
similarity index, is 0.29 by FSM and 0.27 by top 20% ability. The level of school
segregation differs substantially by LA, as shown in Figure 4.4.
The regressions of LA level school segregation on a set of school type variables in
Table 4.4 shows that higher levels of school segregation are associated with greater
proportions of pupils educated at grammar and VA schools (this identifies the possible
effect of these schools without endogenous residential sorting confounding estimates,
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Figure 4.4: School segregation in English LAs
but is not a causal impact since the supply of school places is not explicitly modelled).
Foundation schools are also associated with segregation by ability, but not FSM seg-
regation in this sample. As with all regressions reported in this study, explanatory
variables explain a relatively low proportion of variability in FSM segregation and a
high proportion of variability in ability segregation. We cannot know whether this is
due to the poorness of FSM as a proxy for social disadvantage, or whether school types
have a clearer, more direct effect on ability sorting.
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Almost all LAs have lower school segregation in the simulation proximity allocation
of pupils to schools (segproxI), the values of which directly result from residential
segregation. This is an important finding since it cannot easily be reconciled with
the suggestion that low income families are the principal beneficiaries of policies that
reduce the role of residential location in school admissions.
Figure 4.5 maps the distribution of segreal and segproxI in LAs by FSM and top
ability. The proximity segregation distribution represents the best possible reduction
in school segregation by instituting a proximity policy. Overall, the weighted mean
level of post-residential sorting is 0.05 (s.d. 0.04) by FSM and 0.11 (s.d. 0.12) by top
ability. In both cases, segregation under the proximity allocation is typically lower.
However, several LAs have a lower calculated segregation between schools currently
than in the proximity allocation, i.e. post-residential sorting is less than zero. This
is most likely to be because large numbers of pupils are crossing LA boundaries and
so the calculation of segregation contains different pupils in each instance, i.e. the LA
is not the valid market. Alternatively, whether by chance or design, these LAs have
catchment areas drawn around schools that do not reflect strict proximity well and
result in lower segregation.
Figure 4.5: Current school versus Proximity I segregation
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4.3.3 Explaining levels of post-residential sorting
There is a positive and significant correlation between levels of mobility in an LA and
post-residential sorting by FSM and ability. These correlations, shown in Figure 4.6,
are 0.48, 0.56 and 0.62 for FSM, top ability and low ability, respectively. The outliers
by top ability post-residential sorting are areas with grammar schools.
Figure 4.6: Relationship between pupil mobility and post-residential sorting
Table 4.5 shows that LAs with greater proportions of Voluntary-Aided, Foundation or
grammar schools have higher levels of post-residential ability and FSM sorting. Not
surprisingly, the effect of grammar schools on top ability sorting is very high indeed:
where grammar schools in an LA educate 25% of the pupils, they contribute to a 0.35
unit increase in top ability post-residential sorting. VA and Foundation schools control
their own admissions, yet their typical effect on school sorting is different. VA non-
grammar schools contribute to higher levels of post-residential sorting than Foundation
non-grammar schools. All these findings are robust to the exclusion of London LAs
from the regressions. There is relatively weak evidence that post-residential sorting is
lower in areas of high unemployment.
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As pupils succeed in attending a non-proximity school this mobility raises school segre-
gation relative to residential (or the proximity) segregation. We can use the proximity
allocation to show that pupils who are not eligible for FSM are more likely to benefit
from current sorting than FSM pupils, where ‘benefit’ is defined to mean they improve
their peer group relative to the proximity allocation. Pupils who remain in the same
school following the simulation may not have mobility, but this does not mean they do
not benefit from sorting. We can say they will benefit if the choice policies produce an
improved peer group at the school they currently attend.
One way to illustrate the peer group of a school is as the proportion of pupils eligible
for FSM in the real data and Proximity I. Table 4.6 shows the change in the FSM
peer group experienced by FSM and NONFSM pupils as a result of current mobility.
Sixty-one per cent of FSM pupils are worse off in terms of their peer group under
current sorting, compared to a proximity allocation. Just 13 per cent of FSM pupils
have mobility that results in them improving their peer group and 25 per cent find
that their own school’s peer group improves through current mobility. By contrast,
half of the pupils not eligible for FSM have a better peer group under current sorting
(and some have a considerably better peer group, which is why more than 50 per cent
of pupils are worse off in the proximity allocation overall).
Table 4.6: Gains from mobility as measured by change in FSM peer group
Worse peer group Better peer group
than under proximity: than under proximity:
% in a % remaining % in a % remaining
different in the same different in the same
school school school school
Pupils eligible for FSM 29.86 31.45 13.30 25.38
Pupils not eligible for FSM 29.16 20.86 19.62 30.36
School segregation is said to matter because it creates inequalities in the school peer
group experienced by children from different backgrounds. Standard estimates of the
size of the peer group effect suggest a one s.d. improvement in a child’s peer group
leads to around a 0.1 s.d. change in that child’s achievement (see Ammermueller and
Pischke, 2006, for a recent summary). The proximity simulations suggest that the
typical child currently experiencing a relatively poor peer group (one s.d. below the
mean) would see this improve somewhat under a proximity allocation to around 0.57
s.d. below the mean peer group. Though this is a meaningful improvement in peer
group and therefore predictive educational outcomes for the child, it would be wrong
to claim that neighbourhood schooling offers a magic bullet for lowering social class
inequalities in achievement.
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4.3.4 Post-1988 mobility and post-residential sorting
The prediction of sociologists working in the field of education has been that the policies
introduced since 1988 will increase pupil mobility and that this will in turn produce
greater school segregation (e.g. Gewirtz et al., 1995). Two simulations – Proximity II
and III – can separate mobility likely to have existed pre-1988 from potentially newer
mobility. Proximity III allows grammar and VA schools to keep existing pupils (to
identify the post-residential sorting attributable to these schools) and Proximity II
separates the contribution of VA schools to post-residential sorting by allowing only
grammar schools to keep existing pupils.
Figure 4.7 shows that mobility caused by grammar and VA schools can explain most
of the post-residential sorting of pupils by ability, but they explain little of the total
FSM post-residential sorting.






Attributable to grammar 
schools 
Attributable to VA 
schools 
Attributable to post-1988 
choice policies? 
Figure 4.7: Sources of post-residential sorting
The weighted mean value of post-residential sorting that might be attributable to the
post-1988 choice policies is 0.03 for each of FSM, top ability and low ability segregation.
This is quite a low figure, but it varies between areas: it is as high as 0.20 in Haringey
(by FSM); and 0.28 in Wandsworth (by high ability).
4.4 Discussion
This chapter has sought to show that we can improve our understanding of the impact
of school choice policies on student sorting via simulations that reallocate pupils to
secondary schools strictly on the basis of proximity by exploiting the availability of
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pupil postcodes. This is a new (and therefore imperfect) technique and could be im-
proved, for example: via consideration of each school’s relevant geographical ‘market’;
by accounting directly for partial ability selection by comprehensives in the simulation;
through repetition over several years to understand the changing role of the housing
market; and by accounting for the part of the endogenous residential sorting that
takes place between the ages of 5 and 11 as more years of pupil-level data become
available.
Though half the pupils in the study do not actually attend their proximity allocation
school, much of this can be likely attributed to the shape of catchment areas and
the presence of grammar and VA schools (i.e. pre-1988 mobility). The simulations
estimate that mobility between non-faith comprehensive schools is likely to involve no
more than one-in-five pupils in England.
Pupil mobility results from the combination of both the choice to attend a non-
proximity school and the displacement of local pupils from their proximity school and,
if successfully exercised, naturally means longer journeys to school. The proximity
allocation indicates that the typical journey currently made by a pupil is 60% longer
than the minimum necessary. In fact, over 5 million kilometres14 of additional travel
is made by 11-16 year olds every school day, either because parents are choosing not
to send their child to the local school, or because the local school is choosing not to
give the child a place. This raises important efficiency issues that are little discussed in
the literature. We should not assume that a parent incorporates the external costs of
pollution and congestion, even if they rationally decide that a longer journey (with the
associated time and money cost for parent and child) is warranted by the ‘superior’ ed-
ucation at the end of the journey. Furthermore, if school places are highly constrained
and proximity is not the sole allocation rule, one parent’s rational choice to access a
‘superior’ education farther away from home may force a pupil local to the school to
make a longer journey to an ‘inferior’ one.
The simulations show that FSM and ability segregation is almost always lower in
the proximity counterfactual than in the actual data, confirming that where pupils
are sorting themselves into a non-proximity school, it does tend to increase social
and ability segregation between schools, relative to underlying residential segregation.
This would appear to be contrary to the suggestion that choice policies are likely to
disproportionately benefit low income families because they were previously unable to
afford homes close to popular schools, thus lowering school segregation (e.g. Hoxby,
2003a; Burgess et al., 2005b). In England we did not start from a position of complete
residential stratification, and in addition we have given some schools both the means
141.4 million km total distance to school in real data versus 0.9 million km in proximity allocation.
Difference of 0.5 million km is multiplied by 2 to incorporate the return journey and multiplied by 5
for the 5 year groups
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and the motivation to recruit pupils with above average ability and those with fewer
problems. However, because existing school allocations widely use catchment areas
rather than proximity criteria, it is possible that these are also leading to the observed
differences between school and residential segregation.
Unfortunately, we cannot use these findings to predict the size of the effect that re-
moving discretion over admissions from grammar, VA and Foundation schools and
forcing a strict proximity allocation would have on school segregation because this
model cannot identify the magnitude of the endogeneity of residential sorting. We
can say that a proximity allocation has the potential to lower school segregation by
the amount that is post-residential sorting, and the size of this potential reduction is
greatest in areas with grammar, VA and Foundation schools and higher population
density areas. However, we do not know the extent to which residential segregation
will rise in any one area to offset this potential fall, so post-residential sorting should
be interpreted as the maximum possible reduction resulting from a proximity alloca-
tion. It is noteable, though, that areas with grammar, VA and Foundation schools do
not currently have lower residential segregation than areas where all schools operate
catchment areas.15
About two-thirds of LAs have a level of post-residential FSM sorting that is lower than
0.05, once segregation directly attributable to grammar and VA schools is accounted
for. Though the simulations do measure significant mobility between non-faith com-
prehensives in these particular LAs, it would be wiser to attribute this to the inability
of the simulation to capture the shape of traditional catchment areas for schools than
it would be to use this to suggest that these parts of the UK are indisputably achieving
choice without greater school segregation. Indeed post-residential FSM sorting that
might be associated with post-1988 policies is only a weighted mean average 0.03 across
LAs. This very low figure might explain why time-series of school segregation reveal so
little change over time on a national basis. If policy-makers genuinely wish to improve
equality of educational opportunity in England, this chapter suggests they should look
closer at the continuing role of grammar schools, Voluntary-Aided faith schools and,
most of all, of the proximity oversubscription criterion in producing socially segregated
secondary schools.
15Also, despite the introduction of school choice, residential patterns (at least the ranking of LAs
from lowest to highest) of economic segregation have remained fairly constant over the last twenty
years (Meen, 2005). Some argue that residential segregation by income has actually intensified in
London and other metropolitan areas in the UK over the past 20-30 years (Meen and Meen, 2003).
Chapter 5
Sources of school stratification
II: School intake versus
neighbourhood characteristics
Chapter 4 showed that local authorities with high proportions of schools that con-
trol their own admissions tend to have a large gap between the level of school and
residential segregation. The purpose of this chapter is to document the extent to
which these own-admissions schools have intakes that differ substantially from their
local neighbourhood, and also to explore the role of specific admissions criteria in
contributing to school segregation. Through the use of a survey of school admissions
policies, a distinction can be drawn between the effects of own-admission schools that
use explicit criteria designed to prioritise pupils with particular characteristics, and
own-admissions schools who do not appear to have policies designed to cream-skim,
but nevertheless do administer their admissions process.
One aim of the chapter is to distinguish between the phenomenon of schools cream-
skimming pupils and stratification attributable to parental choice. This distinction is
difficult to establish in the absence of data containing lists of applicants to schools,
so the conclusions of this chapter are necessarily rather tentative. In fact, even with
this type of data there are circumstances where this distinction would not be appropri-
ate. For example, a school might discourage certain families from applying to a school
through the use of complex opaque admissions procedures, including supplementary
forms that ask for information on marital status, and so on. Thus, data on appli-
cants to the school might appear to show that parental choice was responsible for the
school’s advantaged intake, yet school admissions procedures mean that true parental
preferences were not reflected in applicant lists.
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Two other studies have compared school and neighbourhood characteristics for sec-
ondary schools. The Sutton Trust (2006) compared the intakes of the ‘top’ 200 com-
prehensive schools (according the GCSE league tables) to their local neighbourhoods.
It found evidence of social selection in that only 5.6 per cent of pupils were eligible
for FSM in these schools, compared to 11.5 percent living in their local communities.
Chamberlain et al. (2006) compared the intakes of all secondary schools to their post-
code district, showing the Voluntary-Aided schools admit fewer FSM and more high
ability pupils than are in their local neighbourhood. This chapter makes two additional
contributions to evidence. First, it makes use of different measures of a school’s ‘neigh-
bourhood’, which it argues are superior to the use of the postcode district. Second,
it is able to relate statistics on intakes directly to data to school admissions poli-
cies, therefore moving the debate beyond a discussion about the effect of governance
on cream-skimming and towards the more nuanced debate about the use of specific
admissions criteria and cream-skimming.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, the current intake characteristics of schools
by school type are described. Second, the method of comparison with the local neigh-
bourhood – the proximity ratio and recruitment ratio – are described and evaluated in
relation to each other. Third, admissions policy data are used to assess how policies are
correlated with overt cream-skimming. Fourth, the data on Voluntary-Aided schools
is interrogated further to make preliminary suggestions as to why these schools tend
to have advantaged intakes.
5.1 Schools included in analysis
This chapter uses the National Pupil Database of school leavers in 2005 for England,
details of which can be found in Chapter 2. By examining the characteristics of school
leavers, the intention of this chapter is to investigate the total effects of a school’s
admissions procedures, including the effects of admissions and exclusions after year
7. However, it does mean that the neighbourhood characteristics are measured with
reference to the pupils postcode at 16 and not at the point they enter the school.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the admissions policies and practices of
two distinct types of non-grammar schools that control their admissions: those that
have a religious denomination and those that do not. This distinction is made because
criteria to establish religious adherence are complex, and would appear to focus on the
characteristics of the family rather than the child. LA controlled Community schools
are used as the comparison group for both these types of schools. There are currently
four types of own-admissions schools: Academies, City Technology Colleges (CTCs),
Foundation schools and Voluntary-Aided (VA) schools. However, because Academies
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are still very new and CTCs are few in number, this chapter compares Community
schools to (i) all Foundation schools (most of which will be non-religious former Grant-
Maintained schools); and (ii) VA schools with a religious denomination. There are 42
VA schools that are not defined as religious, and these are excluded from the analysis
because it is the religious admissions criteria that are of particular interest here. On
the other hand, there are a very small number of Voluntary-Controlled schools that
are defined as religious, but these are excluded from the Religious schools group in
this chapter because their admissions are decided and controlled by the LA. Thus, the
label Religious in this analysis refers only to VA religious schools. Table 5.1 marks in
bold the three sets of schools that are compared in this chapter.
Table 5.1: Governance of religious and non-religious schools
Academy CTCs Comm- Found- Vol. Vol. Total
unity ation Aided Con.
Non-religious 10 14 1961 492 42 55 2574
Religious 4 0 0 9 480 38 531
Total 14 14 1961 501 522 93 3105
Since this research is concerned with the effect of admissions policies on school com-
position, the 164 grammar schools are excluded from the majority of this analysis.
Table 5.2 shows that a large proportion of grammar schools have Foundation status,
but since all grammar schools use very similar academic entrance tests, any intake
difference between the 77 Foundation and 41 Community grammars would not seem
likely to inform the analysis of ‘comprehensive’ schools that follows. Although grammar
schools are excluded from the analysis, pupils who are currently in grammar schools
are not dropped from the dataset, but instead are included when the neighbourhood
characteristics of the schools in the analysis are calculated. This means that the aver-
age school in the analysis will have an intake that is less able than the neighbourhood
in which it is located.
Table 5.2: Governance of grammar schools
Non-grammar Grammar All
schools schools schools
Not in analysis 135 28 163
Community 1920 41 1961
Foundation 424 77 501
Voluntary-aided religious 462 18 480
All schools 2941 164 3105
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5.2 Current intake characteristics by school type
Table 5.3 shows the social, ethnic and ability characteristics of pupils who attend
Community, Foundation and Religious schools, compared to pupils in all state schools.
Foundation schools have the fewest free-school meals (FSM) eligible pupils (an average
of 9.7%), followed by Religious schools (12.7%) and Community schools (15.1%). By
contrast, Religious schools have the greatest proportion of pupils who scored in the
top 25% nationally in Key Stage Two tests (28.3%), compared to Foundation schools
(23.6%) and Community schools (21.0%). Throughout the remainder of this chapter,
‘top ability’ is short-hand for these pupils scoring in the top quarter of the population
in KS2 tests, i.e. the pupils deemed to be of highest academic ability on entry to
secondary school. Similarly, ‘low ability’ is short-hand for pupils scoring in the lowest
quarter of the population in KS2 tests.
Table 5.3: Characteristics of pupils in schools by analysis group (%)





































FSM 13.3 14.9 8.8 12.4 13.8 15.1 9.7 12.7
Top 25% ability 24.9 21.9 29.9 29.9 22.7 21.0 23.6 28.3
Low 25% ability 25.2 27.8 21.4 19.0 26.2 28.3 24.0 19.6
Asian Indian 2.3 2.3 2.8 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.7 1.5
Asian Pakistani 2.3 2.8 1.5 0.9 2.3 2.8 1.5 0.8
Asian Bangladeshi 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.9 1.1 0.5 0.3
Black African 1.6 1.3 1.1 3.3 1.6 1.3 1.2 3.4
Black Caribbean 1.5 1.3 1.2 2.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 2.8
White British 81.5 81.9 82.4 77.2 81.5 81.9 82.4 77.5
Religious school have greater numbers of Black African and Caribbean pupils, but little
reference is made to ethnic composition of schools for the remainder of this chapter.
Though Community schools are clearly less aﬄuent and have a lower ability profile
than Foundation and Religious schools, the averages mask considerable diversity within
these three sectors. Figure 5.1 shows that there are schools in all three sectors with
FSM proportions above 50%, as there are schools with few FSM pupils.
5.3 Neighbourhood characteristics by school type
The chapter now turns to comparisons of a school’s current pupil composition with
the characteristics of the neighbourhood within which the school is located. There are
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of FSM pupils within Community, Foundation and Religious
sectors
many different ways we can conceptualise the neighbourhood, for example:
• the street adjacent to the school;
• a 3 kilometre walk zone for the school;
• the postcode area or district in which the school is located;
• the local authority in which the school is located.
There are problems with all definitions of the neighbourhood. For example, a 3 kilo-
metre walk zone would be a good definition for a very urban school, but would exclude
most pupils who attend their local rural secondary school. Local authorities (LAs)
differ substantially in size across England so that shire county LAs are far too large to
be considered a neighbourhood, yet London LAs are inappropriate as the neighbour-
hood for schools who are located on LA borders. The decision to use postcode areas
(the first half of the postcode) by Chamberlain et al. (2006) and Sutton Trust (2006)
to measure the characteristics of a school’s neighbourhood means that, particularly in
urban areas, the definition of neighbourhood is far broader than the recruitment area
of the school. In rural areas the reverse is true because a Community school is likely to
recruit from several villages, each of which may be in a unique postcode area. The use
of postcode areas is also unlikely to reflect the neighbourhood for all schools located
on the edge of a postcode sector. The choice of neighbourhood measurements reported
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here are in some respects also necessarily arbitrary and flawed, but many have been
tested and the substantive results reported are robust to the use of many alternative
measures of neighbourhood.
5.3.1 Proximity and recruitment neighbourhoods
The first measurement of the neighbourhood characteristics used in this chapter is
called the proximity neighbourhood. The conceptual idea is that it measures the char-
acteristics of the school if all pupils in the neighbourhood wished to attend the school
and the school allocated places simply based on proximity to the school. In com-
putational terms, the number of pupils currently at the school is counted, then the
computer finds that number of pupils who live closest to the schools from all pupils
currently in state schools.1 The social and ability characteristics of these proximity
pupils are measured.
Table 5.4 shows the proximity neighbourhood characteristics for the school types in
this analysis. Foundation schools are located in more aﬄuent areas than Community
schools, on average (neighbourhood FSM proportions of 9.6% versus 12.4%); Reli-
gious schools are in more deprived areas than both (neighbourhood FSM proportion
of 16.5%). The proportion of top ability pupils living in the neighbourhoods for the
three school types is more evenly balanced.
Table 5.4: Proximity characteristics of schools in analysis (%)
Excluding grammars
Community Foundation Religious
FSM 12.4 9.6 16.5
Top ability 25.0 27.2 25.3
Low ability 24.8 22.8 25.2
Asian Indian 2.1 2.4 2.9
Asian Pakistani 1.9 1.4 2.9
Asian Bangladeshi 0.9 0.5 1.5
Black African 0.8 0.8 1.9
Black Caribbean 1.1 1.1 2.1
White British 84.6 83.5 77.7
The second measurement of the neighbourhood characteristics used in this chapter is
called the recruitment neighbourhood. The conceptual idea is that it identifies the char-
acteristics of all pupils who live within a similar distance of the school to three-quarters
of the current intake (i.e. the school’s main recruiting area). In computational terms,
the distance of each pupil currently at the school is calculated and the 75th percentile
1For single sex schools, only pupils of the relevant sex are included in the computation. However,
for other types of school, including religious schools, all pupils are included.
Chapter 5. School intake versus neighbourhood characteristics 102
home-school distance is recorded. Then all children who are living closer than the 75th
percentile home-school distance are found, and their social and ability characteristics
are measured. Table 5.5 shows the recruitment neighbourhood characteristics of schools
in the analysis. The statistics are very similar to those in Table 5.4.
Table 5.5: Recruitment characteristics of schools in analysis (%)
Excluding grammars
Community Foundation Religious
FSM 13.1 10.0 17.1
Top ability 24.5 26.4 23.9
Low ability 25.4 23.6 26.3
Asian Indian 2.2 2.4 3.0
Asian Pakistani 2.2 1.7 3.0
Asian Bangladeshi 1.0 0.5 1.4
Black African 0.8 0.9 1.9
Black Caribbean 1.2 1.3 2.2
White British 83.9 83.0 77.6
The choice of the 75th, rather than the 95th or 55th, percentile radius appears quite
arbitrary. It represents a compromise between wanting a radius that captures the
journey lengths for the majority of pupils at the school, yet excludes pupils who appear
to make unrealistically long journeys. Table 5.6 shows that the pupil at the 95th
percentile can make a journey as far as 172 km to school each day! Some of these very
high figures are likely to be caused by data errors, so reducing the length of the radius
for the analysis avoids these problems.
Table 5.6: Home-school distance (in km) for nth percentile pupil in school
Mean S.D. Min Max
15th percentile radius 0.93 0.72 0.14 17.12
35th percentile radius 1.78 1.43 0.36 25.60
55th percentile radius 2.86 2.39 0.54 41.83
75th percentile radius 4.33 3.81 0.73 85.22
95th percentile radius 8.27 7.82 1.43 172.16
These two measures of neighbourhood characteristics produce indicators of a set of
pupils who live within a particular radius of the school, with the proximity neighbour-
hood being tighter than the recruitment neighbourhood. In practice, actual neighbour-
hoods the school draws from are often irregular rather than circular in shape, partic-
ularly where geographical barriers such as motorways, hills and lakes affect journey
times. This means a school might draw from its direct neighbourhood, as it concep-
tualises it, yet may have an intake with characteristics significantly different from the
neighbourhood measured by these statistics. However, if the school’s actual intake is
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irregular due either to the school themselves selecting a favourable catchment area,
or due to parental choice, it is desirable to use the circular neighbourhood because it
abstracts from these processes. For the purposes of this analysis, all that matters is
that the statistic measures the average neighbourhood characteristics for any partic-
ular school type without bias, and there is no reason to suppose this should not be
so.
Neither measure of neighbourhood is, a priori, more superior in urban versus rural
areas. The differences in a school’s calculated neighbourhood will be most pronounced
in areas with high levels of pupils sorting. However, in practice, the measured neigh-
bourhood characteristics differ very little between measurement based on proximity
neighbourhood versus the recruitment neighbourhood, as shown by the correlation co-
efficients between the two for key pupil characteristics (see Table 5.7).
Table 5.7: Correlation between alternative measures of neighbourhood characteristics
Correlation coefficient
FSM proportion 0.91
Top ability proportion 0.85
Low ability proportion 0.84
Asian Indian proportion 0.91
Asian Pakistani proportion 0.86
Asian Bangladeshi proportion 0.92
Black African proportion 0.93
Black Caribbean proportion 0.92
White British proportion 0.95
There is a question as to how meaningful quite a narrow definition of a neighbourhood
is when we know that families move close to schools in order to secure a place, i.e.
the neighbourhood characteristics are necessarily endogenous to school type. This is
more true for the proximity neighbourhood than it is for the much wider recruitment
neighbourhood. It means that the interpretation of data in this chapter is necessarily
quite narrow – we can simply investigate the characteristics of a school compared to
a situation where it solely admitted the pupils currently living close to the school.
Of course, if a school that is currently partially selective, for example, abandons this
policy, this is likely to produce a change in the school’s neighbourhood characteristics
as well as its school composition.
There is a related issue regarding Religious schools, especially Roman Catholic (RC)
schools that have never had a stated commitment to educate the local community. As
this is the case, it could be asked why the neighbourhood characteristics would be of
any interest for RC schools. However, given that these schools do recruit from a wide
geographical area, the recruitment neighbourhood is also measuring the characteristics
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of the pupils over a similarly wide area. It is true that the measure does not identify
which children are Catholic within this area. Without knowing the Religious affiliation
of all pupils in the dataset, or alternatively knowing who wished to attend an RC
school but did not gain a place, we have few methods for assessing whether these
schools are cream-skimming. This means that differences in neighbourhood versus
school characteristics for RC schools will reflect (i) differences in the characteristics of
Catholic versus non-Catholic families; (ii) application choices made by families to these
schools; and (iii) acceptance rates at RC schools for different groups of families. The
final section of this chapter gives an example of how this data restriction of not knowing
religion of family can be overcome by looking at sorting within the group of pupils who
attend RC schools in London, and who are therefore likely to have sufficiently proved
their RC religious adherence.
5.4 School intake versus neighbourhood characteristics
The chapter now turns to visual comparisons of pupil characteristics for each school
type compared to neighbourhood characteristics. Figure 5.2 presents a scatter diagram
with each point representing a Religious school’s FSM proportion versus its proximity
neighbourhood characteristics (the chart for the recruitment neighbourhood looks very
similar). A school such as school (a) is located in an area of high deprivation with
over 60% FSM eligibility in the neighbourhood. The school itself has an approximately
equal number of FSM pupils as the neighbourhood has, and thus takes its ‘fair share’ of
such pupils. School (b) is also located in an area of very high deprivation with around
half of all local children eligible for FSM. However, less than 5% of the pupils actually
attending the school are eligible for FSM. By contrast, school (c) is in a relatively
typical area of England with few FSM pupils in the neighbourhood, yet it has a FSM
proportion of almost 40% at the school. In general, the pattern for Religious schools
is that the school composition is more aﬄuent than the neighbourhood the school
is located in, so most points on the chart are below the 45 degree line (67%, versus
37% for Community schools). There are strong regional patterns though, with London
Religious schools being, on average, far more aﬄuent than their neighbourhood (shown
in Figure 5.3).
Figure 5.4 compares the intake of Religious schools to the local neighbourhood in terms
of proportion of pupils scoring in the top ability on KS2 tests. The neighbourhood here
is measured as pupils within the recruitment neighbourhood, although the pattern is
similar for the proximity neighbourhood. It shows that no Religious schools are situated
in a neighbourhood where over 40% of pupils are classified as top ability pupils, yet
13% of Religious schools have over 40% top ability proportion in their actual intake.
Overall, 62% of Religious schools have an intake with more top ability pupils than the
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Figure 5.2: Actual versus proximity FSM composition for Religious schools
Figure 5.3: Regional differences in FSM composition for Religious schools
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local neighbourhood.
Figure 5.4: Actual versus proximity top ability composition for Religious schools
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the same charts for Foundation schools. Here the pattern is
much less pronounced. Foundation schools tend not to be located in deprived areas,
so schools such as that marked (a) on Figure 5.5 (a school with a deprived intake in
a deprived neighbourhood) are unusual. Overall, 60% of Foundation schools (versus
37% Community schools) have a FSM proportion that is lower than their neighbour-
hood.
5.4.1 Proximity ratio and recruitment ratio
The graphical illustrations of neighbourhood and school intakes can be summarised in
a ratio. Taking the example of FSM proportions in the school and neighbourhood, the




Table 5.8 shows the mean values of these ratios for FSM, ability and ethnicity char-
acteristics of pupils at Community, Foundation and Religious comprehensive schools.
The ratios using the recruitment neighbourhood for the denominator are shown in
square brackets. For FSM ratios, a value greater than 1 indicates the school’s intake
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Figure 5.5: Actual versus proximity FSM composition for Foundation schools
Figure 5.6: Actual versus proximity top ability composition for Foundation schools
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is more deprived than its neighbourhood. Community schools have approximately
30% more FSM pupils than live in the neighbourhood immediately adjacent to their
schools. By contrast, Religious schools have almost 10% fewer FSM pupils than live in
the local neighbourhood. It is important to point out once again that, while grammar
schools, Academies and CTCs are excluded from the summaries of these ratios, pupils
in these other schools are included when calculating the neighbourhood characteris-
tics of schools. This means that the comprehensive schools shown here will, overall,
have intakes that are slightly more deprived (with fewer top ability pupils) than their
neighbourhoods. The correct comparison is therefore between different types of com-
prehensive schools.
Table 5.8: Proximity ratios (excluding grammar schools)
Community Foundation Religious
FSM 1.30 [1.12] 1.11 [0.97] 0.93 [0.72]
Top ability 0.84 [0.85] 0.88 [0.90] 1.24 [1.19]
Low ability 1.16 [1.11] 1.08 [1.01] 0.84 [0.74]
Asian Indian 1.05 [1.00] 1.04 [0.97] 0.86 [0.92]
Asian Pakistani 1.24 [1.16] 1.08 [0.99] 0.71 [0.53]
Asian Bangladeshi 1.08 [1.08] 0.96 [0.94] 0.67 [0.42]
Black African 1.22 [1.54] 1.14 [1.35] 1.32 [2.38]
Black Caribbean 1.04 [1.03] 1.04 [0.94] 1.26 [1.14]
White British 0.95 [0.95] 0.97 [0.97] 1.06 [0.99]
Note: 75th percentile radius ratios are in square brackets
Overall, both Religious and Foundation schools achieve intakes that are more aﬄuent
and more able than Community schools, once the characteristics of the local neigh-
bourhoods are taken into account. The differences between Religious and Community
schools are very large: the statistics suggest that a typical Religious school is likely
to have around 50% more top ability pupils than a Community school located in the
same type of neighbourhood. By contrast, a Foundation school in a similar position
would have around 5% more top ability pupils than a Community school. Pair-wise
t-test comparisons of Community schools with Religious and Foundation schools show
that the differences between these school types are almost all statistically significant
at the 5% level. The exceptions are non-significant ethnic composition differences be-
tween Community and Foundation schools for Asian Indian, Black African and Black
Caribbean groups. There are also non-signficant ethnic composition differences be-
tween Community and Religious schools for Asian Indian pupils.
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5.5 School admissions policies and sources of stratifica-
tion
It is impossible to use administrative data to conclusively establish why schools have
intakes that are markedly different from their local neighbourhood. In particular, we
would like to distinguish between the two main processes by which this could take
place. Taking for example, a school with fewer FSM pupils than is representative
of their local neighbourhood, this might have resulted from FSM-eligible families not
applying to the school or alternatively, they may have applied, but not gained a place
due to the admissions criteria used by the school. We can call the latter phenomena
‘cream-skimming’, meaning a set of admissions criteria and processes that have the
effect of systematically favouring higher ability or more aﬄuent pupils. However, it is
also possible for schools to discourage certain applicants from applying to the school,
for example by using complex admissions procedures or by only marketing the school
to aﬄuent neighbourhoods. These types of activities by schools should also be included
in the definition of ‘cream-skimming’ activities.
West et al. (2004) document the types of admissions criteria used by schools at the
time the pupils in this dataset entered secondary school. They highlight ‘potentially
selective admissions criteria’ that may be used by schools to favour higher ability
and easier to teach pupils, thus excluding others. Table 5.9 shows the proportions
of Community, Foundation and Religious schools in the dataset that are classified
as using these potentially selective admissions criteria. It shows that these criteria
are overwhelmingly used by Religious schools, mostly for the purposes of establishing
religious adherence of the family. A significant number of Foundation schools also use
ability or aptitude tests, even though they are deemed comprehensive schools.
Turning to a comparison of the admissions criteria used by schools and their proximity
ratios, a simple count of the number of potentially selective criteria mentioned for each
school is calculated. Values range from zero to seven. Figure 5.7 charts the average
FSM proximity ratio by school type for schools using different numbers of potentially
selective criteria. Perhaps not surprisingly, the general pattern seen is that the more
potentially selective criteria are used, the lower the FSM proximity ratio. Indeed, the
FSM proximity ratio is identical for Community, Foundation and Religious schools that
have no potentially selective criteria. Furthermore, where three potentially selective
criteria are used, the proximity ratio is little different between school types.
Figure 5.8 shows a similar pattern for the top ability proximity ratio. Community,
Foundation and Religious schools that do not use potentially selective criteria have
similar ratio values. The very high values of the top ability proximity ratio relate to
Foundation and Religious schools that use four or more potentially selective criteria.
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Table 5.9: Use of potentially selective admissions criteria in 2001
Community Foundation Religious
% % %
Sibling’s academic record 0 0 0
Primary school report 0 1 1
Family connections 1 2 5
Religious criteria 0 0 87
Interview with parent 0 0 11
Interview with pupil 0 1 16
School ethos 0 1 11
Banding administered by school 0 2 6
Uneven banding applied by school 0 0 2
Test administered by school 1 7 5
Ability/aptitude selection 1 13 7
Other selective criteria 3 8 82
Figure 5.7: Mean FSM proximity ratio for schools grouped by admissions criteria
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This analysis is quite crude because it classifies all potentially selective criteria equally,
whereas some are more likely to skew the intake of a school than others. However, it
does serve to show that the use of explicit potentially selective admissions criteria are
an important source of stratification in the schooling system.
Figure 5.8: Mean top ability proximity ratio for schools grouped by admissions criteria
From this data it is notable that only a minority of Foundation schools have adopted
admissions policies that are likely, by design, to raise the ability distribution of their
intake. So, it does not appear to be true that schools who are given the means to cream-
skim will necessarily take-up that opportunity. The interesting question is why some of
these former Grant-Maintained schools chose to take the opportunity adopt selective
admissions policies in the 1990s whereas others did not. The list of Foundation schools
using ‘potentially selective admissions criteria’ shows that they tend to be located
in education markets where other schools were selecting based on ability, prior to the
1990s. For example, they include many ‘de-facto’ secondary modern schools in selective
schooling areas and comprehensive schools in local authorities where there are one or
more stand-alone selective grammar schools. It is possible that their own change in
admissions policy was motivated by the perception that the system of local school
admission was already unfair, or that they felt it necessary to change their admissions
policy in order to survive in a competitive environment.
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5.6 Sorting within the religious schooling sector
This thesis returns to the causes of advantaged intakes at Foundation schools in Chap-
ter 7, since they are almost all former Grant-Maintained schools. However, the statis-
tics in the previous section showed that it is the Religious comprehensive schools that
have, on average, the most advantaged intakes, so this section focuses exclusively on
exploring this phenomenon more closely. The analysis is restricted to London since
this is the region with sufficient Roman Catholic (RC) and Church of England (CofE)
schools within close geographic proximity to each other, thus providing an environment
where sorting within the Religious schooling sector is possible.2.
While it is true that the average Religious secondary school has a more able and less
deprived intake than their proximate neighbourhood, within the sector there are a few
schools for whom these figures are exceptional (called ‘e´lite’ schools in this section).
There are only two ways any school can achieve an intake that is far more aﬄuent
than their neighbourhood: either poor families living close to the school are choosing
not to apply for a place (perhaps in expectation of rejection or because they do not
find the school attractive); or these families are applying, but they are excluded by
the school’s admissions criteria. Clearly, the moral implications of a religious school
excluding poor children are less ambiguous than if poor families do not wish their child
to attend in the first place.
It is difficult to disentangle these competing choice versus cream-skimming hypotheses,
but this section tries to contribute to this debate by looking at whether there are pupils
who live close to, but do not attend, an e´lite Roman Catholic school, yet have a clear
revealed preference for Catholic schooling because they attend another Catholic school.
Given that the majority of pupils in Catholic secondary schools in London are required
to be Roman Catholics (Pennell et al., 2007), these pupils will have satisfied Catholic
credentials at another school. This section is interested in whether these non-e´lite-
school pupils of RC parents are more likely to be of low ability or income status. In
other words, do the five e´lite RC schools analysed here appear to cream-skim from
within the pool of pupils from local Catholic families?
For this analysis, pupils who live ‘close to’ an e´lite RC school is defined in two
ways:
1. the group of proximity children who live directly adjacent to the school and would
attend if the school accepted only its closest pupils;
2. the (larger) group of children who live within a 3 kilometre radius of the school
(i.e. a walk zone).
2The analysis in this section was carried out with advice from Anne West for Allen and West (2009)
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Table 5.10 presents this analysis for five e´lite RC schools selected on the basis that
their FSM proximity ratio was the lowest (0.25 or lower). The general pattern across
these schools is that there are pupils who live close to these e´lite schools but who
attend other RC schools. These non-attending RC pupils are more likely to be low
ability or FSM eligible than the pupils who succeed in attending the e´lite school. Very
few of these non-attending RC pupils are educated at a school with a higher ability
peer group than the e´lite RC school they live near. This means it is unlikely that these
non-attending RC pupils are choosing to attend another Catholic school which is both
further away from their house and has a lower ability intake.
The 25 (female) proximity pupils who live very close to School A but attend an
alternative Catholic school have almost four times the rate of the FSM eligibility as
those who attend school A (28% versus 8%). They are also far more likely to have
scored in the bottom quarter in KS2 tests.
School B also has a large number (41) of (male) pupils living very close to the school
but attending alternative Catholic schools. These pupils have over four times the rate
of FSM eligibility as pupils at school B (27% versus 6%). Most (but not all) of these
pupils are attending another RC school with a lower ability peer group than the e´lite
RC school.
Schools C and D are located in the same outer London LA. Just four pupils living
very close to school C attend an alternative RC school; many more live within 3km
and these pupils have much higher FSM eligibility rates. School D has more RC pupils
living locally but not attending the school. Some of these are FSM eligible, but others
are successfully attending school C, which has the high performing peer group.
School E has no alternative RC schools nearby, so few pupils live close to school E
but attend another RC school. Those that do are not FSM eligible. This analysis of
sorting within the Catholic sector cannot draw conclusions about the cream-skimming
behaviour of this particular school. It does have an intake that is highly advantaged
compared to its neighbourhood, but it is possible that this solely results from the
socio-economic circumstances of Catholic families living in the area. Alternatively,
there may be poorer Catholic families who wish to attend this school but do not gain
a place. Because there are no alternative RC schools in the area, these children would
be in non-religious schools, and so it is not possible to identify them as Catholic in
NPD.
In all five schools, criteria and practices that could enable pupils to be ‘selected in’
or ‘selected out’ were used. According to the 2001 survey of school admissions, all
five schools interviewed pupils and/or parents, one used banding and one used the
academic record of siblings as part of the admissions process to decide which pupils of
those who applied should be offered a place at the school.
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Table 5.10: Cream-skimming analysis of 5 e´lite RC secondary schools
N FSM Low High
ability ability
peers?
School A = Inner London RC Girls School
Current intake 143 8% 6%
Proximity pupils who attend other RC schools 25 28% 13% 0%
3km radius pupils who attend other RC schools 101 24% 17% 0%
School B = Inner London RC Boys School
Current intake 193 6% 4%
Proximity pupils who attend other RC schools 41 27% 5% 17%
3km radius pupils who attend other RC schools 94 22% 15% 16%
School C = Outer London RC Girls School
Current intake 150 3% 4%
Proximity pupils who attend other RC schools 4 0% 25% 0%
3km radius pupils who attend other RC schools 47 26% 23% 0%
School D = Outer London RC Girls School
Current intake 87 6% 12%
Proximity pupils who attend other RC schools 14 14% 11% 7%
3km radius pupils who attend other RC schools 123 16% 25% 27%
School E = Outer London RC Girls School
Current intake 175 1% 9%
Proximity pupils who attend other RC schools 3 0% 50% 0%
3km radius pupils who attend other RC schools 22 0% 19% 36%
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The above analysis is repeated in Table 5.11 for the five Church of England denom-
ination schools that scored lowest on the FSM proximity ratio. Once again, for the
most part, pupils living close to these e´lite CofE schools, but attending alternative
CofE schools, are more likely to be FSM eligible or low ability than pupils in the e´lite
school themselves. There are fewer CofE secondary schools than there are RC schools
in London, so generally there are fewer pupils who live close to a CofE e´lite school but
attend an alternative CofE school.
School F has an exceptionally small number of pupils who obtained low scores in
their KS2 tests. By contrast, pupils who live close to school F but attend other CofE
schools have FSM and ability characteristics more typical of Inner London. None of
these pupils attend schools with superior peer groups.
School G has very low FSM eligibility rates and few low ability pupils. Pupils who
live in the area but attend alternative CofE schools have high levels of FSM eligibility
and are of a lower ability, on average.
School H has relatively few local pupils attending alternative CofE schools. The
schools itself has few FSM eligible children and a slightly higher ability intake overall
than the non-attending CofE pupils in the area.
Schools I and J are located some distance from alternative CofE schools, so few
pupils living in the direct locality attend other CofE schools.
All five schools required the demonstration of religious adherence. In addition, three
interviewed pupils and/or parents; two used banding (in one case this was banding
skewed towards higher ability pupils); one selected a proportion of pupils on the basis
of aptitude in languages; two gave priority to children of former pupils; one used
‘compassionate’ factors; and one gave priority to pupils with pastoral reasons. Only
one school used none of these admissions criteria or practices.
5.7 Discussion
The analysis presented in this chapter shows that own-admissions schools have intakes
that are more advantaged than community schools, even when the characteristics of
local neighbourhoods are taken into account. Schools achieving intakes that are far
more advantaged than their local neighbourhood almost always use explicit potentially
selective admissions criteria as part of their admissions process. The more of these
selective criteria are used, the more advantaged the school’s intake appears to be.
However, it is not possible to exclude parental choice as also playing a role in the
production of these advantaged intakes.
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Table 5.11: Cream-skimming analysis of 5 e´lite CofE secondary schools
N FSM Low High
ability ability
peers?
School F = Inner London CofE Girls School
Current intake 90 12% 2%
Proximity pupils who attend other CofE schools 4 25% 25% 0%
3km radius pupils who attend other CofE schools 44 23% 22% 0%
School G = Inner London CofE Girls School
Current intake 151 5% 6%
Proximity pupils who attend other CofE schools 24 33% 38% 13%
3km radius pupils who attend other CofE schools 157 40% 29% 12%
School H = Outer London CofE Mixed School
Current intake 105 4% 15%
Proximity pupils who attend other CofE schools 4 25% 25% 50%
3km radius pupils who attend other CofE schools 56 5% 11% 45%
School I = Outer London CofE Mixed School
Current intake 197 9% 8%
Proximity pupils who attend other CofE schools 4 25% 25% 25%
3km radius pupils who attend other CofE schools 51 22% 27% 47%
School J = Outer London CofE Mixed School
Current intake 181 6% 17%
Proximity pupils who attend other CofE schools 2 50% 0% 0%
3km radius pupils who attend other CofE schools 21 10% 11% 5%
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The fact that explicit admissions policies have been shown to be an important source
of school stratification suggests that the new School Admissions Code (Department for
Education and Skills, 2007b), combined with better adherence to the Code by schools,
should help to balance intakes across the schooling system. However, although explicit
admissions criteria appear to be an important source of stratification, this does not
exclude the possibility that more covert processes – such as marketing to aﬄuent
neighbourhoods and the use of complex supplementary forms – are not taking place
within schools to help achieve more advantaged intakes.
Religious schools have been shown to be far more advantaged in their intakes than ei-
ther Foundation or Community schools. The data suggest that if we take a Community
school and a Religious school located in neighbourhoods with the same demograph-
ics, the Religious school might have as many as 50 per cent more top ability pupils
than the Community school does. It is straightforward to attribute these advantaged
intakes to the admissions policies of Religious schools, and in particular the processes
used to establish religious adherence. Given that the religious background and prac-
tices of the family are a social phenomenon, it is not surprising that the religious
adherence criteria is correlated with social class. The current measurement of religious
adherence on a ‘continuum’ justifies the collection of family background data, giving
religious schools the means to socially select pupils, should they wish to do so. It would
seem inherent that problems will always arise in this process, because some questions
deemed as relevant to establish religious adherence – such as marital status and place
of child’s baptism – by their nature reveal information about the social background of
the family.
However, there is no proof that this covert cream-skimming is actually taking place in
Religious schools: it is possible that more aﬄuent families are able to score higher on
the scale of ‘religious adherence’, either because they are more religious, or because
they are better at meeting the school criteria for religiosity. Thus, it is possible that
Religious schools are cream-skimming (that is, using admissions criteria that system-
atically favour more aﬄuent families), but that they are doing so entirely inadvertently
in the process of selecting by religious adherence.
An interesting policy question is whether religious admissions criteria need always
favour higher income and better educated families. This would largely depend on the
association between church attendance and individual characteristics such as educa-
tion and income levels. Survey evidence from the British Household Panel Survey and
the National Child Development Study suggests that better educated individuals are
indeed more likely to attend church (Brown and Taylor, 2007; Sawkins et al., 1997).
The evidence on the association between income and church attendance is less clear,
with Iannaccone (1997) suggesting there is little relationship and Sawkins et al. (1997)
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estimating that middle income earners are more likely to attend than low and high in-
come earners. None of these measured associations are as pronounced as the observed
differences in the propensities of children from different backgrounds to attend reli-
gious schools, which suggests that there are church-goers of lower social classes whose
children do not currently attend Religious secondary schools. It is possible that they
do not wish their children to attend, but alternatively they may not be negotiating
the complex systems of school admissions successfully (because they lack skills to do
so or do not value education highly enough to invest sufficient time in the process).
For example, they may not attend the correct feeder primary school or a preferred
local church for the correct number of sessions over the length of time specified by the
school.
One way to simplify the admissions process for these families would be to establish
a nationally agreed binary criteria of ‘religious adherence’ that families are deemed
to have either met, or not met. Once this is established, Religious schools could
then rely solely on the presence of a signature on a form from a religious leader to
decide who has priority in the admissions process. This would avoid the need for the
schools themselves to collect family background information, although it is still open
to manipulation by parents. There is no easy solution to the problem of Religious
school admissions, but a policy such as this could simultaneously remove the means
by which covert cream-skimming is possible, while simplifying the admissions process
for parents.
Chapter 6
The effect of school competition
on pupil performance – a review
of literature
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework that is used to argue that competi-
tion between schools can improve standards of teaching and pupil performance. It
reviews the existing quantitative evidence on the effects of school competition on pupil
performance, assessing the applicability of the international evidence to the English
institutional environment.
In the context of schools, competition refers to rivalry between two or more schools for
pupils. This competition may be over both number and type of pupils. With reference
to the latter, schools may prefer to take pupils who have performed well at primary
school or who come from higher social class backgrounds, using these as indicators of
a pupil’s likely future success in their education.
In England, the relationship between schooling provision and the neo-classical compet-
itive market is weak, not least because there is no direct price for state education and
schools do not profit-maximise. It is also true that peer group characteristics enter the
education production function leading to the phenomenon whereby the characteristics
of the demand for schooling affect the quality of supply. Furthermore, competition in
local schooling markets tends to be competition amongst a few providers, making con-
ventional analysis of markets with a large number of providers inappropriate (Davies
et al., 2002). Despite these differences, the arguments for school reform over the last
twenty years have been based on the neo-classical economic model of school compe-
tition, so it is useful to consider the model in detail, as it applies to the provision of
schooling.
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The first part of the chapter sets out the theory to explain a school’s likely conduct in
a competitive market. It also shows that the equations usually used to estimate the
effects of school competition on aggregate performance in an area mask the separate
effects of competition upon a school’s teaching and organisational effort, changes in
sizes of schools with differing effort levels and changes in the peer groups experienced
by pupils due to sorting.
The final part of the chapter describes the findings of the English and international
evidence on school competition, most of which are concerned with measuring the ag-
gregate area effect of competition, as opposed to the distribution of individual or
school-level outcomes.
6.1 Theoretical models of school competition
6.1.1 The school utility function
Schools are complex organisations, perhaps best described as a series of principal-
agent relationships between parents, teachers, headteachers and governors or local
authorities. A school’s response to some competitive pressure will depend on the
utility function of headteachers, teachers and governors of a school. We generally
assume their collective utility at time t, Ujt, is a function of the size of school, njt, the
growth or decline in pupil numbers between t− 1 and t, ∆njt, a measure of the pupil
characteristics, xjt, and the effort they must exert at work, ejt:
Ujt = u(njt,∆njt, xjt, ejt) (6.1)
The rationale for these variables entering the school’s utility function are discussed
below.
Teaching effort
The utility function we construct for the headteacher and teachers depends partly
on our belief about whether these workers are principally self-interested or altruistic
workers. Le Grand (2003, page 27) labels these respectively as knaves who are ‘self-
interested individuals who are motivated to help others only if by doing so they will
serve their private interests’, and knights who are ‘individuals who are motivated to
help others for no private reward, and indeed who may undertake such activities to
the detriment of their own private interests’. Most teachers are not pure knights or
knaves, but operate somewhere on a selfish-atruistic continuum. The attitude of any
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one particular teacher can only be treated as partially fixed since they will likely have a
motivational response to their environment and interactions with other teachers.
If teachers are primarily knaves, and if they derive a negative utility from putting
effort into their work, they will engage in activities that minimise effort and make
their working lives more comfortable. This might include altering their teaching style
and minimising the amount of marking of class and homework they do. Collectively
they would support school policies that seek to maximise rents for the employees (for
example, via providing comfortable staff facilities and small teaching loads). How-
ever, it is perfectly possible that teachers are knaves, yet derive pleasure from certain
teaching activities, and so minimise some, but not all, effort in their work. They may,
for example, work hard in the classroom, but not in administrative aspects of their
work.
Alternatively, teachers might be altruistic to the extent that they care deeply about
pupil outcomes, regardless of the incentive structure that exists. However, although
these knights might be diligent and work hard, they may not focus on the things that
are important to parents.
Number of pupils and school growth
Assuming a pupil-led funding mechanism (as was introduced in the UK under the
Education Reform Act 1998), growth of pupil numbers is likely to be the primary goal
of schools since it equates to more funding. This assumes that heads and teachers
derive some utility from this increased funding, for example through higher salaries,
superior resources/facilities, or the prestige of running a large school. This incentive
is, of course, also contingent on the school having spare capacity in existing buildings
or access to capital to increase capacity.
It is the inter-relationship between pupil growth and its effect on pupil background
characteristics that explains whether school growth is likely to be a goal of schools,
especially where a school is given no control over which additional pupils it admits
as it grows. Epple and Romano (2003) use a theoretical model to argue that under
a school choice program where places for out-of-neighbourhood pupils are allocated
by lottery, few schools will participate in the programme. They do so by making the
plausible assumption that pupils will wish to transfer from a neighbourhood school
with low average peer ability to another school with higher average peer ability. The
prospective recipient school will not know the actual ability of the non-neighbourhood
pupil, but can rationally assume that, on average, they will be of lower peer ability
than the incumbent student on the basis that they live in a lower average ability
neighbourhood. Therefore, the clientele of the prospective recipient school should resist
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accepting this student who would, on average, lower the peer ability in the classroom.
Epple and Romano note that in practice in the US, in states where participation in
choice programs is voluntary, high-income districts typically opt out, or ‘ensure’ they
have no spare capacity. The fact that only 120 schools applied to increase their capacity
in the UK between 1999 and 2005 is consistent with Epple and Romano’s model (Select
Committee for Education & Skills, 2005).
Whilst it is not clear that there is always an incentive for a school to grow, there
are much clearer reasons why a school needs to avoid a fall in pupil numbers, leading
to a utility function with respect to pupil numbers as shown in Figure 6.1. Given
pupil-led funding, falling school rolls almost always lead to teacher redundancies and
severe budget cuts in departmental spending, with an associated loss of morale for
remaining teachers. In the extreme, a falling pupil roll would lead to school closure
with loss of jobs for all, including the headteacher. However, it is not clear how serious
this closure threat is across different countries. In Sweden, for example, schools with
declining numbers have been forced to dismiss teachers and make budget cuts, but do
not generally close (Skolverket, 1996, 1999). In the UK, just 90 schools (both primary
and secondary) closed between 1995 and 1999 (Gorard et al., 2002a). In response, the
government has attempted to increase this threat via the ‘Fresh Start’ programme,
which aimed to close failing schools and open new ones (that now must be academies)
on the same site. However, in these circumstances most teachers will retain their jobs
(with the installment of a new headteacher).
 
Figure 6.1: Utility function of school with respect to pupil numbers
Chapter 6. School competition and pupil performance 123
Quality of pupils
The quality of the pupils at the school, meaning the distribution of prior ability and
socio-economic background of the pupils, might enter the school’s utility function for
three reasons. First, higher SES and ability pupils might be easier or more pleasur-
able to teach and from the headteacher’s perspective this makes the recruitment and
retention of teachers easier. However, as previously discussed, teachers’ motivations
may be mixed and some may be attracted to working with children from a range
of backgrounds. Second, performance appraisal remains contingent on actual pupil
performance, despite the introduction of value-added measures of school performance
which adjust for pupil intake. Lupton (2005) reports the strong association between
Ofsted assessment of school quality and the social background of the pupils. Also, in
June 2008, the government announced a ‘National Challenge’ to intervene in schools
where fewer than 30 per cent of pupils achieved 5+ A*-C at GCSE, regardless of school
value-added (Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2008b). Third, in the
long-run, a high ability pupil intake ensures the school’s survival, since they in turn at-
tract other pupils to the school, assuming that parents value the league table position
of school more than value-added as a measure of quality (as the evidence in Chapter 3
suggests).
6.1.2 The structure of competitive markets for schools
The next two sections distinguish between the classical concept of structural competi-
tion and competition as conduct and behaviour on the part of schools. This approach
follows the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) model (Scherer and Ross, 1989), in
which performance depends upon the degree and form of competitive conduct on the
part of producers, in our case, schools. Competitive behaviour on the part of schools
is, in turn, related to the structure which they face.
Although it is useful to distinguish between these aspects of competition, it is not the
case that the structure of the schooling market is fixed. The structural features of a
schooling market described here are likely to change in response to the conduct and
performance of the system itself.
In describing the structural level of competition a school faces, it is useful to use the
concept residual elasticity of demand, which ‘measures the change in demand for school
places in response to a change in [only that] school’s quality ’ (Bayer and McMillan,
2005, page 8). The determinants of a school’s residual elasticity can be broken down
into the availability of close substitutes in the marketplace (the size of the parental
choice set and the diversity of schools within the choice set) and the responsiveness of
households who are served by the school to changes in the school’s performance. A
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school’s performance should generally be taken to mean a school’s league table position,
given the evidence on parental choice presented in Chapter 3.
Size of the choice set
The amount of competition in an area will depend on the size of parents’ feasible choice
set. The size of the parental choice set is a function of both the household attributes
and location attributes, as discussed in Chapter 3. Determining the size of a choice
set for any particular family is very difficult and subjective. We can define a feasible
choice set given a fixed location as being the set of schools that it is feasible for the
child to travel to and that would be prepared to admit the child, given the household’s
location and attributes and holding constant the preferences of all other households.
So, the size of the choice set will be a function of population density, the costs and
availability of transport, and the admissions policies in operation and ease of collecting
information on schools. This type of definition emphasises that the households with
the largest choice sets will have a higher ability child (who can pass entrance tests
to selective schools), a religious affiliation and will live in an urban area. However,
this doesn’t take account of the capacity of households to choose schools by moving
house. Indeed, in very rural areas, in areas without good public transport and where
strict catchment areas are in place, this is the only means by which parents can choose.
However, choosing by moving house is much more difficult than other forms of choice,
and fewer families are willing to consider it, so it will be the case that competition is
higher where the feasible choice set given a fixed location is high.
Diversity of schools within the choice set
The diversity of schools can be described in terms of hierarchical diversity, meaning
large differences in the league table position of neighbouring schools, whether due
to peer groups or genuine differences in effectiveness, and non-hierarchical diversity,
meaning characteristics that distinguish the school from its competitors such as spe-
cialist sports, music facilities or religious ethos. In general, the greater the level of
diversity of schools, the lower the residual elasticity of demand and thus structural
competition. For hierarchical diversity, if a school changes its effort level and increases
pupil performance, this will attract few extra pupils to the school if this extra effort
does not close a very large gap between the test scores of it and the next best school
in the league table. For non-hierarchical diversity, parents may make choice decisions
based on idiosyncratic preferences for school features that are unrelated to test score;
therefore effort to improve test scores may still not attract them to the school.
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Taylor (2001), in a study of six English LEAs, argues that relatively few schools operate
with the presence of non-hierarchical competition. This would be consistent with the
general equilibrium models presented in Chapter 3 that imply there is instability in
non-separating equilibria where schools have the same peer group quality. Of course, if
schools start from a position of similarities in exam performance, for a period of time
competition should be effective as school popularity will be very sensitive to small
changes in performance relative to peers. This was observed by Fiske and Ladd (2003)
in New Zealand where competition worked best for schools who started on a ‘level
playing field’. However, once a school improves its exam performance above those of
neighbouring schools, the general equilibrium models of school choice suggest it will
attract the higher income families from other neighbourhoods, thus improving its peer
group, which will significantly raise its league table position further above its rivals.
Once this has happened, the competitive threat the school experiences will fall.
Responsiveness of households to changes in school quality
A third determinant of a school’s residual elasticity of demand is the responsiveness of
households in the area to a change in a school’s performance. For a strict neighbour-
hood schooling system, the key parameter is the price elasticity of demand for school
quality because this tells us how much households value schools in their utility function
(see Chapter 3). There may be heterogeneity in this price elasticity, so school located
in low income areas may have lower structural competition, ceteris paribus, than a
school located in a high income area where parents are very sensitive to changes in
school quality. Also, where households can exercise choice given a fixed location, a
key parameter is a measure of the school quality-distance to school trade-off, i.e. an
elasticity of demand for school quality with respect to journey time.
The evidence presented in Chapter 3 suggests that ‘school quality’ can mean different
things to families of different social classes, but that most parents proxy ‘quality’ as the
school’s ‘raw’ league table position without taking proper account of the progress their
child is likely to make in the school. This assessment of the combination of school effort
and peer characteristics means that parents are less responsive to changes in school
effort than they would be if they were able to measure true effort of the school directly.
Also, their use of league tables to assess school quality means that they are observing
a lagged measure of quality based on the educational experiences of children 6 years
older than their own, which bears little correlation with the expected school quality
that their child will experience (Goldstein and Leckie, 2008). This again lessens the
incentive for schools to focus on effort.
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Policies concerning school capacity and closure
A final structural feature of a school market that affects competition concerns how
real the threat of closure is. Where a local school-aged population is growing faster
than capacity growth, the closure threat may be very low indeed, regardless of the
performance of the school. This has been the case in many places where market
reforms were introduced (e.g. UK between 1988 and 2005; California from late 1990s
to present). Three policies can increase structural competition via the manipulation
of capacity. First, government can intervene and close schools down, even if they still
contain pupils. This type of policy is certainly not a market reform, but might be
deemed necessary in areas where the responsiveness of some parents to school quality
is very low. Second, government can provide existing schools with capital to increase
capacity and can subsidise the entry of new schools to the market. Third, governments
can force popular schools to increase their capacity, which is likely to be necessary given
models predict that capacity increases at the most popular schools are, on the margin,
likely to lead to a deterioration in peer quality.
The location of spare capacity in the system is crucial to a consideration of how effective
it is in producing a competitive threat to schools. The problem with introducing
new capacity into a system, regardless of where it is initially located, is that it very
quickly clusters in the school at the bottom of the local market hierarchy and will then
never again be used (unless the population increases). So, this spare capacity becomes
redundant and presents no further threat to other schools in the area.
6.1.3 The conduct of schools in a competitive market
Internal efficiency and test scores
One response to a competitive market is to improve the internal efficiency of the
school by focusing effort on increasing the school ‘output’ given its fixed resources (and
holding the quality of pupils as inputs constant). They might do this simply through
increased effort, or by using resources more innovatively or efficiently. Headteachers
may introduce monitoring and benchmarking systems for teachers to induce internal
competition. They may also hire teachers more carefully and be more prepared to fire
teachers who are underperforming. Finally, they may simply encourage an ethos of
academic performance at the expense of other outcomes. This would be a problem
if the educational outputs valued by children and society were much broader than
exam performance and included, for example, consumption benefits (the enjoyment
of the education process itself); investment benefits (higher pay, job satisfaction and
enjoyment of leisure); and various external benefits, including shared values.
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It is difficult for entities as complex as schools to demonstrate accurately their quality
to potential customers and creating indicators of school quality is difficult (Adnett
and Davies, 1999). In England, league tables have published the proportion of pupils
attaining 5+ A*-C at GCSE at 16 for each school since 1992. This led to an increased
focus by parents and schools on this metric of success, with some unintended conse-
quences. First, schools increased resources directed at the sub-set of pupils on the
C/D borderline, potentially diverting effort away from pupils at the top and bottom
of the ability distribution (Burgess et al., 2005a; Wilson et al., 2006). Second, schools
focussed on subjects where the return to increased effort was greatest. Some schools
used GNVQs worth 4 GCSEs to boost their pass rate and others diverted attention
away from maths and English, which are the most important qualifications from the
perspective of the child, but were weighted equally with other subjects in school league
tables (this problem is now resolved because for league tables from 2006 onwards, the
5 A*-Cs must include maths and English).
Other evidence suggests teachers engage in activities likely to be noticed. For example,
Woods et al. (1998) find that school ‘strategies’ tend to emphasise academic outcomes
and physical facilities which are highly visable, even though parents put just as much
emphasis on, for example, discipline and school climate. An US empirical investigation
of the effect of intra-district choice on teacher incentives suggests that choice does
enhance teacher motivation, though when teachers become more concerned with how
their efforts are perceived in the marketplace they tend to concentrate on activities that
are more likely to be noticed by parents, and not on tasks like classroom preparation
(Rapp, 2000).
Cream-skimming
Cream-skimming occurs where an oversubscribed school selects pupils of high intrinsic
ability so as to improve the school’s performance in examinations at relatively low cost
(Le Grand, 2003, page 10). They have a clear incentive to do this where parents focus
on a metric of raw league table performance, though if these students are also easier or
more pleasurable to teach, this incentive also exists to some extent without a market
for schooling (Thrupp, 1999).
There are two methods by which schools can cream-skim. The first is known as overt
cream-skimming and it takes place through the use of admissions policies (or over-
subscription criteria) to systematically target and accept student of higher ability or
higher SES into their school. For example, in the UK in the 1980s there is some
evidence that the admissions structure of City Technology Colleges (CTCs) allowed
‘cream skimming’. These schools were required to take a sample of children whose
ability was roughly representative of those applying. However, only highly motivated
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parents applied: they had to seek out the application form, arrange for their child
to take a nonverbal reasoning test, attend an interview and confirm that their child
intended to continue in education to 18. Some claimed that CTCs were systematically
selecting pupils whose parents appeared keen and enthusiastic at interview (Walford
and Miller, 1991).
The West et al. (2004) analysis of comprehensive secondary school admissions criteria
in England reveals a significant minority of schools using criteria which appear to be
designed to select a certain group of pupils and so exclude others. Despite all the
schools in their study being ‘comprehensive’ schools, West et al. found the following
opportunities to select:
• Admissions criteria relating to ability/aptitude were mentioned by 11.2% of
Foundation schools, 6.5% of Voluntary-Aided schools and 0.3% of Community
schools.
• School-administered ability banding by schools was found to be more prevalent
in Voluntary-Aided/Foundation schools (5%) than Community schools (2%).
• Giving priority to children of employees/former pupils etc. is now against
the school admissions Code of Practice (Department for Education and Skills,
2003), but 20% of Voluntary-Aided/Foundation schools (versus 5% of community
schools) continued to use this criterion in 2002.
• 13% of schools in West et al.’s sample used religious criteria to admit pupils.
A second form of cream-skimming comes via more ‘covert’ selection and Gewirtz et al.
(1995), in a study of London schooling, argued that subtle ‘social targeting’ is more
prevalent than overt cream-skimming in England. Social targeting means:
giving priority to promoting the school to middle-class and more able pupils
(often done through geographical targeting, focusing on feeder schools lo-
cated where there are concentrations of middle class and more able pupils).
Such strategies also include: attention to the ‘traditional trappings’ of the
school attention to the schools achievement of A to C grades at GCSE; spe-
cialisation in a ‘strong’ curriculum area; downplaying the level of rhetoric
at least of the caring, pastoral side of schooling; and generally sending
signals indicating what sort of parents are made most welcome.
(Woods et al., 1998, page 159)
There is widespread evidence of an emphasis upon promotional image and image en-
hancing changes following 1988 in the UK (Gewirtz et al., 1995). Some of this social
targeting constitutes clear rivalrous behaviour towards other secondary schools, for
example, by marketing to primary schools in their catchment area and by running
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school coaches from their catchment area neighbourhoods (all reported by Levacˇic´,
2004). Thus, if we believe that schools face a clear incentive to behave in this way, it
is likely to reduce the level of collaboration and innovation between neighbouring sec-
ondary schools (Levacˇic´ reports that collaboration was more common between distant
secondary schools that were not in competition with each other).
Diversification
One means of reducing the level of structural competition a school faces, is to diversify
its product and therefore reduce its residual elasticity of demand. The decision by a
school to adopt this approach might be taken alone, or it might be part of a collu-
sive strategy with other schools to segment the local marketplace, thereby reducing
competitive pressure. Ladd and Fiske (2003) claim this was a common response to
competition in New Zealand, where schools re-branded themselves as specialist arts
or sports colleges, for example. However, it is not always the optimal strategy to
adopt this approach if parental tastes for schooling are essentially quite homogeneous,
i.e. they value league table position above all other attributes of the school. In the
UK, despite the introduction of a Specialist Schools policy (where secondary schools are
given extra funding to ‘specialise’ in a particular subject), evidence shows that school
choice reforms appear to have reinforced local schooling hierarchies, reduced the di-
versity of provision and increased differences in the mean level of academic attainment
between schools (Adnett and Davies, 2002).
This seeming homogenisation of schools that is witnessed as schooling markets become
more customer-focused and market-orientated is interesting given that an alternative
competitive response would be to adopt a niche strategy, protecting the school from
competition (Pardey, 1991; Saltman and Von Otter, 1992). It is possible, but unlikely,
that the homogenisation can be entirely explained by the greater regulation of schools,
particular with respect to curriculum content (e.g. the KS3 strategy). Alternatively,
the reduction in the diversity of provision may be a competitive response to either
(1) parental preferences that are essentially homogeneous; or (2) a ‘Hotelling’1 style
response to non-homogenous parental preferences (Hotelling, 1929). The weight of the
current evidence on parental preferences, presented in Chapter 3, would seem to weight
towards the former. In other words, greater choice in a market does not necessarily
produce greater variety, which is one of the purposes of introducing choice in the first
place.
1This refers to analysis of the effect of absolute and relative positioning of firms (or schools) on
their success in a market. It demonstrates the circumstances under which the optimum strategy for
all firms (schools) would be to meet the preferences of the median buyer (parent).
Chapter 6. School competition and pupil performance 130
6.1.4 The dynamics of a competitive marketplace
Well-functioning competition in the quasi-market cannot exist if schools in certain
circumstances find it very difficult to improve their position in the local hierarchy of
schools, regardless of effort or quality of education offered. In a longitudinal study of
six LEAs between 1991 and 1998, Levacˇic´ and Woods (2002) found that schools with
lower concentrations of social disadvantage relative to other local schools were able to
improve their GCSE results the fastest. Furthermore, schools with high concentrations
of social disadvantage were liable to suffer a dual handicap as their relative social
disadvantage tended to worsen over time. There is some evidence to the contrary.
Glennerster (2002) points out a narrowing of the gap in English KS3 scores between
the top and bottom quartile of schools from 32 points in 1995 to 26 points in 2000.
On this measure there was little change in the gap in maths and science, but certainly
no widening gap. Furthermore, the schools with over 40% of pupils on free school
meals have been catching up with the schools where less than 5% have free meals. One
caveat about these figures is important: the schools at the top are already near the
achievement targets and now have little room for improvement, thus ‘catch-up’ could
be an artefact of truncating the measurement of improvements with fixed targets.
6.2 School competition – the estimation problem
Empirical studies of the effects of school competition on mean pupil performance usu-
ally employ an aggregate area-level measurement of the ‘effect’ of competition, which
captures the total effect of three mechanisms:
1. increases in school efficiency at one or more schools, induced by competitive
pressure;
2. changes in the relative sizes of schools, with more effective schools possibly gain-
ing additional pupils; and
3. student sorting effects, which alter the distribution of pupils across schools, which
might either induce better matching effects or beneficial changes in peer group
effects.
Formally, using an example of two equal-sized schools, A and B, operating in a town
that are initially not in competition (because, for example, the authorities control
admissions and capacity at the schools), a child’s educational outcomes, y, at t = 0
are:
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In other words, we assume that a child’s test scores is determined by some function
of the peer group it experiences in the school, θ; the effort the school puts in as a
direct result of competition, C (where we can assume that Ct=0 = 0); the school effect
on outcomes not attributable to peer group or competition (e.g. because of strong
leadership), U ; and the known, x, and unknown, , characteristics of the child.
Then suppose in time period t = 1, open enrolment is introduced and schools may
compete freely for pupils. As a result, the 2n pupils in the town are redistributed across
schools and A grows to size nA > n > nB (retaining nA +nB = 2n). The effect of this









is the aggregate of three effects:
1. β2Ct=1 > 0, assuming that the impact of competition from school A on school
B is identical to the impact of competition on school B from school A;2
2. β32n [UA(nA − n) + UB(nB − n)] > 0, but only if school A was more effective than
school B in the first period and continues to be so, so that parents are correctly
identifying and choosing the more effective school (given its inputs). There is no
reason to expect this to be the case where ‘raw’ league table results are published.
3. β12n [nAθ
t=1
A − nθt=0A + nBθt=1B − nθt=0B ] , which may be positive, negative or zero.
If we take the common assumption that the peer group θ = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi (the mean
characteristics of the school), the marginal gain by any one student represents
an equal marginal loss in peer group by another student. Therefore this change
in the peer group distribution has no effect on mean pupil performance. This
assumption may, or may not, be reasonable: the Bayer and McMillan (2005)
findings (described in this chapter) imply that there are decreasing returns to a
good peer group (so segregation reduces mean pupil performance). By contrast,
the UK literature on ability streaming suggests that the benefits to high ability
pupils outweigh the disadvantages to the lower ability pupils (e.g. Galindo-Rueda
and Vignoles, 2004; Atkinson et al., 2006).3
2We generally assume that the effect of competition cannot be negative, although the theoretical
models of De Fraja and Landeras (2006) suggest that the strategic interaction among the participants
in the education process may make incentives backfire and competition have perverse effects. For
example, students may reduce their effort when teachers increase theirs, and school attempts to attract
the better students may plausibly reduce students’ attainment
3In any case, our ability to make judgements that compare the size of the gains for high ability
pupils with the size of the loss for lower ability pupils depends on the construction of a scale of
outcomes. For example, is an improvement from grade B to A equal to the improvement from grade F
to E? So, the overall direction of the effect on mean test scores is solely a function of the construction
of this outcome measure, where the construction of cardinal intervals is necessarily quite arbitrary.
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6.2.1 Key measures of competition between schools
The key explanatory variable of interest – the amount of competition – often prox-
ies some aspect of structural competition in the market. This is because structural
competition tends to be more amenable to measurement and more readily subject to
manipulation by policy-makers. The first set of variables used by empirical studies of
school competition measure structural competition at the area level in terms of:
• Number of schools in area;
• Share of a particular school type enrollment in area, e.g. private school, religious
school or Charter school;
• Herfindahl index of school competition in area;
• Population density.
There are two problems with the construction and use of these measures. First, the
‘area’ must first be defined. If it is too large an area, the competition measure will be
a poor proxy for the competition actually experienced by schools. If it is too small an
area, it will fail to capture the full extent of competition between certain schools. The
problem tends to be that some schools exist within very small competition areas, but
others (such as religious schools) will have large recruitment areas. In practice, typical
areas used include local authorities, municipalities and non-overlapping areas of com-
petition defined by the researcher for the purpose of the study. The second problem
with these measures is that, except for population density, they are all endogenous
to the market under investigation. For example, the share of pupils in private schools
will be partially determined by public school quality. The studies described often over-
come this endogeneity by instrumenting the competition measure with an exogenous
variable. Population density would seem to be a strong competition measure since it
is exogenous. However, there are alternative explanations as to why urban areas may
systematically differ, for example schools may be more likely to collaborate and they
have access to a different type of teacher labour market.
The second set of measures of competition are also endogenous structural measures, but
they identify the extent of competition at the level of the individual school (although
they can also be aggregated up to area level):
• Distance to school to nearest ‘choice’ school (e.g. Charter school or private
school);
• Number of other schools within a 1, 3 or 5 km radius;
• Number of other schools within a 10 minute drive-time zone;
• Presence of a ‘choice’ school within a 5 km radius.
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The third set of measures are also school-level structural variables, but these exploit
the availability of data regarding pupil geo-locations, for example:
• The proportion of pupils living within 5 km of the school that have switched to
a ‘choice’ school;
• The mean level of choice a school’s pupils have, measured as schools the pupil
can reach within some defined time or distance.
Fourth, an endogenous measure is used that attempts to capture the competitive threat
as measured by (lagged) school exam performance of other schools in the area. Finally,
one study uses survey data to measure the headteachers’ perception of the level of
competition in the area.
6.3 Literature on competition and pupil performance
This section describes and evaluates the key empirical studies into the effect of com-
petition on pupil achievement from across the world. All the main UK studies are
analysed, and in addition recent international studies are described, providing they
use high quality datasets with clear methods for identifying the effect of competi-
tion.
6.3.1 English non-experimental evidence
The simultaneous country-wide implementation of legislation arising from the 1988
Education Reform Act, combined with a lack of historic pupil-level national datasets,
makes evaluating the effect of these reforms very difficult. The non-experimental stud-
ies all rely on exploiting structural differences in the level of competition between
schools in different geographical locations. However, as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, almost all ‘structural’ measures of competition are also endogenous.
Bradley et al. (2001) use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to calculate the efficiency
frontier for all secondary schools in the UK, where the school’s inputs are the proportion
of pupils ineligible for free school meals (FSM) and the proportion of teachers who are
qualified at the school. Individual school efficiency, in terms of the proportion of pupils
gaining 5+A*-C at GCSE and school attendance rates, is measured in relation to the
efficiency frontier. School competition is measured as the number of other schools
within a given kilometre radius (<1 km, 1-2 km, 3-5 km). In cross-section they find
that schools facing competition from non-selective schools are more efficient. Between
1993 and 1998 they find that the change in relative efficiency is positively related to
competition (particularly the number of schools within 1 km). In a related paper
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they also show that change in test scores is positively correlated with test scores of
other schools in the same district and interpret this as a competition effect, although
common gentrification of areas would produce the same association (Bradley et al.,
2000).
Bradley et al. report issues with the quality of the school-level data in this study: the
validity of the attendance measure is in some doubt (in relation to reported truancy
rates in the Youth Cohort Study); there are very few school-level controls and no
pupil-level background variables or prior attainment. Furthermore, their competition
measure is highly correlated with population density, so the study cannot distinguish
competition effects from other effects associated with cities.
Ros Levacˇic´ (2004) also tries to identify an association between a structural measure
of competition (the number of schools within a non-overlapping approximate area of
competition) and school performance in Annual Schools Census data, but finds no
association over the slightly longer period between 1991 and 1998. There are several
possible explanations for this apparent contradiction with Bradley et al.’s work. First,
she has a much smaller sample of just 220 schools in six LEAs. Second, her structural
measure of competition is quite different and arguably weaker since it relies on non-
overlapping competition spaces and is not a school-level measure. Third, she employs
an OLS regression approach rather than a DEA. DEA is potentially superior to regres-
sion where organisations have clearly defined multiple outputs, and particularly where
increasing one type of output is likely to reduce another type of output. However, in
the case of schools it is less clear that attendance rates and exam performance should
be treated as distinct outputs since improving attendance rates is likely to improve a
school’s exam performance. In addition the attendance variable data is poor, so using
standard regression analysis for schools seems sensible.
The more interesting aspect of Levacˇic´’s study is the survey of 220 headteachers asking
them how much competitive pressure they perceived their school to be under. She
found no association between her structural measure of competition and perceived
competition by headteachers. However, schools where the headteacher had a high
perception of competition (reported more than 5 competitors) outperformed other
schools with 4.0 - 5.5 percentage points more 5+A*-C grades and a 0.3 percentage
point/per annum greater increase in this measure from 1991 to 1998. It is not clear
that this finding can be interpreted as a causal relationship between competition and
school performance: it is equally likely that headteachers who are intrinsically highly
motivated by league tables and other outcome measures are more likely to perceive
they are in a competitive environment.
In a recent study, Bradley and Taylor (2007) use school-level data over a very long time
period (1992-2006) to analyse the effect of competition within local authorities (LAs)
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on the proportion of pupils achieving 5+A*-C at GCSE. The competition variable is
measured by the average exam performance of all schools in the LA, lagged one year,
excluding the school in question. A Herfindahl index of concentration is also used
as a measure of competition in the LA. The estimation strategy employs school fixed
effects and time-variant school control variables to attempt to deal with pupil sorting,
although the limited range of school-level pupil characteristic variables available for this
time period means that sorting based on unmeasured characteristics might confound
results. The study finds that a one percentage point increase in the exam performance
of competing schools is associated with an improvement of 0.38 percentage points in
metropolitan schools compared to only 0.12 percentage points in non-metropolitan
schools. However, once again, the gentrification of English cities would explain this
type of result.
These associative relationships between structural measures of competition and pupil
performance have been analysed in the more recent pupil-level data by Gibbons et al.
(2008b), who show that secondary school progress is faster in areas of relatively dense
population, but that the elasticity of school performance with respect to population
density is low at +0.02 (Gibbons et al., 2008b). There are many different specifications
in the paper that try to deal with the limited number of pupil controls in NPD. For
example, one specification does this by using a dependent variable of pupil progress
between 11 and 16, relative to the mean progress of primary school peers. The param-
eter of interest is the change in urbanness of school experienced by the pupil as a result
of the primary-secondary transfer, relative to other pupils the child was at primary
school with. One underlying assumption for an unbiased estimate of this parameter
is that the change in urban density between primary and secondary is not correlated
with unobservable individual characteristics. An example of when this might be vi-
olated would be an observation that more prestigious secondary schools tend to be
located in town centres (since they are the former grammar schools). They cannot
completely reject sorting on observables in this study (notably schools in urban ar-
eas have accelerating pupil progress), so their findings should be only suggestive of a
causal relationship. They rightly point out that it is impossible to distinguish between
competition and collaboration effects in urban areas.
The final non-experimental study to look at competition effects analyses the rela-
tionship between KS1-KS2 progress in the latter part of primary school and a school
competition index in London (Gibbons et al., 2008a). The construction of the school
competition index is complex. The first stage is to calculate the distance travelled
by the median pupil at each school. Next, they calculate the size of the choice set of
each pupil by asking how many within-LA schools the pupil can reach if s/he travels
no more than the median travel distance for each school and remains within his/her
local authority (LA). This definition of ‘choice’ is not structural but is actually endoge-
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nous to actual choices currently exercised by parents, given the constraints imposed
by school capacity. For example, if a set of parents are currently choosing to travel
a long distance to a non-neighbourhood school, this will increase the choice measure.
The competition index is calculated for each school by computing the mean of this
pupil choice index for all pupils at the school. Since the resulting competition index is
also endogenously determined by demand for schooling, an instrument of distance of
school from the LA boundary is used to predict it, on the basis that this is exogenous
to school performance. The instrument is, by construct, strong because the measure of
the choice set restricts choice close to boundaries. They find no overall effect of choice
or competition on school performance, though some positive effect of competition from
religious schools.
It is possible to interpret this finding as showing that primary schools do not respond to
competition from other schools. However, there are several serious questions over the
validity of their competition measure that need to be considered further. First, once
again underlying it is a structural approach that assumes that schools feel competitive
pressure from schools in close proximity, but this is not necessarily so if the market
for schools is very fragmented with neighbouring schools operating in very different
competition spaces. For example, a full capacity school with a high income peer group
is unlikely to perceive it is in competition with a partially full school with a low
income peer group. Second, the identification strategy relies on the assumption that
pupils do not generally cross an LA boundary in London and so schools experience no
competitive threat from schools in other LAs. It is not particularly difficult to attend
a school in a neighbouring LA, but it is true that only 4.7% of pupils do so in Gibbons
et al.’s dataset. It is not clear whether or not the figure of 4.7% is sufficiently low to
claim that boundaries significantly impact choice. Even if we could show that some
parents were discouraged from considering schools in other LAs, provided high-income,
motivated parents saw it as no barrier to choice, schools would experience competitive
pressure across LA boundaries since these are the type of families that they arguably
compete for. The validity of their competition measure needs to be considered in
the context of the following question, and it is not clear how it can be answered:
‘if the boundary disappeared, would schools operating near the boundary experience
an increase in competitive pressure from other schools’? Our knowledge of parental
choice strategies suggest that the boundary is more likely to act as a constraint for
working class families, which suggests that it is only schools who cater for lower income
households that are likely to experience the increase in competitive pressure.
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6.3.2 English quasi-experimental evidence
There are two UK studies that exploit policy reforms to implement a quasi-experimental
approach to studying competition effects. The first is a paper that identifies the effect
of a potential increase in competition resulting from schools pursuing autonomy under
the Grant-Maintained schools legislation. This paper by Clark (2007) is described in
some detail in the next chapter, so the competition finding is briefly summarised here.
School governing bodies were required to hold a vote of parents of current pupils at
the school before electing to become Grant-Maintained. Damon Clark (2007) exploits
this vote and data on the proportion of parents voting yes by employing a regression
discontinuity design to compare change in exam results for those schools where they
‘just’ won over 50% of the vote to those schools where they just lost with under 50% of
the vote. Using data between 1992 and 2000 he finds that Grant-Maintained schools
did not appear to exert a greater competitive pressure on their neighbours than schools
who lost the vote and remained under LA control. It is not possible to use his dataset
to disentangle whether neighbouring schools felt no threat from GM schools (this is
possible given rising pupil rolls over this period, especially if neighbours felt the GM
school had no plans to increase capacity) or whether his structural measure of compe-
tition (once again) does not reflect the true competitive environment in which schools
operate.
Burgess and Slater (2006) also try to employ a quasi-experimental approach by using
the administrative boundary change of 1988 in Berkshire to estimate the impact of
changes to school competition on pupil progress between KS3 and KS4. Using a small
sample of 390 schools, they estimate a difference-in-differences model of changes in
school effectiveness on changes in competition between a cohort finishing secondary
school in 1997 and another in 2002. The changes in competition result from the
division of Berkshire into 6 LAs, with the presumption that schools close to the newly
created boundaries see a greater fall in competition than those in the middle of a
new LA. The paper benefits from the availability of pupil-level data (though the first
panel has no pupil-controls other than prior attainment so a bias correction is used).
It finds no effect of the fall in competition on pupil outcomes, but there are several
methodological explanations for this null result. First, the sample is small with the
variation in ‘competition’ being driven from very few schools. Second, they are unable
to show any evidence that competition did actually change following this reform. Very
high proportions of pupils cross an LA boundary to attend secondary school in this
densely populated part of England. Indeed, there are even official catchment zones for
schools that cross these boundaries. Each LA in Berkshire advertises clearly how to get
sent a brochures for schools in other LAs and admissions applications are on a common
form for all schools inside and outside the LA. Third, Berkshire’s education system
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was always particularly complicated because selective systems of schooling operate
alongside non-selective systems and so it is not clear how much, for example, the
grammar schools in Reading ever seriously felt competition from the comprehensives
in Windsor and Maidenhead. Finally, even if mobility did fall, if the higher-income
well-motivated parents are still choosing schools across LA boundaries then this should
mean there is no change in competitive pressure for most schools since these are the
very families they are competing for.
6.3.3 US public school competition evidence
The US empirical literature on school competition provides a more positive picture of
an effect on school performance. The Belfield and Levin (2003) literature review of 35
wide-ranging studies found that between 36% and 67% of estimations of the effect of
a cross-sectional measure of competition are statistically significant and positive (with
less than 3% negative and significant). However, the effect sizes are quite modest and
are not generally robust to changes in the specification of equations. The typical study
found that a 1 s.d. increase in competition (measured on a Herfindahl index of school
concentration) increases test scores by 0.1 s.d. and no effects on drop-out rates were
generally found.
Most of the studies reviewed by Belfield and Levin are measuring associations without
employing an identification strategy to identify a causal effect. The most controver-
sial study that attempts to do this is Caroline Hoxby’s (2000) article on competition
(measured as the number of school districts within a metropolitan area) and pupil
performance in 8th, 10th and 12th grade reading and maths tests. Using 1994 data
from the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS) of over 6,000 students in 209
metropolitan areas she finds a positive, statistically significant effect of competition
on pupil outcomes and productivity. She has a good set of pupil and district-level
control variables and deals with the potential endogeneity of the Herfindahl index by
instrumenting it using the number of large and small rivers in the metropolitan area.
The rationale for this is that rivers form a natural geographical boundary such that
the greater the number of rivers, the more school districts there are likely to be. As an
example of the magnitude of her findings, in an area with maximum competition she
estimates a 3.8 percentage point effect on 8th grade reading scores and 5.8 percentage
point effect on 12th grade reading scores, compared to an area with no competition
between school districts.
Hoxby’s findings have been strongly questioned by Jesse Rothstein (2005) who docu-
ments several errors in Hoxby’s data and code. He also demonstrates that the estimated
choice effect is extremely sensitive to the way that ‘larger streams’ are coded. When
Hoxby’s hand count of larger streams is replaced with any of several alternative, easily
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replicated measures, there is no significant difference between IV and OLS, each of
which indicates a choice effect near zero. Rothstein appears to throw the strength of
Hoxby’s claim into some doubt: when econometricians employ an IV technique it is
important that their estimates are robust to small technical ‘tweaks’, and hers appear
not to be.
Using a completely different approach to the problem of identifying causal effects
in non-experimental data, Bayer and McMillan (2005) use an exceptionally detailed
dataset to estimate a complete model of demand for schooling in San Francisco. In San
Francisco there are no choice programs, so families exercise ‘choice’ for schooling by
moving neighbourhoods. This means that the elasticity of demand for school quality
is revealed in house price data at district boundaries. Bayer and McMillan run a simu-
lation that uses these elasticities to calculate a residual elasticity of demand for school
quality at each school. This is defined as the responsiveness of demand (measured in
house prices) to changes in own school quality. Using cross-sectional regressions of
elasticity on school performance, they find a one s.d. increase in the competitiveness
of the school’s local environment within the Bay Area leads to a 0.15 s.d. increase in
average test scores. Their finding relies on the validity of the initial school demand
model specification, but does appear to be robust to various different specifications.
Nevertheless, this approach does need to be validated via replication in another city,
which is difficult given the need for very disaggregated data. They also find an as-
sociation between the level of school segregation and school performance (segregation
lowers competition between schools) and this result could be more simply replicated
elsewhere.
6.3.4 US Charter school competition evidence
Charter schools are US government-funded schools that are not subject to many of
the same rules and regulations as traditional public schools. They do not select by
ability and have been set up with the intention of raising academic standards, in part
by exerting a competitive pressure on existing public schools. The UK Academies
programme was, to a large extent, directly modeled on US Charter schools.
The quantitative literature described here is slightly different from studies described
earlier because it tends to estimate the effect of Charter school competition on pupil
outcomes at traditional public schools (i.e. these are not whole-area effects). The
problem with this approach is that some (but not all) studies are incapable of properly
distinguishing between changes in public school effectiveness and changes in pupil
sorting. So, given that Charter schools can often attract a slightly more aﬄuent
demographic away from traditional public schools, studies with poor pupil control
variables are likely to estimate a negative effect of competition. A second problem
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with many of these studies is that they estimate models as though the location of
Charter schools is exogenous to traditional public school effectiveness. The direction
of this endogeneity problem depends on the model estimated: there is likely to be a
negative correlation between public school performance and the location of Charter
schools; however, there may be a positive correlation in panel data between changes
in public school performance and changes in Charter school penetration, via a simple
‘mean reversion’ of any school’s effectiveness.
Estimates of the effect of Charter schools on traditional public schools from across the
US have varied in both the direction and degree of the competition effect. Carr and
Ritter (2007) suggest there are two likely explanations for this. First, Charter school
laws differ across US states, and this has affected the very nature of the programme.
For example, in some states Charter schools can be set up by independent bodies,
whereas in others only the local school district is allowed to create Charter schools.
Second, construction of the primary explanatory variable – the amount of competition
from Charter schools a public school faces – has been inconsistent across studies. This
has meant that, even where studies analyse Charter schools in the same state, estimates
of competition effects have differed.
The state of Texas is the only area where all studies have identified a positive competi-
tion effect of Charter schools. Booker et al. (2005) find competitive pressure produces
test score gains in a very large 8 year panel survey of high school pupils in Texas.
Their measure of competition is the number of actual students in the district lost to
Charter schools, which is endogenous to pre-existing school efficiency and therefore
instrumented using a lagged competition measure (independence of the instrument is
met, they argue, because they have a measure of prior achievement for every child).
The study uses student fixed effects to control for unobservable pupil characteristics,
and thus exploits movements of pupils between school districts (there is very high pupil
mobility in Texas and they argue it is mostly for reasons unrelated to schooling).
Bohte (2004) also find a positive effect of Charter schools using Texan data from similar
years to Booker et al. (2005) and a variety of measures of competition. They estimate
that a one per cent increase in Charter school market share is associated with a 0.1
per cent increase in district passing rates.
North Carolina is one of two states where different research teams have drawn opposite
conclusions about the effect of the Charter school programme. Using similar years of
data for grades 3 to 8, Holmes et al. (2003) found a small positive effect of competition
on public school test scores, whereas Bifulco and Ladd (2004) found no effect on maths
achievement and a negative impact on reading where Charters were within 2.5 miles
of a traditional public school.
Similarly, the studies from Michigan state also conflict. Hoxby (2001), using difference-
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in-difference means tests between areas with over 6% Charter market share and those
with less found 4th and 8th grade reading and maths scores increased by a modest
amount (she also found this in Arizona). However, Bettinger (2005) finds no robust
evidence that test scores in neighbouring public schools increase as the number of
Charters in Michigan increases. Unlike Hoxby, he can deal with the endogeneity of the
location of Charter schools by instrumenting it using proximity to a state university
(since these could set up Charter schools). However, his sample is of Charter schools
is quite small (33 out of 1,800 schools in total) and this might explain his null result.
In a much later study, Ni (2007) is able to look at the longer run effects of the policy
in Michigan. He finds a negative impact on student achievement and school efficiency
in traditional public schools. The effect is small or negligible in the short run, but
becomes more substantial in the long run, which is consistent with the conception of
choice triggering a downward spiral in the most heavily impacted public schools.
Studies from Milwaukee, Florida, California and Ohio have estimated no effect, or a
slightly negative effect, of Charter schools on traditional public schools. Sass (2006,
Florida) and Buddin and Zimmer (2005, California) both use school fixed effect regres-
sions to look at the association between changes in competition from Charter schools
on changes in school performance. Sass finds no effect on reading and only a small
effect on maths achievement. Buddin and Zimmer find no effect on either, with a sur-
vey of headteachers reporting that they perceived little or no impact on their school.
However, during the implementation of the policy, California was experiencing an in-
creasing school population, which might explain why the new capacity introduced via
Charter schools failed to impact on traditional public schools.
Greene and Forster (2002) find no effect of Charter school competition on test scores in
grades 4 and 8, but a small positive gain for 10th grade students where a Charter school
is within 1km in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. However, the identification strategy is weak,
relative to other studies, since it estimates a school-level OLS regression with only basic
control variables. Carr and Ritter (2007) uses a pooled times series regression design
(with lagged outcome and school context variables as controls) to find a small but
consistently negative effect of Charter schools on proficiency passage rates of nearby
traditional public schools in Ohio. However, the lack of pupil characteristic control
variables means they cannot exclude the explanation that this is a pupil sorting effect,
rather than direct negative competition effect.
6.3.5 International private school competition evidence
Public schools do not just experience competition as a result of other public schools;
some public schools compete for pupils with private schools. However, there are rea-
sons to think that this competition from private schools is unlikely to be as effective
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as competition from other public schools. This might be because choice of private
school has little to do with the performance of public schools. Alternatively, the small
number of parents actively choosing between private and public schools might mean
that competition is never high enough to estimate a significant effect.
Caroline Hoxby (1994) uses the same dataset as described in her study above to exam-
ine the relationship between the proportion of pupils in private schools in the metropoli-
tan area with the performance of pupil school pupils. Because the number of private
schools in an area is clearly endogenous to demand for schooling, an instrument is
needed for this explanatory variable. Hoxby uses the population densities of nine ma-
jor religious denominations as her IV. It predicts the level of private schooling in areas
because public schools must be secular, so religion communities were the principal
drivers of the growth of private schooling in America. Hoxby argues that the incidence
of religious groups is largely a historical phenomenon that is exogenous to her depen-
dent variable (8th, 10th, 12th grade reading and maths scores), provided the religious
denomination of the child is included as a control. The validity of this assumption is
discussed in Chapter 8. She finds that private school choice has a positive, statistically
significant effect on public schools productivity. For example, a public school in an
area with moderately high private school choice (as opposed to moderately low pri-
vate school choice) has 8th grade reading scores that are 2.7 percentile points higher.
Greene and Kang (2004) use the same identification strategy for data from upstate
New York school districts, but does not replicate the positive Hoxby result. It finds
generally significant positive effects of private competition for some measures of school
output, but little if any on measures such as the percent of students receiving high
quality statewide Regents diplomas (for grades 9 to 12).
The use of the religious communities instruments means that Hoxby’s positive effect
is restricted to a Catholic private school effect. US studies that analyse the effect
of all types of private schools have yielded mixed results. Hall and Vedder (2003)
show a positive association between the proportion enrolled in private schools within
Ohio school districts and public school performance. However, this positive (though
small) effect is estimated in a simple cross-sectional OLS regression, with relatively
few control variables. Other US studies have not successfully replicated her finding.
For example, Geller et al. (2001) failed to find any effect of private school competition
on public school performance in Georgia using a 10 year panel of data including 3rd
and 10th grade scores for reading and maths. The models are estimated using lagged
measures of competition in regressions and estimating first difference models.
The introduction of a nation-wide voucher scheme in Chile in 1981 produced a sig-
nificant growth in private sector schooling. Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) examine the
growth in competition from private schools in Chile on total pupil achievement in the
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municipality. They employ a difference-in-differences approach with municipality fixed
effects using data on 150 municipalities from 1982 and 1988. The outcomes of interest
are changes in the municipality mean maths and language scores, average repetition
rates and average years of schooling among 10-15 year olds. They are able to condition
on changes in the SES of pupils in each school. Since the growth in the private sector
is potentially endogenous to factors that affect changes in the outcome variables, they
use IVs of urbanisation level, population size and heterogeneity in adult education in
the area to predict the growth in private schooling. They find no evidence that compe-
tition from private schools improved average educational outcomes in the municipality.
McEwan and Carnoy (2000) draw slightly different conclusions for the later period of
1988 to 1996 using a repeated 8-year cross-section and using a difference-in-differences
to control for school unobservables. Their best estimates suggest that 15 years of
competition in Chile led to modest gains of around 0.16-0.2 s.d. in test results among
public schools experiencing competition from the private sector in Santiago. However,
in other regions (where 75% of the population live) they find that this private school
competition had slightly negative effects.
The effect of the growth in competition from private schools on lower-secondary state
schools following the introduction of vouchers in Sweden is also contested. A study
using pupil-level cross-sectional data found (mostly) positive relationships between
the proportion of pupils in private schools in the municipality and ninth grade credit
scores in maths, English and Swedish (Sandstrom and Bergstrom, 2005). Two political
control IVs were used to predict the proportion in private schools in an attempt to
deal with the endogeneity of the location of private schools. However, the administra-
tive dataset used by them had poor pupil controls and no prior achievement variable.
Furthermore, the independence of political control as an instrument is unclear, par-
ticularly given the very poor control variables, since it affects educational outcomes
by acting a proxy for other cultural and social pathways beyond the incidence of pri-
vate schooling. Using the same dataset and a slightly different IV approach, but for a
sample for which a prior attainment measure at grade 6 exists, Ahlin (2003) finds no
statistically significant effects of private school competition on municipality achieve-
ment. Bjorklund et al. (2004) broadly agree with Ahlin that the positive association
found between independent school share and pupil outcomes is not robust to their
using a repeated cross-section with municipality fixed effects. They do find a positive
effect on the maths score in the population, rather than the sample, data, but it is
small. Because it is in the administrative population data it is possible that the poor
pupil-level controls are responsible for this positive association. A final study, using
very similar data (from 1988 to 2003) to Bjorklund et al. (2004) found modest, but
statistically significant effects of private school share on average municipality GPA test
scores (Bo¨hlmark and Lindahl, 2007). The study employed a difference-in-differences
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estimation strategy, looking across municipalities in Sweden and comparing changes in
pupil outcomes with changes in private school enrollment. This is valid provided the
factors that explain supply of private schools are fixed over time within municipalities.
It is difficult to understand why these final two studies disagree in terms of the effect
of private schools. However, Bo¨hlmark and Lindahl (2007) report fewer robustness
checks than Bjorklund et al. (2004) so it is possible that their findings are sensitive
to exact specification. It is worth making a comment on the outcome variable used
by all Swedish studies of school performance. The 9th grade achievement is assessed
by teachers, so there is a risk that ‘measurement error’ on this test (i.e. differences
between teacher reported versus actual competency) is correlated with the pressure
the school perceives themselves to be under from the education market.
Bradley et al. (2004) provide a plausible explanation for why so few international
studies find a strong positive relationship between competition and school performance.
They calculate the relative efficiency of primary schools in Queensland, Australia using
DEA and show that efficiency of schools shows limited correlation with league tables
that do not adjust for socio-economic background of pupils and other school inputs.
Thus, the incentive for schools to increase their efficiency is quite limited if league
tables or raw exam results are the primary means by which parents judge schools.
However, it is notable that in the UK value-added data is published, yet parents
do not appear to utilise it (as discussed in Chapter 3). In Australia they do show
that school efficiency is positively affected by between-government school competition,
albeit weakly. However, there is weak evidence of net negative effects on efficiency of
cream-skimming by non-government (voucher) schools.
6.3.6 International ‘choice’ school competition evidence
Tel Aviv in Israel used to operate a system of bussing to integrate pupils from rich
and poor neighbourhoods. Victor Lavy (2006) examines the effect that abandoning
a school bussing program and introducing choice had on the pupils of one school
district in Tel Aviv. He employs a regression discontinuity design with comparison
groups from untreated tangent neighbourhoods to examine the overall effect of the
choice program on pupil outcomes in lower secondary schools in terms of drop-out
rates, matriculation rates and average scores in matriculation exams. He finds the
choice program had significant general effects on all these pupil outcomes, particularly
among disadvantaged children, and attributes this to the threat of competition (which
was very real because schools actually closed) and on better matching of pupils to
schools.
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6.4 Discussion
Overall, the international evidence on the effects of competition on pupil performance is
mixed. In the UK, early studies yielded some positive associations, but the measures of
competition used were highly correlated with population density and none had access
to pupil-level data. However, the recent null results of Gibbons et al. (2008a) and
Burgess and Slater (2006) may result from methodological considerations, particularly
regarding their measurement of competition, and so should not necessarily be taken
as decisive evidence of no relationship between competition and school performance.
The following two chapters increase the evidence on competition between schools in
England by exploiting geographical variation in the supply of autonomous – foundation
and religious – state schools to estimate the effects of competition on pupil exam
performance. The analysis benefits from the availability of pupil-level data and draws
on identification methods used by US economists working in the same field.
The US non-experimental evidence is similarly mixed, and where consistent positive
effects are estimated they are usually quite small. Certainly, the growing body of
evidence from the Charter school programme could not yet be described as consistent.
In any case, the majority of these papers estimate short-run effects of policy changes,
and longer-run effects may turn out to be very different. Furthermore, the extent to
which UK policy-makers are able to draw useful conclusions from US literature, given
very significant institutional differences in schooling structures, must be limited.
The effect of private schools on public school systems across the world is once again not
consistent, even where researchers are analysing exactly the same education system.
It is perhaps not surprising that the effect of competition from the private sector
is somewhat muted. Parental choice of private school may have little to do with
the performance of public schools, particularly in countries where private schooling is
predominantly religious or the preserve of a wealthy e´lite. Alternatively, public school
competition in these areas may already be sufficiently high such that private schools
provide no additional effective competition. Equally, private schools may not perform
any better than public schools and thus not present a significant threat.
The large number of non-experimental studies that find no effect of competition on
pupil performance raises the question of whether this is because competition is complex
to measure, or competition is complex to implement, or both. In terms of implemen-
tation of policies to encourage competition, it is possible that headteachers are aware
of competitive threats, but are not able to translate their increased effort into greater
effort on the part of teachers. This might be the case if teachers were displaying
knavish behaviour, particularly given the negligible relationship between teacher pay
and performance in most countries discussed in this chapter. It would also be true of
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teachers who had knight-like attitudes towards their work, but who cared about pupil
outcomes beyond test scores. Alternatively, headteachers and school administrators
may perceive themselves to be operating in a competitive environment, but they do
not care about the small increases or falls in pupil numbers that are possible given
limited spare capacity, and so a low-effort, non-competitive equilibrium persists.
Alternatively, perhaps levels of competition do vary, but they never vary enough
in practice for researchers to be able to identify this variation effectively in non-
experimental studies. Indeed, the only study to show that choice policies really can
have a substantial effect on pupil test scores comes from the best designed intervention
– the choice pilot program in Tel Aviv; it is possible that similarly designed pilots
in other countries would also find a substantial effect. The important aspect of this
intervention, compared to most other competition scenarios, was that the competitive
threat was undoubtedly large because schools really were threatened with closure (and
did close). Given that it is not clear that schools aim to grow in a competitive envi-
ronment, it is possible that this threat of school closure is essential in a competitive
environment to produce increased effort and focus on pupil performance.
Chapter 7
Spillover effects of the
Grant-Maintained schools
policy
The Grant-Maintained (GM) schools policy was a relatively radical experiment in
school autonomy, with one-in-six secondary schools achieving independence from Lo-
cal Education Authority (LEA) control between 1989 and 1997. So it provides one
of the best opportunities to assess whether market-like structures to introduce choice
and competition in the English schooling system are capable of improving educational
outcomes for pupils at age 16. Evaluating the gain from school autonomy and its
impact on neighbouring schools is particularly important given similarities between
the GM schools policy, the ongoing academies programme and new legislation to en-
courage Community schools to acquire Foundation Trust status (and thus operate
independently from Local Authority control).
Although the policy was suspended shortly after the Labour Party came to power in
1997, there is reason to believe that it has had a lasting impact on schools. This
chapter therefore seeks to study this long-term impact of the GM policy using recent
pupil-level data. Legislation in 1998 gave GM schools a new Foundation status (or
they reverted to Voluntary-Aided status). Under their new status, they retained the
same control over operations and admissions as before, gradually lost their preferential
financial treatment and were required to have some LEA-appointed governors (An-
derson, 2000).1 Nevertheless, this continued relative autonomy may bring benefits to
the former GM schools, and impact positively or negatively on their neighbours, even
today. It is true that Foundation schools appear to out-perform Community schools
in both Contextual Value-Added (CVA) and standard GCSE league tables, but it is
1They could also obviously continue to benefit from past superior capital investment
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important to understand whether this apparent superior performance should be taken
as evidence that governance structure can influence school effectiveness or whether it
is biased by sorting based on unmeasured pupil characteristics.2 Indeed, Chapter 4
showed that Foundation schools are associated with smaller proportions of pupils in
the LA attending their nearest school, which suggests they are enabling some degree of
parental choice and sorting, thereby increasing the competitive threat experienced by
neighbouring schools. Thus, the policy provides an opportunity to look for evidence
supporting the thesis that competition for pupils improves school performance across
an area. It is these area-wide estimates – the combination of own-school and spillover
effects – that are the relevant metric by which to judge the effect of this important
policy on social welfare.
Table 7.1 summarises the GM schools policy, in relation to Community and Foundation
schools today. GM schools were owned and managed by their governing bodies. They
received funding directly from the Department for Education which in turn recouped
the cost from the former LEA’s revenue support grant. They were completely inde-
pendent of the former LEA and accountable directly to the Department for Education
(and later the Funding Agency for Schools).3 The GM school governing bodies dealt
with all staff matters, including suspension and dismissal, though staff enjoyed the
same pay and conditions as prior to the transfer of contracts.4 Some GM schools were
allowed to introduce sixth-form provision, against the wishes of the LEA. It should
be noted though that, although the GM reform does appear quite radical, it was in-
troduced against a background of increased financial autonomy for all schools under
Local Management of Schools (LMS) reform. Indeed, Deem and Wilkins (1992) argue
that GM and LEA-LMS schools should not be regarded as different in kind, but as
institutions located at different points on the same [self-governing] continuum.
There were three distinct claims made for the GM schools legislation at different times.
First, the GM policy put in place both the incentives and capabilities for substantial
improvements in school efficiency at these schools. This may have been possible be-
cause schools were given control over all financial, building and staffing decisions.
However, their (mostly) higher levels of per-pupil funding make it difficult to attribute
any superior performance to school autonomy rather than increased resources.5 Sec-
2See, for example, Department for Education and Skills (2007a).
3The LEA was still required to provide certain services to pupils at opted-out schools. These
included education welfare, careers, home-to-school transport, and support for statemented pupils
(Bush et al., 1993).
4One survey indicated GM schools made greater use of fixed-term and part-time contracts (Thomp-
son, 1992).
5Bush et al. (1993) find that almost all schools in survey report higher spending on books and
materials, furniture, maintenance and decoration, INSET, support staff. Many report higher spending
on teaching staff levels, but few increased salaries as such. Technology and science were major bene-
ficiaries of capital works. Simon and Chitty (1993) report that GM schools got on average four times
as much in the way of capital grants than mainstream county schools.
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Table 7.1: Differences between Grant-Maintained, Foundation and Community status
Grant-Maintained schools Foundation schools Community schools
(1989 onwards) (1998 onwards)
Land and buildings owned
by Governing Body, who
make decisions about new
capital spending, funded
directly by central govern-
ment.
Land and buildings owned
by Governing Body, who
make decisions about new
capital spending, funded
via the formula grant.
Land and buildings owned
by LA, who makes deci-
sions about new capital
spending, funded via the
formula grant.
Funded directly from cen-
tral government, often at
significantly higher lev-
els than equivalent LA
schools.
Funded via LA under
same terms as other
schools, although higher
levels of GM funding at
schools took many years
to phase out.
Funded via LA.
Managed by their govern-
ing bodies, with no ac-
countability to the LA.
Managed by their Govern-
ing Body, with minority
LA representation. LA
may intervene in very spe-
cific circumstances.
Managed by their Govern-
ing Body, with majority
LA representation.
Governing Body runs the
selection panel, appoints
and employs the head-
teacher.
Governing Body runs the
selection panel, appoints
and employs the head-
teacher.
LA appoints and employs
the headteacher, but the
selection panel is usu-
ally run by the Governing
Body.
Staff are employed, ap-
pointed and dismissed by
the Governing Body.
Staff are employed, ap-
pointed and dismissed by
the Governing Body.
Staff are employed by the
LA. The Governing Body
appoints staff, but the LA
has advisory rights.





by the Secretary of State.
Schools may apply to in-
troduce academic selec-
tion.




must adhere to the Ad-
missions Code. All pre-
existing selection may re-
main.
LA has responsibility for
deciding and administer-
ing admissions arrange-
ments, which must adhere
to the Admissions Code.
Source: Education and Inspection Bill 2006 Annex B, accessed July 2007.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldbills/116/en/06116x-k.htm
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ond, politicians argued it would increase parental choice through diversity of school
provision; but it is widely agreed that regulations combined with restrictions imposed
by the National Curriculum prevented GM schools from pursuing a distinct curricu-
lum or identity (Bush et al., 1993; Fitz et al., 1993b; Sherratt, 1994).6 Finally, it was
suggested that the policy would be a catalyst for improvement in standards across the
system as GM schools provided a competitive threat to their neighbouring schools (or
alternatively induced local authority officials to work harder to ensure other schools
did not want to leave their control). Clark (2007), in a paper discussed in some depth
in the following section, showed there was little short-run evidence for this competition
claim.
The GM schools policy was very controversial, being opposed by LEAs of all shades;
some Anglican and RC churches; some Department for Education officials; large areas
of the press; and teacher unionists (Sherratt, 1994). So, the government required the
Governing Body of schools wishing to acquire GM status to pass a resolution proposing
that an election be held; then win a majority vote of the parents of current pupils.
About two-thirds of the c.850 secondary schools who took this vote gained over 50 per
cent of the parental vote and thus became GM schools.
Given high levels of opposition to the policy, the decision to take the parental vote could
not be taken lightly. According to Fitz et al. (1993b), headteachers were instrumental
in deciding whether a vote should be held. A survey of headteachers, chair of governors,
teacher union reps, parent governors and teacher governors in Bush et al. (1993) reports
that the main stated motivation for gaining GM status on the part of the school was the
increased autonomy and higher levels of funding that were available (see Figure 7.1).
However, a notable minority did so to avoid closure or redesignation (94 of the first
439 schools to embark on the process were subject to a Section 12 or 13 closure or
redesignation proposal; many others – up to half in early surveys – were not yet
subject to formal plans but believed they would be in the future (Bush et al., 1993)).7
A final group of schools had some disagreement with LEA officials (for example, over
tertiary education policy or staffing decisions). This heterogeneity in motivations to
seek GM status is important to quantitative analysis of the policy because it is likely
to result in heterogeneity in benefits to autonomy at different schools.
The fact that a vote of parents was required to become a GM school provides an
important identification strategy for evaluating the policy experiment. We are clearly
concerned that those schools taking the vote are a non-random selection of all schools
in England, thus any improvement in test scores might be attributable to systematic
unobservable characteristics of this group of schools. However, under assumptions
6Fitz et al. (1993b) report only a tiny minority of parents who felt the new GM status had any
bearing on their choice of school.
7A specific request by an LA to the Secretary of State to either close or re-designate a school.
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Figure 7.1: Reasons given for opting out (from Bush et al., 1993, Table 8.1)
discussed in the next section, Clark (2007) used the schools that just lost the vote to
gain GM status as the policy counterfactual to those who just won the vote. He was
thus able to show significant short-run gains in GCSE results for those winning the
GM vote, relative to those who lost the vote.
This chapter builds directly on the work of Clark, but uses recent data to look at the
long-term effects of the policy. The next section examines the validity of the regression
discontinuity as a means of evaluating the impact of the GM schools policy. The
validity of the empirical work in this chapter is contingent on some of the validity tests
contained in Clark, and also additional new tests, so they are reviewed here. Section 3
looks for evidence that the GM policy had ‘spillover’ effects on neighbouring schools. It
presents causal evidence on whether former GM schools may be cream-skimming more
aﬄuent or higher ability pupils. The fourth section also looks at spillover effects by
measuring the average GCSE performance of pupils in areas with former GM schools
to look for evidence of competition effects. Finally, the chapter aims to decompose the
area effects by looking at whether (former GM) Foundation schools are more effective
as a result of their greater operational independence.
7.1 The use of the GM schools vote in a regression dis-
continuity design
A regression discontinuity design (RDD) allows us to identify the effect of becoming
a GM school using the schools that lost their parental vote as the control group. The
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dichotomous treatment, d, is a deterministic function of a single, observed continuous
covariate, Vj , the percentage of parents voting yes to GM status in school j. Treatment
is assigned to those schools whose vote share is greater than 50 per cent (d = 1 [V ≥
50]). We cannot estimate E[y1− y0] as E[y1 | d = 1]−E[y0 | d = 0] because we suspect
that a set of (observed or unobserved) covariates, x,8 alter both the probability of
receiving the treatment and the proportion of pupils gaining 5 or more A*-C at GCSE,
y:
yj = βddj + g(xj) + εj d = 1 [V ≥ 50]
V = f(xj) + uj
The RDD used assumes subjects near the threshold of 50 per cent are likely to be
similar and thus comparable. The group of schools defined as being ‘near the threshold’
varies through the paper from as narrow as V = [45, 55] to as wide as V = [15, 85], as
discussed in detail later. This ‘threshold’ randomization identifies E[y1 − y0 |V ' 50].
Hahn et al. (2001) formally establish minimal continuity assumptions for identifying
treatment effects in the RDD:
E[y0 |V = v] and E[y1 |V = v] are continuous in v at 50 (7.1)
The RDD estimates a weighted average treatment effect for the entire population,
where the weights are the probability that the school draws a V near 50 per cent (Lee,
2005a). This means we can infer little about the potential effects of GM status for
those schools who achieved very low or high V , e.g. 10% or 90%, and indeed for those
who did not take the vote at all.
The GM schools’ parental vote represents an unusual application of the RDD because
schools have some influence over their vote – there is non-random self-selection. Specif-
ically, the vote share V obtained by the school will be dependent on the headteacher’s
persuasiveness and campaigning effort (and even parents’ perception of the benefit of
the treatment), so that, on average, those who receive the treatment of winning the
vote (V > 50) could be systematically more talented or ambitious than those who
lost their vote (V < 50). Lee (2005a) explores the implications of this and shows
that provided there is some random chance error component to V that has a contin-
uous probability density function, treatment status in a neighbourhood of V = 50 is
statistically randomised.
McCrary (2007) also argues that the continuity assumption is not sufficient where
agents are able to manipulate the assignment variable, as is the case with headteachers
8For example, the aﬄuence or political persuasion of parents of children at the school.
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and vote share. He develops a test of manipulation related to continuity of the running
variable (V ) density function. The important insight is that we should not be able
to see significant ‘bunching’ of observations that just pass the assignment threshold.
Figure 7.2 shows that for the GM schools we do not see an unexpectedly large number


































Figure 7.2: McClary’s test of manipulation of assignment variable for GM voting data
7.1.1 Use of the GM vote in Clark (2007)
Clark (2007) applies the RDD to estimate the effect of winning the GM vote on school
GCSE performance for between one and eight years after the change in school status.
School GCSE performance is measured as the percentage of pupils gaining 5 or more
GCSEs at grades A*-C at age 16 – the only available metric in datasets available
for the relevant time period. Clark finds a positive effect of GM status in the order
of a one quarter of a standard deviation (or 4-6 percentage points) change in school
performance after two years. Figure 7.3 shows a running smoothed mean regression-
adjusted pass rates from Clark (2007, Figure 3b) for 520 non-grammar schools in the
wide vote share interval V = [15, 85], estimated in the following form:9
y1 = β0 + β1win+ β2win ∗ vote+ β3lose ∗ vote+ β4y0 + β5controls+ ε (7.2)
9The main result is estimated using 2SLS, as discussed later in this section. Controls are school
type and year-term of vote.
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Figure 7.3: Clark’s effect of a GM vote win on pass rates: 2 years after vote
Clark finds this positive effect of GM status to be persistent over the eight years
following the change in school status, but is not able to control for changes in sorting
(either through school exclusions10 or more importantly through school admissions)
due to a lack of pupil-level administrative data for this period.11
The lack of a set of school composition controls is likely to explain why Clark’s findings
contradict those of Levacˇic´ and Hardman (1999) who do not employ an RDD, but
instead carry out a difference-in-difference analysis of the change in the performance
of GM schools compared to LEA schools from 1991 to 1996. They agree with Clark
that on a straightforward comparison of GCSE examination performance, the rate of
improvement was higher for GM schools. However, when they added school control
variables they found that this apparently superior performance could be attributed to
having falling proportions of social disadvantaged students in GM schools.
The RDD shown above is one of many model specifications set out in Clark (2007)
and others will be mentioned throughout this chapter. The remainder of this section
discusses validity and interpretation issues that relate directly to the unusual nature
of the RDD using GM schools data.
10There was a very sharp increase (as much as three-fold) in the number of permanent exclusions
made by schools in the early 1990s, which Gillborn (1996) attributes to increased school competition
and the publication of league tables.
11Pupil-level data for approximately one-in-ten schools where pupils took A levels between 1994 and
1997 was used in Gray et al. (2001) and is available in electronic format. This dataset reveals that GM
schools with sixth forms made no improvement in A level performance over this period, controlling for
GCSE attainment, gender and age of pupils. The dataset can also be used to show that this subsample
of GM schools did not improve their average or total GCSE score, relative to LEA schools, for these
pupils who continued to A level at the same school (and would have completed their GCSEs between
1992 and 1995).
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7.1.2 RDD – efficiency versus bias trade-offs
Clark estimates the effect of winning the GM vote versus losing over a wide band of
vote share values V = [15, 85]. This was necessary since there were too few schools
close to the threshold to achieve statistical significance at the 95% level, given likely
effect sizes. The further this band widens from the V = 50 discontinuity, the higher the
likelihood that results are biased by unobservable characteristics underlying the opt-
out decision. There are three quite separate sets of characteristics that are unmeasured
in the education function and that V may therefore proxy. First, V reflects the effort
put in by the headteacher and Governing Body to win the vote and it is possible, for
example, that heads highly motivated to become GM are also highly motivated by
league table position. Second, V reflects the political attitudes of the parental body,
and this is correlated with socio-economic background and therefore the academic
performance of their children. It could also reflect the degree of confidence that parents
have in the school’s headteacher more generally, or even their perceived belief in the
capacity of the school to benefit from the treatment. Third, V reflects the external
circumstances the school faced at the time, in particular whether or not it expected to
be closed or re-organised in the near future.
Clark’s approach to dealing with unobservable differences in x as we move further
from the V = 50 discontinuity is to use linear approximations to generate simple
estimates of the discontinuity gap. The dependent variable is regressed on the vote
share, separately on each side of the threshold (see equation 7.2). This parametric form,
which is common in the RDD literature, exploits more data than the use of a narrow
band, and can therefore be more efficient. It is also possible that it generates less
biased estimates of the true conditional expectation function at the V = 50 threshold
than a simple difference in means on a narrower band, where the true function has a
non-zero slope.
However, the critical assumption is that the parametric regression function used for
extrapolation is correctly specified (Lee, 2005b). In our case, we have no a priori evi-
dence that V should be a linear function of exam score growth. Indeed, this particular
regression discontinuity is particularly unusual because it is not entirely clear how the
assignment variable V should enter the education production function at all: we are
quite vague about the xj it proxies. The pre-test using data prior to the treatment can
partially help indicate an appropriate parameterisation by showing the relationship
between outcomes and vote share prior to the intervention. However it cannot reveal
heterogeneities in capacity to benefit from treatment (as are implicit in Clark’s spec-
ification). Figure 7.3 shows that Clark’s estimated coefficients reflect an assumption
of greater benefit from treatment at the discontinuity than for schools with large vote
shares. This type of heterogeneity in benefits from the treatment is perfectly plausible,
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but we not have a clear explanation as to why they might exist (as opposed to any
other specification of heterogeneity, for example). It is important to stress that we
cannot make inferences away from the 50 per cent discontinuity using an RDD, so we
have no reason to believe (and indeed do not need to believe) that the estimated slopes
are correct. However, by drawing on data further from the discontinuity for efficiency
reasons, we must believe that the parametric form we have chosen for the data is the
correct one (hence, we must believe in the plausibility of larger treatment effects for
smaller V ).
We should therefore be cautious in making statistical inferences from parametric re-
gressions. On the one hand, if the polynomials (in this case first-order) are ‘correct’, the
estimator is efficiently using data that are both close to and far from the discontinuity.
On the other hand, if the true functions do not belong to the class of polynomials we
select, the discontinuity will in general be biased, and may lead to erroneous inferences
of statistical significance (DiNardo and Lee, 2004).
As an alternative, non-parametric procedures are also available to estimate the con-
ditional expectation function at V = 50 (Lee, 2005b). These are not heavily model
dependent, simply assuming:
yj =βddj + h(Vj) + ωdj d = 1 [V ≥ 50]
(1) lim
V→50
E[ω0 |V ] = lim
V→50
E[ω1 |V ]
(2) h(.) is an unknown function continuous at V = 50
βd is identified with the difference between right and left limits of E[y |V ] at V = 50:
βd = lim
V ↓50
E[y |V ]− lim
V ↑50
E[y |V ]
Unfortunately, identifying statistically significant results using the right and left limits
is contingent on having a great deal of observations very close to the discontinuity;
just 60 schools had first vote outcomes between 45 and 55 per cent. This chapter
will report a variety of parametric forms, as in Clark, but will also relax identification
assumptions needed by estimating differences in mean outcomes for schools in a tight
band around the discontinuity. It is able to do this, where Clark could not, because
the availability of pupil-level data removes most of the variance in GCSE scores, thus
reducing standard errors on estimates.
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7.1.3 RDD – role of the pre-test
Data collected prior to the intervention allows us to partially test the internal validity
of the RDD. First, we can partially test the Hahn et al. (2001) minimal continuity
assumption by checking E[y0 |V = v] is continuous in v at 50 (see equation 7.1). This
is passed in Clark’s data.
Lee (2005a), in his paper on voting data and RDD, also sets out the local indepen-
dence result, which implies that baseline characteristics in treatment and control must
be identical for the RDD to be valid. Table 7.2 shows mean GCSE scores prior to treat-
ment for vote winners versus losers in Clark’s dataset (obtained directly from Clark
and re-analysed for this study). The data does pass this pre-test at the 5% level on
the V = [15, 85] interval chosen by Clark for his main results. However, the difference
between means is consistently negative across all possible chosen groups, i.e. vote win-
ners had lower GCSE performance prior to treatment than vote losers. Interestingly,
the difference is very large – over 3 percentage points – for schools very close to the
discontinuity and this might explain the large growth in GCSE scores post-treatment
for schools just winning the vote.
Table 7.2: T-test of difference between means on pre-treatment GCSE scores
Vote share interval
[0,100] [15,85] [25,75] [35,65] [45,55]
Number of schools 662 524 357 207 62
Win 38.05 39.36 40.72 41.04 42.35
Lose 40.96 41.48 41.57 42.78 45.50
Diff (GCSE percentage points) −2.91 −2.12 −0.85 −1.75 −3.15
T-value on Diff 2.21 1.55 0.53 0.81 0.84
Significant difference at 5%? Yes No No No No
Note: grammar schools are excluded
This is somewhat surprising since intuitively we assume that vote winners were more
likely to be in aﬄuent areas without political opposition to GM status. However, as
discussed earlier, a significant proportion of vote winners were blighted by closure or
re-organisation threat. Fitz et al. (1993a) show that prior to 1991, 80% of schools
gaining GM status were motivated by avoiding reorganisation; this figure fell for later
votes but they estimate it to be around 50% for their sample as a whole. It is likely that
this subset of schools has no/few counterfactuals in the control group. This quote from
a pupil might explain not only why these schools had relatively low GCSE performance
prior to treatment, but also why they benefited so much from GM status in terms of
general morale, and recruitment of both pupils and teachers to the school:
Before, less people were coming here in case it closed. Now they know it
isn’t . . . People aren’t looking at us . . . [and thinking] we’re going to shut
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down.
(Fitz et al., 1993a, page 78)
All this means that there is an outstanding question about how the pre-treatment
outcomes data should be used. We can estimate the RDD in two ways – first without
using GCSE performance before treatment (y0) as a control and second by adding y0
as a control. If the pre-test proposed by Lee (2005a) is passed the point estimate on
the effect of winning should not really change: all the y0 control does is explain some
of the variance in y1 and thus reduces standard errors.
Table 7.3 presents some regression results from Clark’s data (after two years). We
substantially change our inferences by including y0 as a control: the raw differences in
outcomes two years after treatment are just 0.2 percentage points, yet our estimated
effect of GM school status rises to 2 percentage points by adding the y0 control. In
other words, the borderline pass-fail of the pre-test is potentially inflating win-lose
differences in y1 − y0.
Table 7.3: Sensitivity of Clark’s main (ITT) estimates to changes in control variables
No controls y0 included as control
b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Win 0.202 (1.394) 1.963 (0.681)
N(schools) 520 520
Note: data taken from Table 1a in Clark, 2007
7.1.4 RDD – independent causal effect of V on y
In identifying the causal effect of GM status on school GCSE performance, we must
assume that the random draw of V does not itself have an impact on the outcome,
except through its impact on treatment status (Lee, 2005a). That is, while V is
allowed to be correlated with y1 or y0 in the population, V is not permitted to have
an independent causal impact on y for a given school.
There is a plausible argument that in our case V does have an independent causal
impact on y. A school that wins its GM vote may experience a ‘euphoria effect’ that
temporarily increases staff motivation, resulting in effort directed at improving test
scores. Alternatively, a headteacher who wins a controversial vote might experience
an increase in respect from staff, which allows him/her to unite teachers in pursuing
exam-orientated goals. Similarly, the school management who loses their GM vote
may well perceive the lack of support for their proposal as a vote of confidence in the
school more widely. This would be de-motivating, and may even cause some vote-losing
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headteachers to leave their job.12
Figure 7.4 shows that ideally we wish to identify the effect of choosing to take the GM
vote and winning it (Yw(V )), versus those schools not taking the vote at all (Yn(V )).
However, we are only able to estimate the effect of taking the vote and winning versus
taking the vote and losing (Yw(V )-Yl(V )). This might be an overestimate of Yw(V )-
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Effect of voting and losing 
Figure 7.4: Illustration of the separate effects of voting and the voting outcome
There is some evidence for this latter phenomenon in the aggregated GCSE perfor-
mance data for the period 1992-1995 (1992/3 is the time period when the majority
of schools gained their GM status). The 1992-5 increase in the proportion of pupils
getting 5 A*-C at GCSE is 5.20 percentage points across all schools (including gram-
mars). For vote winners (including grammars), this figure is 6.56 percentage points;
so schools gaining GM status outperformed the average. For vote losers, this figure is
4.87 percentage points; so vote losers did worse than the average school over this time
period.13
12No analysis of the headteacher turnover data has been carried out for this period, but conversations
with government officials and academics associated with early research into GM votes suggests this
happened on more than one occasion.
13However, data presented by Clark in web appendix Table 3 does not identify these differences
between non-voters and vote losers for the longer time period of 1992 to 2001. It is not clear why our
observations disagree.
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7.1.5 RDD – fuzzy versus sharp discontinuity
There are further issues in the GM votes data concerning schools that lost their first
vote to become GM, but that went on to hold subsequent votes, which they won. We
use the first ballot win as our assignment to treatment variable since we think it is
this V that reveals the underlying characteristics of the school (xj). However, it is
the final ballot that determines the long-run treatment status of the school. A small
number of schools winning the vote were rejected for GM status by the Secretary of
State because they were subject to reorganisation or closure (Fitz et al., 1993a); a
number of schools losing the first vote went on to hold further parental votes that they
then won. Figure 7.5 shows that 25 of the 233 schools losing their GM vote went on to
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Figure 7.5: Percentage of first ballot vote losers achieving subsequent yes votes
There are several possibilities for dealing with this problem in the data. We can use
the first vote data in a ‘sharp’ RDD, as described earlier, and interpret results as
‘Intention to Treat’ (ITT) estimates (Angrist et al., 1996). However, in this case it is
not clear the ITT estimates are the ones we want since the GM policy is no longer in
place: we are interested in the effects of school autonomy and increased competition
and not the effects of taking the GM vote. Alternatively we can use the outcome of
a first vote (WIN) as an instrument for the outcome of the final vote (and thus the
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treatment – GM), known as a ‘fuzzy’ RDD in the literature:
yj = β0 + β1GMj + f(Vj) + εj
GMj = α0 + α1WINj + f(Vj) + υj
This identifies the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), which in this case would
be the effect of receiving the treatment for schools who won the first vote (and had
an expected vote share close to the discontinuity). As in Clark, both the ITT and
IV estimates are reported; given so few schools held a second vote, the coefficients
are generally quite similar. Of course, if treatment effects are heterogeneous, which
they are likely to be since schools’ motivations for taking the vote were very different,
average effects across the whole group of GM schools might be very different; this
study can say nothing about them.
7.1.6 Using RDD in recent pupil-level data
There are difficulties with using data over 15 years after a policy is introduced to
identify long-term effects. First, sorting of pupils across schools, neighbourhoods and
even cities will have occurred in this time period. Indeed, theory predicts this is a likely
outcome of the intervention. This makes it more difficult to distinguish between school
effectiveness and unobserved pupil characteristics for the 2005 cohort of school leavers,
compared to pupils in the first five years of the GM intervention who entered school
prior to the change in status. However, pupil data not available in the 1990s gives us
information on where pupils in schools from 2002 onwards live, relative to where they
attend schools. This allows us to qualitatively describe the nature of the sorting effects
that control over admissions has on the allocation of pupils across schools.
On the other hand there are some significant advantages to using an RDD design
in the recent pupil-level data, compared to the historical school performance tables
used by Clark. The first advantage is that we can measure pupil achievement using
the capped GCSE point score on their best eight subjects, a measure not available
to researchers in the 1990s. The percentage gaining 5+A*-C at GCSE is a rather
crude measure of achievement that can be manipulated by schools. This is why, after
the publication of league tables using this measure in 1992, some schools were able
to rapidly improve their league table position with little extra effort by focussing
solely on grade C/D borderline pupils and offering ‘easier to teach’ subjects (Wilson,
2003). Capped GCSE point score is a better reflection of school performance because
it captures the performance of all pupils across a wide variety of subject areas.
The second advantage is that we can be less concerned about the short-run negative
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(and positive) effects of losing (and winning) the GM vote confounding our estimates
of treatment effect since, for example, negative effects of losing a vote on school morale
and headteacher turnover should have disappeared. Thus, any differences between vote
winners and losers at the discontinuity should be attributable solely to the former GM
schools’ continuing control over admissions and management of resources and staffing
(as Foundation or Voluntary-Aided schools).
A final advantage is that models can be estimated using pupil level data with a wide
set of prior attainment and socio-demographic controls (described in the next sec-
tion). This approach to estimating a RDD with controls is formalised in a non-
parametric form by Fro¨lich (2007), who shows it requires fewer assumptions than
the one-dimensional nonparametric regression analysed by Hahn et al. (2001). The
use of pupil-level data can introduce a large set of covariates to account for differ-
ences around the threshold, thus reducing bias on estimates of school effectiveness
(and without dimensionality problems since the number of pupils is very large). In
addition, accounting for covariates will also substantially reduce the variance in the
outcome GCSE variable, thus increasing the precision of estimates. A consequence of
this is that statistical significance can be achieved for the relatively narrow band of
vote winners and losers.
7.2 Data
Data for the 573,227 school-leavers is drawn from the 2005 National Pupil Database
(NPD). Table 7.4 summarises the key variables. The main outcome variable used is
pupil achievement in GCSE exams at age 16. This is measured as total points achieved
by pupils over their best 8 GCSE/GNVQ or equivalent examinations. The GCSE exam
is graded from A* (58 points) to G (16 points), with 6 point increments between grades.
The typical pupil achieves around 4 Cs and 4 Ds.
There are several pupil-level variables in the dataset that make use of the pupil post-
code in NPD. First, the home-school distance is calculated for each pupil, and the
median value for each school is found. Second, two continuous measures of depriva-
tion – the Index of Deprivation 2004 and the IDACI measure – are included, as are
57 ACORN dummies of household type. These are imperfect indicators of the child’s
social background to the extent that they measure average social characteristics of
households in the postcode or SOA.
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Table 7.4: Key descriptive statistics
Won vote Lost Never
first time first vote took vote
Capped GCSE score 312.1 (98.7) 299.0 (101.6) 283.8 (106.7)
KS2 test score over 3 subjects 4.59 (0.70) 4.51 (0.72) 4.43 (0.75)
FSM eligibility 8.87% 11.80% 14.60%
White ethnicity 83.41% 83.64% 83.95%
SEN with statement 2.06% 2.22% 2.63%
SEN without statement 11.11% 11.78% 14.17%
English not first language 4.81% 9.68% 8.81%
Home-school distance for 3.12 (2.55) 2.40 (1.51) 2.31 (1.70)
school’s median pupil (km)
Number of pupils 111, 840 47, 541 413, 846
Number of schools 618 233 2, 257
Won subsequent re-ballot 10.8%
Note: statistics include grammar schools, but these are dropped for some analysis. These descriptive
statistics are for a slightly larger set of than Clark uses. Some vote-taking schools closed or have been
renamed, but I include these schools where a new school opens on exactly the same site or where a
school moves but retains exactly the same name; I have also included schools achieving GM status
before 1992.
7.2.1 School variables
The voting data for these schools is taken from the Grant Maintained Schools Database,
which provides details of all GM status ballots taken by schools, and the outcomes of
these ballots. Further details can be found in Chapter 2.
The 3,108 schools in the dataset are identified by whether they are a grammar, Foun-
dation (non-grammar), Voluntary-Aided (VA) (non-grammar), Voluntary- Controlled
(VC) (non-grammar), academy or City Technology College (CTC). The default school
is a Community (LEA controlled) comprehensive school. Foundation schools are over-
whelmingly former GM schools, as shown in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5: Governance of GM vote winners and losers
Final GM Final GM GM ballot
ballot won ballot lost never taken
Grammar 94 8 70
CTC/Academy 0 0 14
Community (non-grammar) 12 162 1750
Foundation (non-grammar) 404 1 22
Voluntary-aided (non-grammar) 133 26 331
Voluntary-controlled (non-grammar) 0 11 69
Total 643 208 2256
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For most of the regressions, grammar schools are excluded. This is because a very
large majority of them won their vote, so there is not a large enough counterfactual to
identify the effects of becoming a GM grammar school.
School peer group control variables used in regressions are the percentage of girls in
the school; the mean KS2 prior attainment of intake; the percentage of pupils who are
FSM eligible; the mean deprivation value for pupils.
7.3 GM schools and cream-skimming
Chapter 5 showed that own admissions schools – Foundation and Voluntary-Aided
schools – showed signs of cream-skimming in the sense that they had intakes of higher
ability and lower FSM than if they educated the pupils who lived closest to the school.
This evidence was far weaker for Foundation schools than it was for VA schools. Nev-
ertheless, it is consistent with West et al. (2004) whose survey data of 2001 showed
both Foundation and VA schools were more likely to have admissions policies designed
to favour easier to teach pupils and exclude others.
This section asks whether the current cream-skimming patterns of Foundation schools
can be directly attributed to their having been given GM status in the 1990s. An
alternative hypothesis, for example, would be that schools who were motivated to
maximise their league table position (and thus cream-skim) were more likely to apply
to become GM schools. Two different types of analysis are shown here. First, the pupil
intake characteristics of vote winners and losers are directly compared. If they differ at
the discontinuity it could be for one of two reasons: either more aﬄuent families have
been attracted to live close to vote winning schools; or these schools have used their
control over admissions to systematically favour certain pupils. To distinguish between
these two explanations, the second part of this section compares the intakes of vote
winners and losers to the characteristics of families located close to these schools.
Figure 7.6 shows the current average KS2 point score of pupils at schools who took
a GM vote in the 1990s, plotted against their vote share in the first vote of parents
(rounded down to nearest 5%). If we exclude grammar schools, the evidence for GM
vote winners having a superior intake is present, though weak.
Table 7.6 shows output from regressions of the same data. There are six different
specifications shown here. The first four columns of estimates compare mean KS2 prior
attainment of intake for non-grammar schools, varying the subset of schools on which
the regressions are estimated each time. On each occasion, the parametric assumption
is that KS2 intake should not vary by vote share on each side of the discontinuity for
the subset of schools on which the model is estimated. This is clearly a less onerous
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Figure 7.6: Current KS2 prior attainment of intakes for GM vote takers
assumption for V = [45, 55]. The tighter bands around the discontinuity reduce the
chance of mis-specification biasing results, but increase inefficiency (and therefore type
II errors) since sample size is small. The final two columns allow the effect of the vote
on KS2 intake to vary, as Clark did in his preferred specifications. However, they rely
on a very wide bandwidth. Both the ITT coefficient (whether the school won the first
vote) and the two-stage IV coefficient (instrumenting GM school status using whether
the first vote was won) are reported for each specification.
Overall, the evidence for cream-skimming here is present but quite weak: coefficients
are always positively signed, but not always significant at the 5% level so we cannot
always reject the null of no ability cream-skimming taking place. If there is a cream-
skimming effect, this data suggests it is quite small: a coefficient of 0.05 corresponds to
5% of a Key Stage improvement (or 7% of a S.D.) in mean KS2 test score of entrants
to the school.
Turning to evidence of cream-skimming based on social status, as measured by FSM
eligibility, the evidence here exists but is also quite weak. Figure 7.7 shows that vote
winners do have slightly fewer FSM eligible pupils at their schools. There is a 2.4
percentage point difference in the FSM proportions for non-grammar vote winners and
losers (9.7% versus 12.1%). This magnitude of difference is consistent with Clark’s
data from a slightly earlier period.
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Table 7.6: Differences in intakes by KS2 for non-grammar schools taking GM vote
45%–55% 35%–65% 25%–75% 15%–85% 15%–85% 15%–85%
with linear with split
term linear term
Win (IV) 0.048 0.043 0.060∗∗ 0.030 0.094∗∗ 0.077







Cons 4.515∗∗∗ 4.498∗∗∗ 4.485∗∗∗ 4.488∗∗∗ 4.455∗∗∗ 4.489∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.029) (0.020) (0.018) (0.028) (0.042)
Win (ITT) 0.034 0.036 0.053∗∗ 0.027 0.078∗∗ 0.062
(0.058) (0.031) (0.022) (0.019) (0.038) (0.040)
N(pupils) 11,263 43,574 75,906 115,107 115,107 115,107
N(schools) 60 221 384 593 593 593
Note: *** = sig. at 1%; ** = sig. at 5%.
Dependent variable is mean KS2 score. Robust S.E.s, clustered for school
Figure 7.7: Free school meals status of intake for GM vote takers
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Table 7.7 shows the estimates from a probit regression of the probability of a FSM
pupil attending a vote winning versus a vote losing schools. The Win coefficient is
always correctly signed – GM vote winning schools do have fewer FSM pupils – but it
is not always statistically significant. A coefficient of -0.15 would indicate that a child
selected at random from a former GM school has 5 percentage points lower chance
that s/he is eligible for FSM, compared to a child from a vote losing school.
Table 7.7: Differences in intakes by FSM for non-grammar schools taking GM vote
45%–55% 35%–65% 25%–75% 15%–85% 15%–85% 15%–85%
with linear with split
term linear term
Win (IV) −0.026 −0.103 −0.164∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗ −0.118 −0.090







Cons −1.336∗∗∗ −1.230∗∗∗ −1.204∗∗∗ −1.167∗∗∗ −1.194∗∗∗ −1.261∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.067) (0.050) (0.044) (0.068) (0.107)
Win (ITT) −0.025 −0.087 −0.146∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.098 −0.073
(0.157) (0.072) (0.053) (0.046) (0.094) (0.102)
N(pupils) 11,506 44,755 78,014 118,529 118,529 118,529
N(schools) 60 221 384 593 593 593
Note: *** = sig. at 1%; ** = sig. at 5%.
Dependent variable is mean KS2 score. Robust S.E.s, clustered for school
If former GM schools do have slightly superior intakes today, we want to be able to dis-
tinguish whether this results from more aﬄuent families moving closer to these former
GM schools or whether the schools appear to have admissions policies or procedures
that are different to those of the vote-losing schools.
We can calculate the social and ability composition of a school compared to its neigh-
bourhood using a proximity ratio of the current composition of the school over the
characteristics of the same number of pupils who live closest to the school, the con-
struction of which is described in Chapter 5. These ratios are created for the proportion
of FSM pupils in the school, the proportion of pupils who scored in the top quintile
on KS2 tests and the proportion of pupils who scored in the lowest quintile on KS2
tests. Regressions are run with these ratios as the dependent variable for GM vote-
taking schools. Table 7.8 shows the output for these regressions where vote winners
are compared to vote losers (and the win coefficient is instrumented using the first
vote outcome). All the regressions display coefficients on the win variable that are
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signed as expected – GM vote winners have intakes that are more superior to their
local neighbourhood (compared to GM vote losers). However, they are not always
significant at the 5% level.14
Table 7.8: Ratio of current-to-proximity intake characteristics
45%–55% 35%–65% 25%–75% 15%–85%
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Win (IV) −0.129 −0.235∗ −0.241∗∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.122) (0.077) (0.069)
FSM Cons 1.039∗∗∗ 1.234∗∗∗ 1.190∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.090) (0.058) (0.056)
Adj R-Sq 0.000 0.019 0.022 0.014
Win (IV) 0.344∗∗ 0.173∗ 0.060 0.048
Top 20% (0.172) (0.091) (0.111) (0.081)
KS2 Cons 0.870∗∗∗ 0.995∗∗∗ 1.090∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗
score (0.136) (0.067) (0.083) (0.065)
Adj R-Sq 0.035 0.025 0.000 0.000
Win (IV) −0.042 −0.073 −0.120∗∗ −0.103∗∗
Low 20% (0.122) (0.075) (0.050) (0.041)
KS2 Cons 0.976∗∗∗ 1.060∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 1.075∗∗∗
score (0.097) (0.055) (0.038) (0.033)
Adj R-Sq 0.000 0.006 0.014 0.012
N(schools) 58 215 377 581
Note: *** = sig. at 1%; ** = sig. at 5%.
GM schools impact on their neighbours, albeit weakly, by cream-skimming more aﬄu-
ent pupils. Furthermore, Table 7.9 shows that GM schools are likely to have presented
some threat to their neighbouring schools, because the policy appears to have allowed
them to grow, relative to vote losers. The effect size here is not consistent across spec-
ifications, but the magnitude of their growth in size appears to be in the order of 10%
(consistent with Clark).
7.4 GM schools and competition
This section looks at the effect of GM schools on the GCSE outcomes of pupils attend-
ing schools in the wider area. The previous section gives evidence that former GM are
responsible for some sorting of more aﬄuent pupils into their schools. Chapter 4 shows
that Foundation schools are associated with a smaller proportion of pupils attending
their nearest schools. All this suggests that former GM schools must be actively com-
peting with their neighbours for pupils, and so this competition may increase area-wide
14Regressions of proximity intakes of vote winners and losers show there are no differences, suggesting
families have not moved to live closer to GM schools.
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Table 7.9: Differences in school size between vote winners and losers
45%–55% 35%–65% 25%–75% 15%–85% 15%–85% 15%–85%
with linear with split
term linear term
Win (IV) 148 79 82 ** −11 199 *** 211 ***







Cons 1011 *** 1107 *** 1111 *** 1148 *** 1044 *** 1020 ***
(91) (39) (31) (28) (42) (60)
Win (ITT) 110 68 73 ** −10 168 *** 174 ***
(85) (46) (36) (31) (61) (63)
Adj R-sq 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02
N(schools) 60 221 384 593 593 593
Note: *** = sig. at 1%; ** = sig. at 5%.
pupil achievement.
Clark argues that there are three possible routes by which schools that neighbour GM
schools might improve their GCSE results. First, there might be a direct competi-
tion effect, whereby increased competition for (certain) pupils induces neighbouring
schools to increase effort directed at exams (thereby improving league table position
and making the school more attractive to parents). Second, the presence of successful
GM schools might have induced neighbouring schools to also pursue autonomy from
the local authority (although he finds no evidence of this ‘copycat’ behaviour). Third,
the presence of GM schools might encourage LA officials to work harder in the interest
of remaining schools to discourage them from pursuing autonomy (this would seem to
be more relevant to estimating short-run effects). Clark argues that GM schools could
give other local non-GM schools ‘an important bargaining chip: either local authori-
ties accede to their demands (for example, to fire certain teachers or suspend certain
students) or those schools would themselves seek GM status’ (Clark, 2007, page 5).
However, it is of course entirely possible that this particular threat to LAs produced
a negative impact on pupil test scores since LA officials might be more reluctant to
intervene in schools where there were problems.
This encouragement of direct competition between schools was the reason why the GM
policy was opposed by many headteachers, who feared the effects it would have on the
dynamics of schooling in their area. Brown and Baker’s survey (1992) revealed that
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most of the heads who had decided not to opt out thought that GM status runs against
the ‘spirit of cooperation’, and that their LEAs were doing the best they can given the
financial limitations and other constraints within which they have to operate.
As described in Chapter 6, the possible effects of the GM policy on GCSE results of
pupils living in the area as a whole are quite complex. The known cream-skimming
will redistribute peer effects across the area, affecting the composition of classrooms in
many schools. Table 7.9 also showed the policy caused changes in sizes of schools in the
area, and if these schools are differentially effective, this will impact on average GCSE
scores. Finally, there is the possibility of effort on the part of schools induced by the
increased competition for pupils. What is measured in this section is the total effect
of all these phenomena on average GCSE outcomes in the local authority, estimated
in a pupil-level regression with capped GCSE scores as the outcome variable. Theory
cannot help us predict the possible direction of the effect of GM schools because we
cannot not take any a priori view as to whether any potential effects of competition
are outweighed by anti-collaboration and cream-skimming effects.
In this section two LA-level variables are used to measure the extent to which the area
is likely to be affected by the GM schools policy:
Area 0-100%: the percentage of pupils in the LEA currently in schools that
(a) took the GM vote;
(b) won the GM vote.
Area 15-85%: the percentage of pupils in the LEA currently in schools that
(a) took the GM vote for the V = [15, 85] sub-set of schools;
(b) won the GM vote for the V = [15, 85] sub-set of schools.
The GM taken coefficient tells us the effect of having schools that took the GM vote
in the LA. The GM won coefficient tells us the incremental effect of having schools in
the LA who both took and won the GM vote, and therefore is intended to measure the
direct effects of the policy. Both coefficients are ITT so tell us the effect of winning
the first vote (versus losing it).
Table 7.10 shows estimates from regressions of these LA ‘competition’ variables on
capped GCSE point scores.15 The five columns of estimates differ only in terms of
the number of control variables that are included, except for the final column which
includes selective LAs where over 10% of pupils are in grammar schools.
The fact that the coefficient on GM won falls from a large positive value in the first
column to below zero in the third column suggests that there must be some sorting
of more aﬄuent pupils into LAs with GM schools. The preferred specification in
15The regression is estimated at pupil-level to control for confounding pupil characteristics (with
clustering for schools).
Chapter 7. Spillover effects of Grant-Maintained schools 171
Table 7.10 is the third column. This is because we do not want to attribute sorting of
higher ability pupils into the area to the success of the policy (i.e. the first and second
columns do not identify efficiency improvements). Also, we do not want to control
for school peer groups (as the fourth column does) since changes in these is part of
the effect we want to measure. Finally, it would seem to be less interesting to include
areas with selective schooling systems since so many of these schools acquired GM
status, but they will not tell us about potential competition effects in non-selective
areas.
These results show that although being located in an LA with a higher proportion of
former GM schools is associated with higher raw GCSE scores, there is no statistically
significant effect once pupil characteristics of the LA are taken into account. This
finding is consistent with Clark who finds no spillover effects of the GM policy on
GCSE results in the area.
Table 7.10: Effect of former GM schools on local authority pupil performance
GCSE point score (best 8 grades)
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Area GM won 15.617 10.424 −1.045 −2.379 7.944
0-100%: (12.120) (7.369) (5.783) (5.563) (4.898)
GM taken 4.206 3.687 1.454 2.846 −2.666
(10.766) (6.635) (5.133) (4.910) (4.551)
Adj R-sq 0.001 0.459 0.542 0.545 0.553
Area GM won 24.224∗ 18.849∗∗ 3.508 3.238 13.825∗∗∗
15-85%: (13.305) (8.027) (6.425) (6.176) (5.347)
GM taken 2.398 0.115 −1.313 −0.076 −5.963
(10.990) (6.762) (5.338) (5.124) (4.698)
Adj R-sq 0.002 0.459 0.542 0.545 0.553
N(pupils) 503,746 484,647 480,036 479,972 545,904
N(schools) 2,864 2,833 2,670 2,669 3,102
KS2 score No Yes Yes Yes Yes
NPD controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Acorn indicators No No Yes Yes Yes
School peers vars No No No Yes Yes
Selective areas? No No No No Yes
Note: ***=sig. at 1%; **=sig. at 5%; *=sig. at 10%
7.5 Pupil achievement in neighbouring schools
The failure to establish area-wide effects of GM schools on mean GCSE achievement
in the previous section raises further questions as to why this might be the case. First,
it is possible that no effect was found because an LA is often too large an area over
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which to identify the spillover effect of an individual school. Second, even if there is no
overall area-wide effect, it is possible that there is a distributional effect whereby pupils
who get to attend GM schools benefit at the expense of those attending neighbouring
schools. Both these additional research questions can be tentatively investigated in
the dataset. However, because individual school (rather than area-wide) effects are
being estimated, there is an increased risk that results are confounded by sorting on
unmeasured pupil characteristics.
In this section, models of pupil achievement on schools located close to a GM school
are estimated. Schools are measured in terms of the extent to which they have been
affected by GM vote winning and vote taking schools, using the following school-level
variables:
School SOA1: the percentage of pupils at the school who live in a lower SOA neigh-
bourhood alongside pupils who
(i) attend GM vote taking schools;
(ii) attend vote winning schools.
School SOA2: the school’s average level of pupil exposure to
(i) the percentage of pupils in the lower SOA attending GM vote taking schools;
(ii) the percentage of pupils in the lower SOA attending GM vote winning schools.
School 5km: the number of
(i) GM vote taking schools within 5 km radius of the school;
(ii) GM vote winning schools within 5 km radius of the school;
(iii) (any) secondary schools within a 5 km radius of the school.
School Near3: a binary indicator for whether one of the nearest 3 neighbouring
schools is a
(i) GM vote taking school;
(ii) GM vote winning school.
Table 7.11 shows the output from these final regressions. On this occasion the preferred
specification for these school-level spillover variables is the fourth column, where the
school peer group is controlled for. This allows us to assess schools located close to
former GM schools but who have a similar peer group to other schools, thus directly
isolating the effect of the GM policy on the effectiveness of neighbouring schools.
In these specifications, a statistically significant spillover effect of GM schools on their
neighbours is never found. Indeed, the point estimate values are always negative,
though very small indeed. Note that the only significant coefficient in this specification
identifies that being located close to any other schools (i.e. being a school in an urban
area) appears to be good for school GCSE performance. This has been found by many
others (e.g. Gibbons et al., 2008b), but it is not possible to say whether it is due to
Chapter 7. Spillover effects of Grant-Maintained schools 173
Table 7.11: Effect of GM schools on neighbouring school pupil performance
GCSE point score (best 8 grades)
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
School GM won 8.749∗∗ 6.906∗∗∗ −0.508 −0.179 1.882
SOA1: (3.471) (2.079) (1.615) (1.542) (1.473)
GM taken −0.065 0.694 1.931 1.048 0.916
(3.642) (2.212) (1.680) (1.628) (1.606)
Adj R-sq 0.001 0.459 0.542 0.545 0.553
School GM won 2.439 0.810 −2.843 −2.733 0.761
SOA2: (5.534) (3.404) (2.813) (2.704) (2.538)
GM taken 22.585∗∗∗ 12.129∗∗∗ 4.604∗ 2.938 2.543
(4.784) (2.992) (2.477) (2.406) (2.325)
Adj R-sq 0.004 0.459 0.542 0.545 0.553
School GM won 3.206∗∗ 2.026∗∗∗ 0.139 −0.129 0.286
5km: (1.295) (0.738) (0.595) (0.564) (0.504)
GM taken −0.567 −0.356 −0.238 −0.046 −0.194
(1.227) (0.729) (0.567) (0.544) (0.496)
Any school −1.168∗∗∗ −0.210∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.113) (0.087) (0.098) (0.093)
Adj R-sq 0.005 0.459 0.542 0.545 0.552
School GM won 0.018 1.557 −1.017 −0.414 1.053
Near3: (2.546) (1.533) (1.184) (1.136) (1.063)
GM taken 3.893 1.996 0.169 −0.027 −0.301
(2.439) (1.480) (1.114) (1.067) (1.032)
Adj R-sq 0.000 0.458 0.542 0.545 0.552
N(pupils) 503,746 484,647 480,036 479,972 545,904
N(schools) 2,864 2,833 2,670 2,669 3,102
KS2 score No Yes Yes Yes Yes
NPD controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Acorn indicators No No Yes Yes Yes
School peers vars No No No Yes Yes
Selective areas? No No No No Yes
Note: ***=sig. at 1%; **=sig. at 5%; *=sig. at 10%
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competition, collaboration or another explanation.
7.6 Pupil achievement in former GM schools in 2005
This final section of analysis examines whether GM vote-winning schools directly ben-
efit pupils who attend these schools. This is the assumption of policy-makers because
all recent studies of school effectiveness using NPD show that autonomy from local
authority control is associated with superior pupil performance at GCSE.
Table 7.12 shows as example of these associations by estimating five OLS regressions.
Foundation schools (these are three-quarters of the former GM schools) are associated
with 17 points (one grade in three of the eight best subjects or 0.17 s.d.) higher
GCSE exam scores for their pupils, and this apparent outperformance of Community
schools persists, even as KS2 prior attainment, other NPD indicators, geo-demographic
indicators and peer controls are added. Their unexplained GCSE advantage is 2 points,
or one-third of a grade in one of eight subjects (and these figures are even higher
for Voluntary-Aided schools). However, the RDD approach can assess whether the
apparent effectiveness of former GM schools is likely to be directly caused by the
policy of giving schools autonomy from local authority control.
Table 7.12: OLS regression of school type effectiveness for all non-grammar schools
GCSE point score (best 8 grades)
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Foundation 17.490∗∗∗ 9.098∗∗∗ 7.852∗∗∗ 3.057∗∗∗ 2.127∗∗
(1.995) (1.227) (1.155) (1.008) (0.996)
Vol. Aided 27.794∗∗∗ 10.380∗∗∗ 9.828∗∗∗ 10.798∗∗∗ 7.641∗∗∗
(2.088) (1.312) (1.195) (0.998) (1.047)
Vol. Con. 20.389∗∗∗ 7.508∗∗∗ 7.502∗∗∗ 0.768 −0.685
(3.546) (2.313) (2.232) (1.754) (1.739)
Acad. / CTC 12.356 10.163 14.188∗∗ 18.902∗∗∗ 16.225∗∗∗
(12.378) (6.333) (6.214) (5.752) (5.028)
Controls:
KS2 score No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pupil background No No Yes Yes Yes
Area deprivation No No No Yes Yes
School peers No No No No Yes
Adj R-sq 1.1% 45.0% 50.7% 53.4% 53.6%
N(pupils) 551,688 530,842 528,083 525,935 525,871
N(schools) 2,949 2,949 2,946 2,946 2,945
Note: *** = sig. at 1%; ** = sig. at 5%.
The inference that autonomy is causally related to pupil performance has been consis-
tently claimed by government, yet it is possible that this inference is confounded by
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alternative explanations. First, that Foundation schools have pupils with unobserved
family circumstances that cause them to make more progress in secondary school.
Second, a reverse causation argument that effective schools chose to take the vote to
become GM (and therefore subsequently Foundation) schools and that these differences
in effectiveness have simply persisted through to today. It is difficult to disentangle
school effectiveness from unobservable pupil characteristics using the GM RDD since
sorting of pupils has taken place in the past 15 years. That said, where school catch-
ment neighbourhoods tend to have particular fixed characteristics that have persisted
over the 15 years, the RDD approach does not confound these characteristics with
effectiveness.
Figure 7.8 plots the average capped GCSE point score for schools (grouped to nearest
5%) who took a GM vote in the 1990s. It illustrates that there does not appear to
be a clear discontinuity in 2005 exam performance between non-grammar schools that
did, and did not, win the GM vote. This suggests there is likely to be no difference in
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Figure 7.8: Average capped GCSE point score by GM vote
Table 7.13 shows the RDD results for a series of regressions of 2005 GCSE scores on
whether the GM vote was won or not. It does this first for schools whose parental
yes vote was between 35% and 65%, then for schools whose vote share was between
15% and 85%: the first set of results are less likely to have biased point estimates,
but they have fewer observations so less precision. On each occasion both the simple
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ITT coefficient (whether the school won the first vote) and the two-stage IV coefficient
(instrumenting GM status on the first vote share result) are reported.
The first column of estimates shows that the raw differences in GCSE point scores
between vote winners and losers is around 6 points (or one grade difference in one of
eight subjects); this is not statistically significant. When full pupil characteristics and
peer group variables are added, the gap between winners and losers is tiny – just 0.2
points – and is again not statistically significant.
Table 7.13: RDD comparing non-grammar GM vote winners and losers
GCSE point score (best 8 grades)
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
V = [35, 65] Vote winners (ITT) 5.429 1.802 1.581 0.953 0.237
(5.013) (2.938) (2.746) (2.373) (2.297)
Vote winners (IV) 6.468 2.149 1.879 1.131 0.282
(5.982) (3.507) (3.267) (2.819) (2.741)
Adj. R-sq 0.001 0.472 0.519 0.543 0.546
N(pupils) 44,888 43,499 43,378 43,221 43,221
N(schools) 221 221 221 221 221
V = [15, 85] Vote winners (ITT) 4.991 2.124 2.534 0.495 0.316
(3.378) (2.064) (1.943) (1.656) (1.584)
Vote winners (IV) 5.619 2.392 2.852 0.558 0.356
(3.802) (2.324) (2.187) (1.867) (1.787)
Adj. R-sq 0.001 0.455 0.504 0.530 0.534
N(pupils) 118,919 114,922 114,597 114,141 114,141
N(schools) 593 593 593 593 593
Controls: KS2 score No Yes Yes Yes Yes
NPD controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Acorn indicators No No No Yes Yes
School peers vars No No No No Yes
The OLS coefficient on Foundation status from a regression with a full set of controls
is ten times larger than the (insignificant) RDD coefficient on being a former GM
school in exactly the same dataset. This suggests that there is no evidence that this
policy of school autonomy produced more effective secondary schools. It is possible
that Foundation schools are effective schools, but so are schools that remained in LEA
control because they lost the GM vote. If so, this tells us more about the type of
schools that elected to hold a parental vote than the causal effect of a policy, per se.
More likely, there is no genuine difference in the effectiveness of LEA controlled and
autonomous schools, with apparent effectiveness of Foundation schools attributable to
unmeasured characteristics of pupils in these schools today.
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7.7 Discussion
Education policy reforms are usually made without a randomised element so that
quantitative researchers struggle to find a good counterfactual for the policy not having
taken place. This undermines our ability to draw conclusions about whether the policy
works. In this respect the GM policy was unusual: the desire to legitimise the policy
through a vote of parents (unintentionally) created a discontinuity whereby apparently
similar schools just did, or did not, receive the treatment. This has enabled us measure
the direct and the spillover effects of the policy both in the short-term and in the long-
run.
Many commentators on education policy regard the Grant-Maintained schools policy
as a historical experiment in autonomy: it was abolished ten years ago and several
of the powers these schools once had have been removed (or given to all Community
schools). This chapter is motivated by the belief that the effects of this policy have
persisted and can been measured in current secondary schooling data. Former GM
schools, with Foundation (or VA) status, are able to retain any changes made to their
admissions policies in the 1990s and they can still administer the process of pupil
admissions. This policy decision is reflected in the evidence that former GM schools
do have pupil intakes slightly higher in ability and income status than schools who lost
their GM vote and so remained as Community schools.
Foundation schools also still differ from Community schools in the amount of control
they have over staffing and spending decisions. The assumption that this autonomy
from local authorities is desirable is implicit in many strands of recent government re-
form. This chapter suggests that any new policies that give schools autonomy without
other major institutional changes are unlikely to lead to sustained improvements in
pupil exam performance since former GM schools perform no better than vote-losing
schools, once pupil background is taken into account.
More specifically, taken together with Clark (2007), the studies suggest that the intro-
duction of GM status may have led to quite substantial improvements in pupil achieve-
ment in the short-term, but these have not persisted to today. GM status emerged
alongside the first publication of school league tables in 1992, and these schools may
have responded more quickly than others to the new incentives to maximise the pro-
portion of pupils scoring 5+A*-C at GCSE (West and Pennell, 2000). There might
be technical reasons for our differences in short-run versus long-run findings (most no-
tably differences in GCSE outcome measure and slightly different samples of schools),
or they might be explained by the slightly reduced levels of autonomy Foundation
schools enjoy. However, it seems perfectly possible that our different findings reflect
real substantive differences in how policy implementation affects schools as time pro-
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gresses.
Changes in school governance may enable substantial school improvements in the short-
term as it encourages a fresh start for management and teachers with renewed focus
on pupil achievement. However, in the long-term, this higher level of effort directed
at exam outcomes (relative to other schools) starts to decline. Case studies looking at
leadership, management and teaching in schools in schools over the policy cycle would
help us understand why this might happen.
This chapter also fails to lend support to the assumption underlying market reforms
that structures to encourage schools to compete for pupils are a route to improving
standards. It is likely that secondary schools adjacent to former GM schools do still
perceive them to be a competitive threat since Foundation schools recruit pupils from
a much wider catchment area than their direct neighbourhood. However, consistent
with the short-run findings of Clark, this apparent competition for pupils (if there is
any) does not appear to translate into effort on the part of neighbouring schools to
increase exam performance.
Chapter 8
Spillover effects of religious
schools
Religious schools, maintained by the State, are an important feature of the English
schooling system, educating 15 per cent of secondary-aged children. They are a legacy
of the 1902 settlement between the Government and the Church of England (CofE) and
Roman Catholic (RC) churches, as the principal providers of 19th century schooling.
Despite a steep decline in church attendance across all denominations and limited
support for the principle of state-funded religious schooling in attitude surveys, there
continues to be relatively high demand for places at religious secondary schools, with
institutional rigidities constraining the supply of places.1
Religious secondary schools provide a genuine and enhanced opportunity for some par-
ents to actively choose between faith and non-faith schools (without the cost of moving
house) since they usually give priority in admissions based on religious affiliation of
parents rather than proximity of home to school. This was demonstrated in Chap-
ter 4, which showed that far fewer pupils attend their nearest school in areas where
there are many religious secondary schools. This choice means that, in a system with
spare capacity, religious schools do appear to present an enhanced competitive threat
to neighbouring schools, who may respond by exerting effort in some way to attract
local families to their school. However, for choice and competition to lead to higher
achievement in schools, the incentives for head teachers and teachers need to be aligned
such that all involved respond to competition by making efforts to ‘raise standards’,
however that may be defined. These incentives structures may be weak where there
1For example, in 2006, 62% of respondents agreed with this question in a Populus poll: ‘Faith
schools are divisive because they prevent children from different religious backgrounds from getting to
know and understand each other ’. In 2005, 64% of respondents agreed with this statement in an ICM
poll: ‘Schools should be for everyone regardless of religion and the government should not be funding
faith schools of any kind ’.
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are few changes in capacity in the local educational market so that school survival
is guaranteed regardless of quality. They will also be weak if parents judge schools
based on league table position of overall achievement, rather than measures that take
account of the quality of the schools intake. Under these circumstances, schools can
best ensure they survive and prosper simply by concentrating their effort on securing
an advantaged intake through the application of certain admissions policies and pro-
cedures (i.e. by cream-skimming more able or easier to teach pupils). This suggests
that a quasi-market for school places risks becoming quite stratied.
This chapter measures the extent to which the presence of religious schools ‘spills’ over
to the educational experiences of pupils who attend neighbouring schools, whether
through school effort induced by competition, changes in school sizes induced by choice
or changes in peer groups induced by sorting. The estimation strategy combines, and
improves, methods proposed by Card et al. (2007) and Hoxby (1994) to identify these
effects without the confounding influences of unmeasured pupil characteristics. Pupil
growth in achievement from KS2 to KS4 is modelled as a function of share of pupils
in the area who attend religious schools, using pupil fixed effects and a wide range of
pupil and area controls. In addition, instrumental variable methods are employed to
avoid confounding the causal effect of religious schools on GCSE outcomes with direct
effects of religious families on educational success, or with growth in religious schools
caused by ineffective local Community schools. The historic characteristics of an area
– early 20th century levels of religious affiliation – are used to predict the modern-day
supply of Catholic school places, thus isolating a source of variation that is exogenous
to current demand for religious school places.
An important part of the ‘whole area’ effect of religious schools will be the relative
effectiveness of religious schools compared to local authority schools. In England,
Voluntary-Aided secondary schools outperform other comprehensive schools, though
by relatively little (just under one grade in one subject at GCSE) once all observable
characteristics of the pupil intake are accounted for (see Table 7.12 in Chapter 7).
This estimate is roughly consistent with Schagen and Schagen (2005) who agree that
the higher performance of religious schools at GCSE and KS3 is almost entirely at-
tributable to the nature of their intake. Gibbons and Silva (2006) employ an innovative
method to deal with the confounding influence of sorting based on unobservable char-
acteristics into religious primary schools. By comparing families who switch between
religious primary and non-religious secondaries with families who transfer from non-
religious primary to religious secondary school, they are able to show that the first
group make no greater educational progress during primary school than the latter
group.
There also exists an extensive literature on the effectiveness of US Catholic schools,
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operating in the private sector, and the methodological controversies that arise from
this literature are relevant to this chapter. Early studies of schooling in the US by
Coleman et al. (1982) and Coleman and Hoffer (1987) suggested that Catholic schools
have positive effects on test scores and high school graduation rates, which were said to
have come from their academic structure and culture, their internal community, their
devolved governance, and the inspirational ideology (Bryk et al., 1993). However,
early studies did not account for the selection bias that results from factors affecting
the probability of attending a Catholic school (such as religious affiliation and income)
also directly entering the education production function. There have been numerous
attempts to account for this selection bias through the use of instruments including
Catholic faith, distance to nearest Catholic school and the interaction between these
two (e.g. Evans and Schwab, 1995; Grogger and Neal, 2000; Jepsen, 2003; Neal, 1997;
Sander, 1996). However, Altonji et al. (2005) showed that most of the instruments
used to predict attendance were not orthogonal to pupil achievement, even in value-
added achievement models. This means that effect sizes are likely to be biased upwards
because Catholic schools tend to select children from high-religiosity families and activ-
ities within these homes are known to produce better educational outcomes, regardless
of school attended (e.g. Bankston and Zhou., 2002; Regnerus and Elder, 2003; Glanville
et al., 2008).
In recognition that no suitable instruments to predict Catholic school attendance have
been found, Nguyen et al. (2006) use propensity score matching to compare the educa-
tional attainment of observably-identical children at Catholic and non-Catholic schools,
finding that US Catholic schools raise test scores (but only for males in maths), grad-
uation rates and likelihood of enrolment in 4-year college. However, matching relies
on the condition independence assumption, which states that the outcome of non-
participants is assumed to be independent of participation, conditional on a vector of
observable characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In other words, they again
rely on the assumption that Catholic families have no unobservable characteristics
that raise child’s achievement or progress, independent of school attended. Thus, it
is not clear why a matching approach, even using a value-added specification, would
overcome the problem of sample selection bias.
There are two papers estimating whole area effects of Catholic schools in the US
and Canada that are directly comparable to this analysis. Hoxby (1994) uses the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to estimate the effect of the presence of Catholic
schools (which constitute over 80 per cent of the US private schooling market) on
area-wide achievement. The supply of Catholic schools is instrumented using the
current size of the Catholic population in the area. She finds that a 10 percentage
point increase in Catholic school enrollment produces 0.9 additional years worth of
educational achievement, on average, and 6% higher wages for pupils graduating from
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high schools in the area. However, her choice of instrument is controversial, even
though she is able to control for the religious affiliation of the family, because it requires
us to assume that Catholic families who live in predominantly Catholic areas are no
different from Catholic families who live in areas with few other Catholic families.
Canada’s dual system of schooling is similar to that of England because Catholic
schools are entirely state-funded on the same terms as secular schools. Card et al.
(2007) estimate the effect of Catholic school enrolment share on test score gains by
pupils, using a school fixed effects specification of test score growth between grades 3
and 6. They find small positive effects from competition in the area of Ontario, but have
no means to isolate an exogenous source of variation in the supply of Catholic school
places. This means that their estimation strategy relies on comparisons between areas
with different fractions of Catholic families to identify cross-system effects. This again
raises the concern expressed by Altonji et al. (2005) that the local religious composition
of the population enters the education production function via some other mechanism.
However, although they have no measure of the religion of the child’s family, the
identification assumptions would seem less onerous than Hoxby’s because they use a
value-added specification combined with school and cohort dummies.
The remainder of this chapter begins by documenting the history of church attendance
and religious schooling in England - a history that is particularly important given the
use of historical instruments in the estimation strategy. Next, theoretical models of
competition presented in Chapter 6 are applied to describe how religious schools might
impact on whole area GCSE achievement. The estimation strategy is then described
and assumptions necessary for successful identification are discussed. The use of a
pupil fixed effects specification is a direct improvement on the school fixed effects
approach used by Card et al. (2007). The use of historical instruments, combined
with controls that include modern-day religious populations, substantially reduce the
identification assumptions required by the Hoxby (1994) IV approach. Next, the data
sources are summarised (more detailed can be found in Chapter 2). Finally, the results
are estimated and discussed.
8.1 The supply of religious secondary school places
This section describes the factors contributing to growth in the provision of CofE
and RC secondary schooling in England. Changes in the geographical distribution
of Anglican and Catholic communities across England are important determinants of
both historic secondary school supply and modern-day demand for faith school places.
Catholic schools are given special attention since they comprise about two-thirds of
all religious secondary schools today, and their effects are estimated separately in the
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results sections of this chapter.
8.1.1 Growth and decline of church attendance
The first census of places of worship took place on March 30th 1851, giving a geographi-
cally detailed description of the relative sizes of Anglican, Catholic and non-conformist
communities. The census reported that (no more than) 58% of England’s population
attended church on the Sunday in question, with over half of those in Church of England
congregations. Non-conformists groups made up the majority of the rest of church-
goers, with one-in-five church attendees at a Methodist service, just under one-in-ten
at Baptist services and one-in-ten at an independent church service.
According to this census, levels of formal worship in Roman Catholic churches in
England were very low at around 2% of the English population. There were large
geographical disparities, with Catholic communities concentrated around the north of
England (e.g. Lancashire, Northumberland, Staffordshire, Durham) and the Midlands
(Warwickshire, Leicestershire). Other areas such as Rutland, Huntingdonshire and
counties in the East of England had almost no Catholic church-goers. These Catholic
communities were, for the most part, recent immigrants to England. The size of the
community had grown from around 100,000 in 1800 to 250,000 by 1840 as a result
of Catholic emancipation and Irish immigration. This increased further following the
Irish potato famine in 1845, but the 1851 census failed to capture much of this mass
immigration.
Survey data indicates that the size of the Catholic population in England grew substan-
tially, with around 18% of the population identifying themselves as Catholic by 1961.
Figure 8.1 also shows that Catholics became more geographically dispersed across an-
cient counties (large geographical sub-divisions of England used prior to 1965) from
the mid-19th to the mid-20th century. However, some caution is needed regarding the
quality of this survey data because no church censuses took place over this time, mean-
ing we have no measure of the strength of religious affiliation of these people. This
is important because this historical Catholic data predicts the modern-day supply of
Catholic schools, but the actual size of the church-going population would be a better
predictor of the wealth of the local church, and therefore its ability to finance new
Catholic schools.
The churches resumed holding censuses of church attendance in 1979, 1989, 1998 and
2005, giving some indicator of modern-day demand for religious schooling. These
censuses documented the very rapid fall in church-going, with overall church attendance
(on the day of the census) declining from 11.7% in 1979 to 6.3% in 2005. Anglican
attendance fell from 3.6% to 1.7% and Catholic attendance fell from 4.3% to 1.7% of
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Figure 8.1: Changes in dispersion of Catholic population across England
the population for the same period.
These surveys of church attendance also reveal the current geographical distribution of
church-goers. Catholics are still predominately located in London and in the northern
urban areas of Lancashire, Merseyside, Cleveland and Durham. However, their con-
centration in these areas is less pronounced than in 1851. By contrast, the Church of
England has a relatively low presence in the industrial areas of London, South and West
Yorkshire, Merseyside, Tyne and Wear, Cleveland and Greater Manchester.
There exists an alternative measure of religious allegiance that provides a different of
indication of likely demand for religious schooling. In the 2001 Census of Population,
a question about religion was asked, namely: ‘What is your religion? ’. The options
given were none; Christian; Buddhist; Hindu; Jewish; Muslim; Sikh; any other religion.
Altogether, 71% of the population reported being Christian, with 15% reporting no
religion, 8% not stating a religion, 3% reporting that they were Muslim, 1% each
Hindu, Jewish and Sikh. Unfortunately no details on denominational allegiance are
revealed in this population, but it does suggest that a much larger group of families
might be attracted by a religious education for their child than is representative of
church-going levels.
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8.1.2 The supply of religious secondary schools
The churches, and in particular the established Church of England and Roman Catholic
churches, have played a highly significant and enduring role in the provision of edu-
cation in England. Before 1870, most schooling took place without state involvement.
Most early voluntary schools had religious (both Anglican and non-conformist) under-
pinnings and purpose, although the influence of secular philosophers was also a feature
of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century education system (Johnson, 2006).
The contribution of the churches was not always motivated by simple social altru-
ism, but instead was at times seen as a means of promoting and retaining particular
denominational allegiance (Skinner, 2002). The Church of England (CofE) had long
been involved in the education of the social elite in ‘public’ (i.e. fee-paying private)
schools, but in 1811 it established the National Society for the Education of the Poor
as a strategic response to competition with the nonconformist churches, especially the
Methodists, for the loyalties of the English working class (Johnson, 2006). The initia-
tive to provide an Anglican education for every parish in the country was contested
by dissenting churches, liberal Anglicans and some Jews, who believed that schools
should not be specific to one denomination. So, from 1814 onwards, the British For-
eign School Society for the Education of the Labouring and Manufacturing Classes of
Society of Every Religious Persuasion began set up elementary schools, with a non-
denominational Christian curriculum. A tiny minority, represented by the Central
Society of Education, favoured schools with no reference at all to religion (Gardner
et al., 2005).
The setting up of Roman Catholic schools started in 1847, following mass Irish emigra-
tion into the industrial conurbations of London, Liverpool, Lancashire, Birmingham,
Manchester, Newcastle and the North-East. This network of Catholic schools were
intended to be ‘a cultural and faith bastion against the potentially polluting effects
of hegemonic Protestantism and secular rationalism’, aiming to provide a place in a
Catholic school for every Catholic child (Grace, 2002, page 8). The distinct Catholic
educational mission of this time was to the poor; it is notable that the precursor to the
Catholic Education Service was called the Catholic Poor School Committee (Grace,
2002). However, there were also a small number of Catholic independent and grammar
schools established to provide leadership for the sons and daughters of the Catholic
upper and middle classes.
Although the British government was initially reluctant to be involved in education,
it financially supported the voluntary sector from a very early stage. Grants were
increased rapidly between the years 1833 and 1857, and so to administer the large
sums a Department of Education was set up (Johnson, 2006). State involvement in the
provision of schools began under the 1870 Education Act, which saw the establishment
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of the ‘Dual System’ of elementary schooling provision. The intention was that the
churches would provide the majority of school places and school boards would be set up
to fill gaps in provision (Barber, 1994). The election of members to the school boards
became a partisan battleground for Nonconformists against the Established Church
as they attempted to transform the political and social framework of the nation in
the hopes of obtaining their concept of complete religious equality (Richards, 1970).
The response of the National Society (Anglicans) and Catholics to the threat of board
schools displacing the need for church schools was to move at speed to raise money
to build new schools in the grace year before board schools could be opened. In
the 15 years following the 1870 Education Act, CofE schools increased from 6,382 to
11,864 and RC schools from 350 to 892 (Gardner et al., 2005). This meant that by
the turn of the century, nearly three-quarters of the 20,000 elementary schools were
under religious or voluntary bodies (Ministry of Education, 1950). However, this rapid
growth in voluntary schools provision produced financial difficulties within both the
Anglican and Catholic sectors that would continue into the 20th century (Gardner
et al., 2005).
Financial difficulties forced the churches relinquished some of the control over their
schools as part of the fiercely contested 1902 Education Act. Their schools were now
overseen by local authorities, but in return they were relieved of some of the burden of
paying for them (e.g. teacher salaries and wear and tear on buildings). Church schools
would continue to receive a capital maintenance grant of up to 50 per cent, but once
the system was in place there would be no new building money (Gardner et al., 2005).
This Act also gave power to local authorities to set up secondary schools for the first
time. There was consistent opposition to state subsidies for church schools throughout
the debating of the 1902 Act, with many arguing that the voluntary sector should be
abolished or allowed to wither away (Johnson, 2006). Nonconformists, who had few
schools of their own because most were ideologically opposed to a sectarian education
system, were incensed at the extent of state subsidy to the Anglican and Catholic
schools, particularly as in many rural areas there was no state-funded alternative to
the local CofE school (Barber, 1994).
State support for church schools was not sufficient to remove financial problems. At
the outbreak of WWII, churches provided elementary education for around a third of
children. However, the church schools were in a state of disrepair – in 1939 the gov-
ernment’s black list of schools with defective premises had 735 schools on it, of which
72 per cent were church schools. Furthermore, only 28 per cent of church elementary
schools had implemented the Hadow reforms to partition pre- and post-11 education
(Board of Education, 1941). The church schools’ lack of money and inefficiency due
to their small average size was widely seen as a hindrance to educational reorganisa-
tion, which caused most of the Liberal and Labour political e´lite to advocate outright
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abolition of the sector. This reluctance by the churches to support any educational
reform led many to claim that they were putting their own self-interest before the
national interest (Barber, 1994). The Roman Catholics faced the most severe financial
problems and were the most difficult for Butler to negotiate the 1944 Education Act
with, whereas many in the Church of England took a more pragmatic approach to the
provision of education (Barber, 1994).
Following the 1944 Education Act a system of universal, free and compulsory education
was set up. Section 11 of the Act required that every LEA should prepare a plan for
primary and secondary schools, in consultation with diocesan educational authorities.
Church schools were offered a chance to become ‘Voluntary Controlled’ (VC), meaning
that the State would take day-to-day control of the school. If the church wished to
retain control of their school via ‘Voluntary Aided’ (VA) status, they were required to
make a 50% capital contribution to the school (this figure was reduced to 25% in 1959
and is now 10%). VA status retained significant church involvement and control over
schools. They had majority representation on the governing body, giving them control
over the employment of staff, buildings and repairs, and school admissions (Gay and
Greenough, 2000).
All Roman Catholic schools opted for voluntary aided status, but the Church of Eng-
land gave no clear national guidance as to whether schools should pursue VC or VA
status, and both R.A. Butler (then Secretary of State for Education) and the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury expected few schools to opt for VA status (Barber, 1994). In
a survey of key diocesan decision-makers at the time, Kelly (1978) found some dioce-
ses making strong statements in support of aided status (Bath and Wells, Blackburn,
Carlisle, Chester, London, Portsmouth, Southwark, Winchester and York) and others
equally strongly supporting controlled status (Bristol, St Edmundsbury and Ipswich,
Sheffield). Other diocese either gave a less clear lead, or allowed decisions to be made
entirely locally, and this de-centralised decision-making led to the geographical diver-
sity in the provision of Anglican schooling that continues today.
Most church-run elementary schools converted to primary schools, for two reasons.
First, neither the Anglicans nor the Catholics had the resources to provide facilities
suitable for secondary education (Ministry of Education, 1950). Second, in some areas
the will to build new secondary schools was seen to be lacking: it was difficult to get
local Parish financial support for secondary schools since they recruited from a very
large geographical area (Gay and Greenough, 2000; Ministry of Education, 1950).
The 1959 Education Act allowed for the possibility of new church secondary schools
via increased government financial support for capital costs through both loans and
larger grants (Church of England Board of Education School Committee, 1972). The
Catholics (much more than the Anglicans) made extensive use of government loans to
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embark on a school building programme in the 1950s and 1960s, resulting in a growth
in the number of secondary aged pupils at RC schools between 1950 and 2000 from
50,000 to 309,000. So, they were at partly able to keep up with the population diffusion
of the Catholic population from its earlier nineteenth-century concentrations into the
new towns and suburbs of the twentieth century (Gay and Greenough, 2000).
Expansion in the Anglican secondary school sector was modest, with an increase of
secondary aged pupils from 64,000 in 1950 to 150,000 in 2000. This was due to finan-
cial difficulties that continued in the decades following the 1944 Education Act. By
the early 1970s, inflation was making it difficult for them to meet their share of the
capital costs of VA schools. However, within the Anglican community, VC status was
now seen as less acceptable than it was in 1944 (partly because the amount of time
devoted to religious instruction had fallen to 2 periods a week), so it was preferred
that VA schools were allowed to close, with capital reinvested elsewhere (Church of
England Board of Education School Committee, 1972). However, although national
recommendations were made to Anglican schools there was never any attempt to har-
monise provision across the country (Church of England Board of Education School
Committee, 1972).
The final decades of the 20th century saw very little change in the supply of faith schools
in England, but there is the prospect of a new rapid expansion in the sector. The White
Paper ‘Schools Achieving Success’ called for the expansion of faith-based education,
with the most generous financial conditions ever offered by a government to faith
communities who were now required to make just a 10 per cent capital contribution to
new schools (Department for Education and Skills, 2001) . In return for this generosity,
the White Paper sought to achieve greater mixing between religious (and non-religious)
communities within schools by suggesting that 20 per cent of a faith school’s places
should be set aside for pupils of other faiths, or none (Gardner et al., 2005).
8.1.3 The distribution of religious schools today
Table 8.1 shows the current religious denominations of secondary schools in England.
Around two-thirds of these are Roman Catholic. Whilst overall church attendance is
comparatively low in England, attendance at religious schools is significantly higher.
Thus, in England as a whole, although only 6% of the population attended church one
Sunday in May 2005, over twice as many pupils (15%) attended a religious secondary
school in 2005 (see Table 8.2). RC schools are over represented, relative to church-
going populations in almost all areas, but particularly in Lancashire, Durham, greater
London, Birmingham. Figure 8.2 shows there remains wide variation in religious school
supply across England.
Chapter 8. Spillover effects of religious schools 189
Table 8.1: Religious denomination of secondary schools
N %
None 2, 577 82.9
Church of England 151 4.9
Roman Catholic 338 10.9
Jewish 7 0.2
Muslim 2 0.1
Seventh Day Adventist 1 0.0
Church of England/Roman Catholic 5 0.2
Roman Catholic/Church of England 2 0.1
Christian 23 0.7
Church of England/Christian 1 0.0
Sikh 1 0.0
Total 3, 108 100.0
Table 8.2: Proportion of pupils in religious schools by ancient county
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Proportion in religious schools 15.0% 7.4% 0.0% 30.9% 39
Proportion in CofE schools 4.5% 3.2% 0.0% 16.6% 39
Proportion in RC schools 9.5% 6.1% 0.0% 22.6% 39
Weighted by ancient county size
This reflects the historically high levels of Catholic affiliation in these areas, which
combined with state subsidies has meant that supply has not fallen with a decline
in church-going. In any case, many of these schools remain very oversubscribed, not
necessarily because parents are attracted to the religious education, but because they
recruit a more advantaged intake than other schools in the area. Survey evidence
suggests that the relationship between levels of Catholicism and the supply of RC
school places is not now strong. Grace (2002) reports that only 12 out of 60 Catholic
schools surveyed in London, Birmingham and Liverpool had 100 per cent Catholic
student enrolment. At 5 of the 60 schools, Catholic students constituted only 50 per
cent of the enrolment.
8.2 Competition from religious schools
Chapter 4 estimated that if one quarter of pupils in a LA are educated in a religious
school, this raises the number of pupils who attend a non-proximity school by 15
percentage points. However, though religious and non-religious schools do appear to
actively recruit pupils from the same neighbourhoods, this empirical observation is not
sufficient to assert that they actively compete with each other for pupils. Following the
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Figure 8.2: Proportion of pupils in RC and CofE schools across ancient counties
economic models of school competition discussed in Chapter 6, the level of competition
a non-religious secondary school faces from the presence of a nearby religious school
can be summarised by the Bayer and McMillan (2005) concept of residual elasticity
of demand – the changes in a school’s demand in response to a change in only that
school’s quality. If the residual elasticity of demand at a non-religious school is raised
by the presence of local religious schools, it must be true that many of the school’s
potential parents have a feasible choice set that also includes religious schools. Re-
calling that the definition of feasible choice set used in this thesis requires the schools
to be willing to accept the child if they apply, these families would usually need to
be capable of demonstrating religious adherence through church attendance. It is dif-
ficult to measure the proportion of families who actively consider both religious and
non-religious schools, and thus contribute to the competitive threat.
It is a necessary, but not sufficient, competition condition that families in the area
have both religious and non-religious schools in their feasible choice set. A second
requirement for a school’s residual elasticity of demand to be raised by a religious school
is that parents for whom both schools are in the feasible choice set would be responsive
to a change in the school’s perceived quality, whether academic or otherwise. This
would be the case where parents value academic results or reputational information
very highly, relative to other characteristics such as distance to home or religious
ethos. Where religious ethos of school dominates the household utility function, there is
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little opportunity for non-religious schools to attract these parents by increasing school
quality. Schools’ residual elasticity of demand will be higher where schools are more
closely matched in terms of league table position. One reason why religious schools
might not increase the level of competition in an area is that they are associated with
greater ability stratification of schools (see Chapter 4), so all schools’ residual elasticity
of demand is consequently lowered.
Finally, competition between religious and non-religious schools will be stronger where
the parents who are actively considering both schools have children who are perceived
as desirable to teach. Of course, for a school with spare capacity, all pupils are desirable
in the sense that they bring additional resources to the school, but many schools
are over-subscribed so that they are only incentivised to compete over pupils who
are likely to improve their league table position. Data from Chapter 5 showing that
the higher ability and SES children from neighbourhoods are more likely to attend
religious schools suggests that they do threaten the peer composition of non-religious
schools.
Of course, as with all studies of school competition, raising effort focused on exam
scores is not the only route to attempting to raise perceived school quality, especially
where parents principally use a school’s league table position as an indicator of quality.
Alternative responses such as recruiting higher ability pupils or increasing marketing
efforts would not manifest themselves in improved area-wide GCSE outcomes, even if
competition were genuinely significant.
8.2.1 Secondary school transitions
A competition effect arising from the presence of religious schools will only be evident
where there are religious families who are willing to switch between religious and secular
systems to access higher quality schooling. Therefore, one way to seek confirmatory
evidence on whether religious schools are likely to raise the competition is to look
at the data on pupil transitions from primary to secondary school, and also between
secondary schools for the minority of pupils who make these transitions.
Primary to secondary transitions
The major point of competition between schools is for pupils as they make their tran-
sition from primary to secondary school at age 11. Chapter 3 showed that at this
transition point parents rely on league tables and social networks to form their opin-
ions about school quality. If religious and non-religious secondary schools do genuinely
compete for pupils, we should expect to see some transition between these two sectors
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as parents rely on assessments of secondary school quality, as well as preferences for
religious ethos to influence their choices.
Table 8.3 shows that transitions between the CofE and non-religious sectors are very
high in both directions. By contrast, a large majority of children who are in RC
secondary schools also attended RC primary schools. The reverse is also true. This may
partly be due to the similar size of the RC primary and secondary sectors; to the use of
feeder school admissions criteria in the RC sector, which act as a barrier to entry from
secular primary schools; or may reflect a stronger preference for a religious education
amongst Catholics than Anglicans. The implication of this is that the competitive
threat posed by the presence of Catholic schools may be lower than for other religious
schools.
Table 8.3: Primary to secondary school transitions (%)
Secondary school
None Church of Roman Other Other Total
England Catholic Christian religious
Primary school:
None 66.82 2.71 1.64 0.48 0.05 71.70
Church of England 15.70 1.64 0.51 0.21 0.00 18.06
Roman Catholic 2.01 0.13 7.33 0.10 0.00 9.56
Other Christian 0.43 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.54
Other religious 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.14
Total 84.99 4.55 9.50 0.80 0.16 100.00
Transition data is available for 96.5% of the sample
Secondary to secondary transitions
Transitions between secondary schools are relatively rare in the English system. 4.7
per cent of pupils in the sample moved schools between years 8 and 11 (there is no
data collection available for these pupils in year 7), but most of these moves would
seem to be motivated by family house moves. Just 1.3 per cent of the pupils in the
sample move schools while retaining the same postcode in years 8 and 11. Where
these moves take place that are likely to be motivated by school quality, they should
be better informed decisions than those made at the primary-secondary transfer since
parents would now have improved knowledge on school quality and factors influencing
their child’s well-being.
Table 8.4 shows that for pupils who move secondary school, there are substantial
numbers of moves between the secular and religious sectors between the ages of 12 and
15. At the county level, school moves between year 8 and 11 appear to be negatively
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Table 8.4: Secondary school moves between age 12 and 15 (%)
Age 15/16
None Church of Roman Other Other Total
England Catholic Christian religious
Age 12/13:
None 79.79 3.39 3.16 0.80 0.06 87.20
Church of England 3.09 0.24 0.15 0.03 0.00 3.52
Roman Catholic 6.11 0.31 2.17 0.05 0.00 8.64
Other Christian 0.53 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.59
Other religious 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05
Total 89.55 3.96 5.51 0.90 0.08 100.00
Transition data is available for 96.5% of the sample
correlated with proportion in RC (but not CofE) schools, but this is likely due to their
lack of presence in rural areas where children are forced by geography to move schools
when their family moves house. For the sub-set of children who only move school and
not house, these moves are positively correlated with the proportion in faith schools in
the area (ρ = 0.26). Over 80 per cent of these moves are between two secular schools,
with very few moves between two religious schools. There are slightly fewer moves
from a secular school to a religious school (4 per cent to CofE and 5 per cent to RC)
than there are from a religious school to a secular school (3 per cent from CofE and 9
per cent from RC).
8.3 Method
This section describes the pupil fixed-effects estimation strategy to identify area-wide
effects of religious schools. Following the notation in Chapter 6, this chapter assumes
the education production function for child i in school j in area k at time t can be
represented as:
Yijk.t = γ0 + γ1tθjk + γ2tCjk + γ3tRjk + γ4tUjk + γ5txijk + ijk.t
That is, test achievement for child i at time t, Yijk.t, is a function of the school cohort’s
peer group, θjk, the school’s effort induced by competitive pressure, Cjk, any effective-
ness associated with the school having a religious denomination, Rjk, all other school
effort not related to competition, Ujk, and the measured time invariant, xijk, and un-
measured, ijk.t, characteristics of the child. All these time-invariant characteristics of
the school and pupils have the potential to affect both the level and rate of growth of
pupil test scores, and are thus modelled as time variant.
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The presence of religious schools has the potential to:
1. change efficiency via the presence of a school that may be differentially effective
as a result of its religious status, Rjk, and via competition effects, as measured
by Cjk, for any schools;
2. change the relative sizes of schools, which affects mean area-wide achievement if
differentially effective schools grow and shrink;
3. produce student sorting effects that change the peer groups, as measured by θjk,
at each school.
It is difficult to separately measure these three effects since many characteristics of the
child that affect their educational achievement are unaccounted for in NPD. Instead,
the overall aggregate effect of the presence of religious schools is the principal parameter
of interest in this chapter. By comparing the area-wide effect of religious schools
(scenario 1), compared to a counterfactual where there are no religious schools (scenario
0), assuming no sorting of pupils in or out of the area, the mean effect on pupil





















This chapter identifies these spillover effects of religious schools using a model of pupil
test score growth from Key Stage 2 (KS2 – secondary school entry at age 11) to KS4
(compulsory school leaving at age 16). It identifies whether steeper test score trajec-
tories are associated with a greater presence of religious schools in the area. Pupil
and area variables that might influence the growth trajectory are used as controls, in-
cluding denominational church-going and other religious affiliation levels in the county.
The key identifying assumption is that variation in the supply of religious schools (not
explained by variation in the current size of the religious population) has no direct
effect on test score gains of the students in the county, except via the competition
mechanisms described above. This approach is similar to that used by Card et al.
(2007) in their paper on Catholic schools and competition in Canada. However, the
advantages of the English data are that linked repeated pupil measures of achievement
allow pupil fixed-effects to be used, whereas their paper relies on school fixed-effects.
Thus, more variation in test scores is explained by the fixed effects and the potential
for unexplained family characteristics biasing the results is reduced.
In the basic pupil fixed-effects model, the achievement of the child, Yijk, at KS2 and
KS4, is modelled as a function of the area proportion of pupils in religious schools
(interacted with time dummies), %religschk, the observed characteristics of the area
2School subscripts are removed since pupil i may attend a different school j in scenarios 0 and 1.
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(Wk) and pupil (Xijk) (all interacted with time dummies), a set of pupil fixed effects,
ξijk, to capture the time-invariant characteristics of the pupil, and a time-variant resid-
ual, ijk.t. %religschk is the proxy for the level of cross-system competitive pressure
due to religious schools.
Yijk.t = %religschk.KS4.δ1 +Wk.KS4.δ6
+Xijk.KS4.δ7 +KS4.δ8 + ξijk + ijk.t (8.1)
In the second pupil fixed-effects specification, an identifier for whether the school is
religious (religjk) and school-level variables measuring the school peer group and other
characteristics (Zjk) are added in an attempt to explain part of the pupil test score
growth trajectory. This should have the effect of removing the direct effect of attending
a religious school or a school with a particular peer group from the model, and thus the
coefficient on %religschk reflects a more pure competition effect. However, we have
no reason to believe that the actual coefficients on these school variables are unbiased,
since they also capture average test score growth at the school that is due to systematic
pupil sorting on unmeasured characteristics in the area. This might be an appropriate
specification for isolating a competition effect if any unmeasured pupil characteristics
at religious schools arise directly from the religiosity of their families. However, if
the unobserved characteristics arise from a social selection effect whereby the more
aﬄuent pupils on a street attend a religious school and the less aﬄuent attend a non-
religious school, but average street characteristics are assigned to the pupil postcodes,
this would lead to a downward bias on %religschk.
Yijk.t = %religschk.KS4.δ1 + religschjk.KS4.δ4 + Zjk.KS4.δ5
+Wk.KS4.δ6 +Xijk.KS4.δ7 +KS4.δ8 + ξijk + ijk.t (8.2)
In the third specification, the competition effect is decomposed into an effect experi-
enced by those attending religious schools and one for those attending secular schools.
Again, sorting based on unobserved characteristics within areas mean there is a greater
risk that the coefficients estimated are biased, relative to those estimated in equa-
tion 8.1. This specification is intended to reflect the possibility that the competition
effect is not symmetrical in terms of its effect on pupils in the secular and religious
sectors. In other words, the competition gain from attending a religious school in an
area with many religious schools is not the same as the competition-related gain from
attending a secular school in the same area.
Yijk.t = %religschk.KS4.δ1 + %religschk.religschjk.KS4δ3
+ religschjk.KS4.δ4 + Zjk.KS4.δ5
+Wk.KS4.δ6 +Xijk.KS4.δ7 +KS4.δ8 + ξijk + ijk.t (8.3)
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In the fourth specification, the competition effect of religious schools on non-religious
schools is once again decomposed into an effect on non-religious schools for whom a
religious school is one of the three nearest secondary schools (closereligschjk), and
those for whom there are no religious schools nearby in the county and so are likely to
be under less competitive pressure. The purpose of this specification is to identify a
more disaggregated competition effect, thus reducing the risk of type II errors posed
by measuring competition levels over the large ancient county. However, there will be
a sorting of pupils on unmeasured characteristics within counties, and if this sorting is
in some way correlated with the geographical supply of religious schools, coefficients
in this specification will be biased.
Yijk.t = %religschk.KS4.δ1 + %religschk.closereligschjk.KS4δ2
+ %religschk.religschjk.KS4δ3 + religschjk.KS4.δ4 + Zjk.KS4.δ5
+Wk.KS4.δ6 +Xijk.KS4.δ7 +KS4.δ8 + ξijk + ijk.t (8.4)
In order for the estimation of whole area effects to be valid, the presence of religious
schools should not cause pupils to sort across areas. The models are estimated using
ancient (1851) counties as the areal unit of analysis because this is the area for which the
historical instrument (described later in this section) is available. There are 39 ancient
counties in England, meaning they are much larger areas than the 150 modern local
authorities. This increases the likelihood of the validity of the assumption that historic
counties are contained markets without families re-locating across counties based on
school types and quality. However, this is at the expense of possible aggregation bias
on the measurement of exposure to religious schools.
Thirty-two equations are estimated in total: these four specifications are repeated
across the four subject outcomes described in the data section for religious school
competition, and this is repeated for Catholic school competition only. Competition
from Catholic schools are of separate interest for two reasons. First, they represent
two-thirds of all religious secondary schools, and are a more homogenous body of
schools than the group of all religious secondary schools. So, it is possible that they
exert a more consistent type of competitive effect on their neighbours. We have no
reasons to believe that the effect of Catholic schools is likely to be similar to the effect
of other faith schools. However, many Catholic schools will not be a realistic choice
for the majority of parents because the religiosity requirements tend to be onerous and
fewer families are able to claim some sort of relationship with the Roman Catholic
Church, than they are with the established Church of England. The second reason is
that it is only possible to find instrumental variables that provide an exogenous source
of variation in Catholic schools, so estimation of the spillover effect of these schools is
estimated including, and excluding, an IV for comparability.
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8.3.1 Instrumenting Catholic school supply
There may be an endogeneity problem because the supply of places at religious schools
is believed to be endogenous to current demand for religious schools, which is in turn
related to the current religious population in the county and the quality of neighbouring
Community schools. Both of these might independently enter the education production
function for the county schooling system, thus biasing the estimates of the effect of
religious schools. For example, if Catholic schools expand in response to poor quality
Community schools, this would lead to a downward bias on %RCsch. On the other
hand, if Catholic schools expand to accommodate a larger Catholic population in the
county and if high-religiosity families have characteristics that mean their children are
academically successful (regardless of school attended), this would lead to an upward
bias on %RCsch.
This paper uses a source of variation in the supply of Catholic schools, %RCsch, that
can be argued to be exogenous to current demand for Catholic schooling. This variation
comes from survey data on the historic sizes of the religious populations in England.
It can be shown that the geographical distribution of historic Catholic populations
predicts %RCsch, conditional on the current RC population and other county control
variables, i.e.:
%RCschk = α0 + α1%RC1931k + α2%RC2005k + α3Zk + vk (8.5)
The F-value on the instrument for this first-stage is 20.81. The instrument is applied
to the variable %RCschk as a first stage to the main pupil fixed effects specification,
as set out in equation 8.1. The size of the Catholic population between 1851 and
1961 is sourced from survey data and measured once every ten years in each ancient
county, with details of the survey described in Chapter 2. It makes relatively little
difference to the results which year of data is used to predict %RCsch. The size
of the RC population in 1931 (%RC1931) is chosen as an instrument because it is
strongly correlated and it immediately precedes the opening of most RC secondary
schools.
The claim of this identification approach is that the county-level controls are sufficient
to meet the excludability restriction. These include the current proportion of Catholic
church attendees in the area, and this is a crucial control variable given the absence of
religious affiliation of the family in the pupil-level data (and therefore an inability to
control for direct family religiosity effects). Unlike the data used by US researchers,
there is not a good source of religious adherence by family that can be matched to
NPD, and in any case it is not clear how valid a family’s self-response to this question
is likely to be. As has been pointed out by others, families who send their children to
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religious schools may be more likely to claim religious adherence than those who do not,
which would in itself be a source of bias (Neal, 1997). In addition to the current church
attendance indicators for the county, a full set of socio-demographic indicators are also
included to avoid confounding correlations between the type of areas (i.e. industrial
and urban) that Catholics historically lived and the demographic characteristics of
these areas that persist today.
8.4 Data
Data for this chapter are principally drawn from the National Pupil Database of school
leavers at age 16 in 2005, further details of which can be found in Chapter 2. Four
measures of pupil achievement are used in the chapter – test scores in English, Maths,
Science and an aggregated test score. These are measured at Key Stage 2 (age 10/11)
and Key Stage 4 (age 15/16), as shown in Table 8.5. The total subject scores (an
average of attainment in the three subjects for KS2; the best 8 grades at GCSE for
KS4) is transformed to a z-score to ease interpretation of comparisons across the Key
Stages. Key Stage 3 test scores are also available, but are not used. They are difficult to
interpret because they take place mid-way through secondary school and are therefore
not high stakes exams from the perspective of the school or the pupils. A school that
performs well on KS3 tests will boost their position in KS2-KS3 value-added score,
but risks making it harder to achieve success in KS3-KS4 value-added tables.
Table 8.5: Key pupil test score variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
KS2 English score 4.381 0.848 0.000 6.000
KS2 maths score 4.380 0.876 0.000 6.000
KS2 science score 4.665 0.698 0.083 6.000
KS2 total z-score 0.006 0.993 −5.712 2.055
GCSE English score 4.572 1.852 0.000 8.000
GCSE maths score 4.307 1.949 0.000 8.000
GCSE science score 4.240 1.999 0.000 8.000
GCSE capped z-score 0.012 0.991 −2.758 2.367
Complete cases summary statistics. Number of pupils=546,133
The standard set of pupil control variables are listed in Table 8.6. As in previous
chapters, NPD is supplemented with data on the level of deprivation within the child’s
street, and 57 ACORN indicators of household type.
In a small number of specifications in this chapter, variables are included to indicate
the type of school the child attends. These variables are listed in Table 8.7.
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Table 8.6: Key pupil-level control variables





SEN action plus 4.1%
English not mother tongue 7.4%
Ethnicity white British 83.3%
Postcode deprivation (IDACI) 0.208 0.174 0.003 0.993
Postcode deprivation (IMD) 22.501 16.380 0.590 86.360
N=546,133. Controls also include 14 age, 14 ethnicity and 57 ACORN indicators
Table 8.7: Key school-level control variables





School % FSM 14.1% 12.4% 0.0% 87.0%
School % English not mother tongue 8.5% 16.3% 0.0% 100.0%
N=3,103, weighted for school size
Chapter 8. Spillover effects of religious schools 200
The ancient county level variables list in Table 8.8 are sourced from several surveys.
First, a large range of pupil-level characteristics are aggregated up to the ancient county
level. Second, indicators of levels of church attendance by religious denomination
are included from the 2005 English Church Census. Third, the proportions of the
population identifying themselves as belonging to a religious group are included from
the 2001 Census of Population.
Table 8.8: Key county-level control variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
County % FSM 13.3% 5.0% 2.2% 2.5%
County % SEN statement 2.4% 0.6% 0.5% 4.6%
County % asian Indian 2.2% 2.9% 0.0% 13.6%
County % asian Pakistani 2.3% 2.0% 0.0% 6.3%
County % asian Bangladeshi 0.9% 1.4% 0.0% 6.1%
County % black African 1.5% 2.5% 0.0% 8.9%
County % black Caribbean 1.5% 2.1% 0.0% 7.3%
County % white British 81.5% 13.9% 36.0% 97.8%
County % English not mother tongue 8.7% 9.4% 0.4% 41.4%
County % Church attendance 6.2% 1.0% 3.8% 8.3%
County % CofE attendance 1.7% 0.4% 1.3% 2.8%
County % RC attendance 1.8% 0.7% 0.8% 3.0%
County % Christian (2001 census) 72.2% 6.1% 53.5% 83.6%
County % Hindu (2001 census) 1.1% 1.7% 0.0% 7.1%
County % Muslim (2001 census) 3.3% 3.0% 0.0% 12.0%
County % Jewish (2001 census) 0.4% 0.6% 0.0% 2.3%
County % Sikh (2001 census) 0.7% 0.8% 0.0% 3.0%
County % No religion (2001 census) 14.1% 2.6% 9.1% 18.5%
County average KS2 score 4.471 0.049 4.345 4.637
County average deprivation (IDACI) 0.210 0.054 0.065 0.332
County average deprivation (IMD) 22.687 6.651 7.211 33.020
N=39, weighted for county size
8.5 Results
8.5.1 All religious schools
This section analyses the results from the pupil fixed-effects test score growth model
of the area-wide effect of religious schools. The total effect of all religious schools is
analysed separately from the effect of Catholic schools. These first results are shown
in Table 8.9. Results for all four subjects are discussed simultaneously.
The first specification shows that areas with more faith schools make greater educa-
tional progress in the all-subject score and in science (but not in English and maths).
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The coefficient of 0.163 on the all-subject score indicates that the average child in an
area with 25 per cent of pupils in religious schools would achieve 4% of a standard
deviation improvement in overall GCSE performance compared to the same child in
an area with no religious schools. The 0.418 coefficient on the science score indicates
that the typical child in an area with 25 per cent of pupils in religious schools would
do one-tenth of a grade better at GCSE science compared to living in an area with
no religious schools. In other words, these effects are very small (though statistically
significant) and there are no measurable effects for English and maths. The finding
can be interpreted as unbiased estimates of these whole area effects provided there
is not sorting across areas based on unmeasured characteristics that are correlated
with %religsch. The whole area effect could indicate some effect of competition from
religious schools or could be entirely attributable to the differential effectiveness of
religious schools, with pupils in non-religious schools in these areas doing no better at
secondary school.
Specification (2) attempts to separate religious school effectiveness from a competition
effect. Test score growth in every subject is superior in religious schools and the
magnitude of estimates is consistent at just over one-tenth of a GCSE grade. However,
inclusion of this variable produces inconsistent estimates of a competition effect, with
it appearing positive and significant for science and the all-subject score, and negative
and significant for English and maths. The problem here arises that if religious schools
cause within-area sorting based on unmeasured characteristics, the coefficient on the
competition effect is biased downwards.
The third specification analyses whether the competition effect appears to be symmet-
rical. It asks whether religious schools in areas where there are many religious schools
do better than non-religious schools in these areas, and also whether they do better
than stand-alone religious schools. The estimates show that it is not possible to reject
the hypothesis that the non-religious and religious competition effects are equal, except
for in maths and science where religious schools do worse than non-religious schools as
a result of being in areas with many religious schools. Indeed, by adding δ1 and δ3, it
can be seen that religious schools in high religious schooling areas suffer (except in the
all-subject score) compared to stand-alone religious schools. In these circumstances
they must compete for religious families, but this does not appear to induce them to
work harder at improving exam results. Instead, they appear to suffer, possibly be-
cause the oversupply of religious school places makes the selection of a desirable intake
less possible.
Specification (4) separates the effect of being a non-religious school located in a county
with many religious schools in general from the effect of actually having one of these
schools close by (nearest three schools). There is a positive and statistically significant
Chapter 8. Spillover effects of religious schools 202
Table 8.9: Pupil fixed effects test score growth (religious schools)
All subjects z-score: (1) (2) (3) (4)
(δ1) %religsch.KS4 0.163∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.164∗∗
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051)
(δ4) religsch.KS4 – 0.018∗∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.024∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
(δ3) %religsch.religsch.KS4 – – −0.026 −0.049
(0.047) (0.051)
(δ2) %religsch.closereligsch.KS4 – – – −0.022
(0.019)
R-sq (within) 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091
Variance attributable to ξi 0.744 0.744 0.744 0.744
English score: (1) (2) (3) (4)
(δ1) %religsch.KS4 −0.105 −0.288∗∗∗ −0.271∗∗∗ −0.311∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.085)
(δ4) religsch.KS4 – 0.128∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.015) (0.015)
(δ3) %religsch.religsch.KS4 – – −0.126 −0.078
(0.078) (0.084)
(δ2) %religsch.closereligsch.KS4 – – – 0.049
(0.032)
R-sq (within) 0.212 0.226 0.226 0.226
Variance attributable to ξi 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605
Maths score: (1) (2) (3) (4)
(δ1) %religsch.KS4 0.002 −0.182∗ −0.155 −0.313∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.082) (0.083) (0.087)
(δ4) religsch.KS4 – 0.120∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.015) (0.016)
(δ3) %religsch.religsch.KS4 – – −0.207∗∗ −0.013
(0.080) (0.086)
(δ2) %religsch.closereligsch.KS4 – – – 0.194∗∗∗
(0.032)
R-sq (within) 0.212 0.228 0.228 0.228
Variance attributable to ξi 0.624 0.625 0.625 0.625
Science score: (1) (2) (3) (4)
(δ1) %religsch.KS4 0.418∗∗∗ 0.204∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.121
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.098)
(δ4) religsch.KS4 – 0.139∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.017) (0.018)
(δ3) %religsch.religsch.KS4 – – −0.282∗∗ −0.134
(0.090) (0.097)
(δ2) %religsch.closereligsch.KS4 – – – 0.148∗∗∗
(0.037)
R-sq (within) 0.268 0.285 0.285 0.285
Variance attributable to ξi 0.524 0.525 0.525 0.525
N(pupils)=343,936; N(schools)=3,108; N(county)=39.
Note: ***=sig. at 0.1%; **=sig. at 1%; *=sig. at 5%.
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effect for maths and science of being a non-religious school located close to a religious
school compared to being a non-religious school elsewhere in the same county. If this
is interpreted as a competition effect, it suggests that non-religious schools are only
threatened by religious schools who are located close by. This seem plausible because,
although religious schools do recruit from a wide geographical area, it is possible that
the parents who make very long journeys to religious schools each day are the higher
religiosity families, and so non-religious schools are not able to compete for these
pupils.
There are clearly inconsistencies in findings across subject areas, which are difficult to
explain. For example, the estimates on English are more consistently negative than for
other subjects. The models are re-estimated on the sub-sample of only White British,
English mother tongue pupils to examine whether the distribution of ethnic minority
pupils across the country is responsible for this result, but the same pattern is found.
It is true that achievement in English is more strongly influenced by families, rather
than schools, and this may explain why the institutional environment does not appear
able to positively affect achievement in this subject.
8.5.2 Catholic schools
Table 8.10 shows the same set of regressions for Catholic schools only. Because these
constitute two-thirds of all religious secondary schools the results are very similar,
but are presented with the addition of the instrumental variable specification. How-
ever, there is even less consistent evidence here for a competition effect from Catholic
schools. The first specification shows that the presence of Catholic schools in an area is
associated with significant slower progress in English and somewhat faster progress in
science (with no significant effect on the all-subject and maths scores). These potential
competition effects are little changed by the inclusion of the Catholic school dummy,
although faster progress in maths now becomes marginally significant.
Specification (3) also shows that non-Catholic schools do better than Catholic schools
as a result of being located in an area with many Catholic schools. Again, this is
consistent with the thesis that Catholic schools suffer from oversupply and thus a
deterioration in pupil quality. Finally, specification (4) shows that non-Catholic schools
that are located close to Catholic schools do benefit more from being in an area with
many Catholic schools than other non-Catholic schools in the county do.
The IV specification instruments %RCsch.KS4 in specification (1) using %RC1931. It
produces a consistently negative and large effect of attending a secondary school in an
area with many Catholic schools. The magnitude suggests that pupils in areas with 25
per cent of pupils in Catholic schools do half a grade worse in England and science and
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Table 8.10: Pupil fixed effects test score growth (Catholic schools)
All subjects z-score: (1) (IV) (2) (3) (4)
(δ1) %RCsch.KS4 0.005 −1.063 −0.011 0.015 −0.003
(0.106) (36.169) (0.106) (0.107) (0.109)
(δ4) RCsch.KS4 – – 0.016∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
(δ3) %RCsch.RCsch.KS4 – – – −0.256∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗
(0.069) (0.073)
(δ2) %RCsch.closeRCsch.KS4 – – – – 0.022
(0.027)
R-sq (within) 0.091 0.090 0.091 0.091 0.091
Variance attributable to ξi 0.744 0.743 0.744 0.744 0.744
English score: (1) (IV) (2) (3) (4)
(δ1) %RCsch.KS4 −0.828∗∗∗ −1.996∗∗∗ −0.827∗∗∗ −0.796∗∗∗ −0.879∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.235) (0.176) (0.176) (0.180)
(δ4) RCsch.KS4 – – 0.124∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.016) (0.017)
(δ3) %RCsch.RCsch.KS4 – – – −0.310∗∗ −0.215
(0.114) (0.121)
(δ2) %RCsch.closeRCsch.KS4 – – – – 0.104∗
(0.045)
R-sq (within) 0.213 0.213 0.226 0.226 0.226
Variance attributable to ξi 0.605 0.603 0.605 0.605 0.605
Maths score: (1) (IV) (2) (3) (4)
(δ1) %RCsch.KS4 0.355 −0.729∗∗∗ 0.396∗ 0.453∗ 0.171
(0.182) (0.242) (0.180) (0.181) (0.184)
(δ4) RCsch.KS4 – – 0.093∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.017) (0.017)
(δ3) %RCsch.RCsch.KS4 – – – −0.569∗∗∗ −0.249∗
(0.117) (0.124)
(δ2) %RCsch.closeRCsch.KS4 – – – – 0.351∗∗∗
(0.046)
R-sq (within) 0.212 0.211 0.228 0.228 0.228
Variance attributable to ξi 0.624 0.623 0.625 0.625 0.625
Science score: (1) (IV) (2) (3) (4)
(δ1) %RCsch.KS4 0.467∗ −2.226∗∗∗ 0.519∗ 0.575∗∗ 0.349
(0.205) (0.272) (0.203) (0.203) (0.208)
(δ4) RCsch.KS4 – – 0.115∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.019) (0.019)
(δ3) %RCsch.RCsch.KS4 – – – −0.560∗∗∗ −0.303∗
(0.132) (0.140)
(δ2) %RCsch.closeRCsch.KS4 – – – – 0.280∗∗∗
(0.052)
R-sq (within) 0.268 0.267 0.285 0.285 0.285
Variance attributable to ξi 0.524 0.524 0.525 0.525 0.525
N(pupils)=343,936; N(schools)=3,108; N(county)=39.
Note: ***=sig. at 0.1%; **=sig. at 1%; *=sig. at 5%.
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one fifth of a grade worse in maths. However, this is a Local Average Treatment Effect
(LATE) estimate for the effect of Catholic school presence that resulted from large
historical Catholic populations, relative to today. This might offer reasons as to why
these estimates are negative. First, in these areas there is now a significant oversupply
of Catholic schools, relative to the size of the Catholic population, and so the Catholic
schooling sector is less likely to achieve an advantaged intake, and is therefore less
desirable to parents. Non-Catholic schools may therefore not perceive the competitive
threat from this sector to be particularly high. Second, areas with historically high
levels of Catholics compared to current levels (e.g. London and the West Midlands)
have continued to be areas where new immigrants have entered the country and settled,
and so schools in these areas may face disadvantages and challenges that are captured
in the LATE estimates.
8.6 Discussion
Religious secondary schools impact on all other schools in the area because they enable
genuine choice of school for a group of parents, which produces a high degree of sorting
in the local educational market. This chapter has examined whether this sorting
impact spills over to the educational achievement of pupils who attend neighbouring
schools, whether through school effort induced by competition for pupils, or changes
in peer groups induced by sorting. Since religious secondary schools have been a
long-term historical feature of the educational landscape in England, any competition
effects identified might help inform policy-makers as to the long-term effects of enabling
choice and competition, which may be very different to short-run responses by schools
to market changes.
The chapter combined two estimation strategies previously used in the literature to
attempt to identify these effects without the confounding influences of unmeasured
pupil characteristics. The pupil fixed-effects test score growth models relied on the
supply of religious schools in an area being uncorrelated with average unmeasured
pupil characteristics that might independently enter the production function. The
addition of the instrumental variable required the levels of the Catholic population in
1931 to be excludable from the education production function, once the modern-day
religious and social characteristics of the county were accounted for.
Overall, the regressions fail to find a consistently positive (or negative) effect of religious
schools on overall area-wide educational performance. However, the pupil fixed-effect
regressions provide some evidence of positive area-wide effects resulting from the pres-
ence of religious schools and suggest that there are benefits to attending a non-religious
school located close to a religious school, rather than one located further away in the
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same county. However, with the within-area comparisons there is a high risk that
the estimates are confounded by pupil sorting. The instrumental variables approach
suggests that areas with large numbers of Catholic schools due to a large historical
Catholic population do significantly worse in terms of GCSE performance. The most
likely explanation for this negative estimate is that these areas have continued to house
new immigrants to the country and that this presents continuing challenges to schools.
Alternatively, the negative estimate might be due to the nature of the oversupply of
Catholic school places in many of these areas (Grace, 2002, reports that large numbers
of Catholic schools in areas such as Birmingham have many non-Catholic pupils). The
IV (given the modern day Catholic population controls) estimates the effect of signif-
icant oversupply of Catholic schools, which means the Catholic sector struggles to fill
its capacity, has a lower social and ability profile of intake, and thus presents a low
competitive threat to non-religious schools.
There are three possible explanations for the lack of a consistent positive competition
effect as the result of religious schools being present in an area. The first possibility
is that religious and non-religious schools do not actually compete for pupils. In other
words, high levels of pupil mobility and sorting in an area is not sufficient to suggest
that competition between schools for pupils is actually taking place. This would be true
if they essentially operate in separate markets, with each sector recruiting from different
primary schools. There is some evidence for this in the case of Catholic schools, which
use feeder school admissions criteria to segment the market. This might explain why
the results for Catholic schools are less positive.
The second explanation is that headteachers in non-religious schools do feel genuinely
threatened by the presence of local religious schools, but they do not (or cannot)
respond to this threat. The most likely reason for this is that they do not possess the
means to significantly influence effort exerted on the part of their classroom teachers so
the threat does not translate into improve GCSE performance (i.e. there is a principal-
agent problem). Alternatively, they may find that, although the number and quality
of pupils at their schools is being affected by a religious school’s presence, given little
spare capacity in the system their school’s position is sustainable so no effort response
is necessary for survival.
The final explanation is that competition is actually muted, rather than increased, by
the presence of faith schools, because they allow the system to become stratified. This
stratification then provides schools with a disincentive to focus effort on improving test
scores because marginal changes in effort cannot affect a school’s league table position.
There is a positive correlation between the level of FSM and top ability segregation
and the number of religious or Catholic schools in ancient counties (e.g. ρ = 0.52 for
%RCsch and FSM segregation). Because of this stratification, religious schools are
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also associated with an area-wide stretching of the ability distribution between KS2
and KS4 (there is a positive correlation of ρ = 0.45 between the increase in the county
standard deviation in test scores from KS2 to KS4 and the proportion of pupils in
religious schools).
This observation that many schooling systems have a tendency to become stratified
in the long-run is one of the problems with operating a quasi-market. Thus, it is
possible that relatively recent competition reforms in countries such as the US and
Sweden might have identifiable short-run competition effects, but if the system is also
stratifying, efficiency is likely to fall in the long-run.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
This thesis has presented new evidence on the effects of the English system of secondary
school admissions on social welfare. In doing so it contributes to the quantitative
literature on choice-based school admissions, pupil sorting and school competition.
This conclusion will draw together the research findings from preceding chapters and
discuss the implications of these results for policy-makers involved in the development
of market-based reforms to schooling.
9.1 Parental choice of school
Choice of secondary school appears to be genuine and feasible for some households
in many parts of England, although restricted school capacity imposes very real con-
straints on choice for almost all parents. Through the exploitation of recently available
postcodes in the National Pupil Database, Chapter 4 showed that half of all English
pupils do not appear to attend their nearest secondary school. However, most of this
apparent choice relates to pupils who are almost certainly at a de facto neighbourhood
school, or are at grammar or Voluntary Aided religious schools that were in place prior
to the 1988 Education Reform Act. It places an upper bound on the number of pupils
involved in sorting between non-faith comprehensive schools, whether voluntarily or
involuntarily, at one-in-five.
The statistics quoted from Chapter 4 are not good estimates of potential or even
exercised choice because attending a particular non-local school may not reflect the
actualisation of a real preference. It is possible that the nearest school had oversub-
scription criteria that excluded the child, or that another non-local school was their
true preference. Equally, a great many children attend their local school as their most
preferred option, and so may be active choosers as much as those that travel further
to school.
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In theory, offering parents a choice of secondary school for their child should in itself
be welfare enhancing. However, the problem with the implementation of choice in
the English system is that it can be illusory because parents are invited to express a
preference for a school, even where there is close to a zero probability that it would
be prepared to accept their child. The ex-post realisation of this causes some parents
to find the process dissatisfactory. Furthermore, even where genuine choice of school
exists, having a choice between a poor school and a good school, where previously
the only option was the good school does not increase well-being (Kelly, 2007). In
the English system, with little creation of new capacity and parental preferences for
school type that are reasonably homogenous, the satisfaction of one person’s choice
necessarily denies that of another, meaning that choice on its own may not be welfare
improving.
The empirical literature on school choice in England has not yet succeeded in mea-
suring how much achievable choice parents have, in terms of the size and nature of
the choice set of schools who would actually accept their child, holding constant house
location and the preferences of others. A first step towards calculating this type of
measure would be to gain access to the stated preference forms submitted by parents
of year six children and held by local authorities and other admissions authorities.
This information could be combined with school oversubscription criteria to identify
achievable choice sets for individual applicants. It is likely to reveal very large dispari-
ties in the levels of achievable choice, even between families who live in the same local
authority, and there will almost certainly be a social class dimension to these inequal-
ities because some oversubscription criteria discriminate between applicants based on
the attributes of the family or the child.
This thesis has been able to show that schools are more segregated than the neighbour-
hoods in which they are located, confirming that where pupils are sorting themselves
into a non-proximity school, it does tend to increase social and ability segregation be-
tween schools, relative to underlying residential segregation. This should be taken as an
indication that processes allocating pupils to schools may in some way be inequitable
with the result that high quality schooling is unevenly distributed across the social
classes. This may be because low income families are financially constrained in their
ability to make choices, or they are unable to meet the criteria to gain places at popu-
lar schools, or alternatively they may not be choosing to engage in the choice process.
Regardless of which of these reasons dominates, we can reject the claim that choice
policies have disproportionately benefitted low income children because their families
were previously unable to afford homes close to popular schools, thus lowering school
segregation. This lowering of school segregation through choice has not materialised
because England did not start from a position of complete residential stratification,
and in addition policies have given some schools both the means and the motivation
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to recruit pupils with fewer problems and above average ability.
Although the thesis makes few conclusive statements about causes of school stratifica-
tion, it is notable that religious, and to a lesser extent, Foundation schools have intakes
that are more advantaged than their local neighbourhoods. These claims regarding the
location of stratification in the secondary schooling system are consistent with a lon-
gitudinal analysis of FSM segregation that shows school segregation has not increased
since the 1988 Education Reform Act (e.g. Gorard et al., 2003). Chapter 4 notes that
most post-residential sorting is attributable to the admissions policies of grammar and
religious schools that were in place prior to the 1988 Education Reform Act. Indeed,
given that 1990 to 2005 was an era of rising pupil numbers and falling spare capacity,
it is possible that achievable choice did not actually rise over this period. Thus, sec-
ondary schools may be no more segregated than they were in the 1980s, but parents
may also have little additional choice.
The findings of this thesis should certainly not be taken as evidence that segregation
is the price that must be paid for enabling free parental choice and facilitating com-
petition between schools. It is true that there exists a social class gradient in the
capacity (and desire) of parents to engage in the school choice process, but this has
been exacerbated by the complexities of the English choice system which continues
to sanction variation in admissions procedures across state-funded schools and allows
oversubscription criteria so complex that it is impossible for a family to assess the
probability of achieving a place at their desired school. Policies to simplify admissions
procedures may in themselves be more equitable, and in addition simplification may
encourage low income families to engage with the system. However, this claim is some-
what speculative because our limited success in modelling parental choice means we
lack the capability to predict whether policies directed at admissions simplification,
the employment of choice advisors or transport subsidies, for example, would best
serve to improve the educational opportunities of children from poor families. Given
existing oversubscription criteria used by schools, it remains possible that engagement
with choice is unproductive if the overwhelming constraint on the poor is their severely
reduced achievable choice set, because their children are less likely to pass academic
selection tests or successfully demonstrate religious adherence.
9.2 School admissions reforms
The main policy recommendations that arise from this thesis relate to changes in sanc-
tioned secondary school admissions rules to improve fairness in the system. Fairness
would seem to be a crucial goal because school admissions reforms (given capacity con-
straints), do not usually facilitate choice, but instead have the effect of transferring a
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particular set of educational opportunities from one child to another. Chapter 5 shows
that own-admissions schools have intakes that are more advantaged than Community
schools, even when the characteristics of local neighbourhoods are taken into account.
If the goal of admissions reforms is to lower the level of social stratification between
schools, this thesis concludes that reforms to the admissions policies of religious, Foun-
dation and grammar schools should be an important starting point.
Religious schools across denominations and regions have intakes that are, on average,
significantly more advantaged than the neighbourhood in which they are located. The
data presented in Chapter 5 suggest that if we take a Community school and a religious
school located in neighbourhoods with the same demographics, the religious school
might have as many as 50 per cent more top ability pupils than the Community school
does. Given that the religious background and practices of the family are a social
phenomenon, it is not surprising that religious adherence criteria are correlated with
social class. However, there remains an unanswered question as to why the social
composition of religious schools appears to be so much more advantaged than that of
the church-going population.
The current measurement of religious adherence on a ‘continuum’ justifies the collection
of family background data, giving religious schools the means to socially select pupils,
should they wish to do so. It would seem inherent that problems will always arise in this
process, because some questions deemed as relevant to establish religious adherence –
such as marital status and place of child’s baptism – by their nature reveal information
about the social background of the family. Furthermore, even without explicit cream-
skimming taking place by religious schools, the complexity of their current admissions
criteria may discourage low income families from applying, or alternatively they may
apply but be less skilled at meeting a specific school’s criteria for religiosity. Thus, it
is possible that religious schools are cream-skimming inadvertently in the process of
selecting by religious adherence. One way to simplify the admissions process for all
families would be for the churches themselves to establish a nationally agreed binary
criteria of ‘religious adherence’ that families are deemed to have either met, or not met.
Once this is established, religious schools could then rely solely on the presence of a
signature on a form from a religious leader to decide who has priority in the admissions
process, so avoiding the need for the schools themselves to collect family background
information.
Although Voluntary-Aided religious and Foundation schools could be argued to have
similar means and motivations to cream-skim, Chapter 5 shows that the Foundation
schools sector has an intake only marginally more advantaged than the neighbourhoods
in which they are located. This assertion that most Foundation schools do not appear
to be engaged in cream-skimming activities challenges the conclusions drawn by those
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who simply measured the social and ability characteristics of these schools without
accounting for their greater propensity to be located in more aﬄuent parts of the
country. This finding raises more questions than it answers about why schools who are
given very clear incentives to cream-skim as the lowest cost route to raising their league
table position, and therefore popularity, usually choose not to do so. The tentative
suggestion made in Chapter 5 is that school leaders at these former LA-controlled
schools may have a strong commitment to their local community and a notion of ‘fair
play’, so will only introduce overtly selective criteria where they see it as essential for
their own survival or where they perceive that other schools are cream-skimming, for
example because there are grammar schools or other partially selective schools in the
area.
However, a notable minority of these schools do use ability or aptitude tests to se-
lect up to 30 per cent of their intake, and this significantly impacts on the social
composition of neighbouring schools. Removing this right to select, along with the
selection that continues in the 164 grammar schools would substantially lower social
stratification, but raises potential conflicts between the desire for greater educational
opportunities for low income children and efficiency considerations regarding the edu-
cation of the most able in society that are beyond the scope of this thesis. That said,
one straightforward policy to reduce social stratification would be to remove the right
of automatic entry to partially selective schools for the younger siblings of pupils who
secure selective places, since they displace others who live closer to the school yet have
themselves displayed no aptitude for the school’s specialist subject. There is no clear
rationale for allowing this policy to continue (it would be unthinkable for the younger
siblings of grammar school pupils to be given automatic right of entry) and the policy
has enabled a minority of ‘comprehensive’ schools to exclude almost all neighbourhood
pupils.
There have been major changes to the school admissions code since the pupils under
analysis in this thesis started secondary schools and there has not yet been an analysis
of the impact of these changes on stratification. Chapter 5 demonstrates that explicit
admissions policies are an important source of school stratification, which suggests
that the 2007 School Admissions Code, combined with better adherence to the Code
by schools, should help to balance intakes across the schooling system. Following the
release of NPD for pupils starting secondary school in 2008, three surveys of school ad-
missions policies (West et al. (2004) for 2001 entry; Coldron et al. (2008) for 2006 entry;
and a forthcoming West survey for 2008 entry) can be used to measure how specific
changes in a school’s admissions policy, brought about by changes in legislation, alters
that school’s intake. This work is particularly important because it measures the direct
relationship the policy lever of a national school admissions code, the implementation
of the legislation by schools and the resulting composition of school intakes.
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Despite significant legislative reform, it remains true that the objectives of an effec-
tive admissions system have remained largely implicit and there has not been enough
analysis of what they might be (Coldron et al., 2008). However, one goal should be,
and has been according to Government, that they the achieve fairness in school allo-
cations. The concept of ‘fair access’ was enshrined within the 2007 Code’s statutory
legislation with Alan Johnson, then Secretary of State for Education, writing that the
advent of the new Code would ensure that admissions procedures ‘operate in a fair
way that promotes social equity and community cohesion’ (Department for Education
and Skills, 2007b, page 7). However, the word ‘fairness’ has arguably been narrowly
defined by Government and the Schools Adjudicator. The Adjudicator, in a ruling on
the new Brighton and Hove admissions system, judged the requirement of the Code
that policies must not disadvantage, directly or indirectly, a child from a particular
social or racial group, in the very narrow sense that it is only prohibited to design poli-
cies that excludes certain groups if the policy explicitly sets out to do so (Eastwood
and Turvey, 2008). This means that new admissions policies can cause an increase in
social stratification in an area, provided they do not explicitly intend to do so.
9.3 The proximity oversubscription criterion
Reforms to schools admissions criteria regarding religiosity and academic selection
do have the potential to produce very real reductions in social stratification between
schools and therefore modestly improve the average peer group experienced by children
from poor backgrounds. The potential reductions in school stratification by these
types of reforms are potentially very large in the very areas, such as Haringey and
Wandsworth, where school segregation is seen to be a problem. However, Chapter 4
shows these policies are marginal in many parts of the country compared to the huge
impact that the use of catchment areas and proximity oversubscription criteria have on
pupil sorting. Part of this residential stratification is directly caused by the use of these
criteria, although a large proportion would persist regardless of the schooling system.
We do not currently have good estimates for the amount of residential stratification
that is attributable to parents deliberately relocating their family to access a particular
catchment area, although a replication of methods in Chapter 4 using postcodes from
age 5 through to age 11 could indicate the amount of sorting that takes place during
these years.
Systems involving lotteries and banding are potential reforms that would be consistent
with achieving more socially integrated schooling. The allocation of places at all schools
based on open lotteries for places among applicants would appear to be truly blind to
the social background of the applicants. However, schools would still be stratified given
that the housing market stratifies for reasons that are unrelated to school catchment
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zones and the (time and money) costs of daily transport to and from schools would
restrict choice for all. Also, by not giving families a guaranteed place at a local school,
it would be a stressful process resulting in enforced long, or even infeasible, journeys for
some families, with associated high costs that may have to be borne by the State.
A system of local authority-wide banding with a proximity oversubscription criteria
within, say, five ability bands (i.e. similar to the old Inner London Education Authority
(ILEA) scheme) would be more likely to achieve integrated schooling while minimising
journey times. It is not inconsistent with a choice system (as many critics claim) since
places within each band can be allocated based on parental preferences for schools.
However, this type of scheme has several potential problems. First, the ILEA experi-
ence suggests that it can lead to gaming by parents who encourage their children to
score badly on banding tests if they live in aﬄuent areas and suspect it will increase the
probability of a place at their favoured school. Second, if schools with intakes that are
representative of children in the LA are unacceptable to certain parents they will seek
an alternative school in the private sector or in another LA. Given this activity will be
more prevalent among high income households, this in turn further lowers the ability
distribution of the home LA, making it unacceptable to a further set of parents. Thus,
the system can be unstable and lead to across LA stratification. The extent to which
this happens depends on the size of LAs and how easy these cross-LA journeys are.
Third, achieving balanced intakes is very difficult in large or rural LAs because it might
involve transporting pupils long distances. Finally, it potentially lowers incentives for
schools to compete for pupils, compared to the current system, because schools can
only compete for pupil numbers and not for quality. On the other hand, however, if
intakes are truly balanced, school quality will be clearly revealed through simple league
tables, which should direct parents to apply for the highest quality schools. Compe-
tition for pupil numbers can then be made more effective by mechanisms to increase
capacity at popular schools.
Although banding has significant potential problems, it is consistent with some com-
mitment to neighbourhood schooling, which has benefits that should not be under-
stated. It gives certainty of future transitions for parents, does not require additional
testing at age 10/11, allows pupils to progress to secondary school with their primary
school friends and minimises the journeys pupils must make to school each day. There-
fore the best feasible policy reforms are likely to retain aspects of the neighbourhood
schooling system with policies to enhance choice and equity. Areas of the US that
have experimented with choice reforms have usually retained neighbourhood priority
systems (e.g. a 3 mile walk zone around schools in Boston and defined catchment areas
in Charlotte), but give parents the opportunity to express a preference for alternative
schools. Priority for all out-of-catchment pupils is allocated by lottery in most systems.
A more radical version of this approach would assign out-of-catchment places based
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on child’s ability, with priority given to children who balance the intake of the school
to make it more representative of the area.
In the UK, as the pupil population shrinks, there exists a narrow window of oppor-
tunity to reform school admissions without disenfranchising families who have bought
homes in the expectation of achieving a school place. Usually falling rolls produce
an expansion in the geographical area a school recruits from. However, rather than
allowing new streets to become part of the de facto school catchment, the spare places
produced by falling rolls could be set aside and allocated based on a lottery or some
compensating intake principle.
9.4 Predicting the effects of future policy reforms
Although researchers are able to make generalised claims about potential effects of
these admissions policy reforms, they are unable to predict the magnitude of effects on
school sorting, residential sorting, house prices, and so on. This is because the empirical
literature, to which this thesis contributes, confines itself to documenting the types of
school admissions procedures that are currently being used by schools, associations
between admissions policies and stratification, differences in the propensities of pupils
to attend particular schools, and areas of the country where pupil sorting appears to
be a problem (e.g. Burgess et al., 2007; Chamberlain et al., 2006; Coldron et al., 2008;
West et al., 2004).
Chapter 3 documented the huge gap that exists between the theoretical models that
might be most appropriate for building predictive models of sorting and the current
state of the literature. It proposes that an agent-based modelling framework might
be more appropriate than a general equilibrium solution given that households display
myopic behaviour and have financial and psychic attachments to particular areas, so
as a result housing markets can take generations to adjust to policy changes. The
sociological choice literature is capable, in part, of informing decisions about how to
specify household utility functions and behaviours. However, it is not a quantitative
empirical literature and so can play no part in parameterising the model.
There have been two approaches to parameterising school choice models by economists.
The first is to find an extremely rich dataset, with full micro information on neigh-
bourhood and school qualities, household characteristics and house prices, as Bayer
and McMillan (2005) did in San Francisco. A structural equation model can then
be used to estimate values for the parameters in the model. However, this approach
can only be used in an equilibrium modelling framework and is invalid if the theo-
retical model is incorrectly specified. The alternative (and more viable) approach is
to seek estimates for the values of particular parameters in isolation, often by finding
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sources of exogenous variation in the data, as the school district boundary estimates
of willingness-to-pay for school quality claim to do (e.g. Black, 1999).
9.5 School competition policies
Competition between schools for pupils provides a potential route by which standards
can be raised across the secondary education system, regardless of how choice affects
sorting. Both Foundation and religious secondary schools appear to enable genuine
choice of school for a group of parents, which results in them recruiting from a much
wider catchment area than their direct neighbourhood and produces a high degree of
sorting in the local educational market. It is likely that secondary schools adjacent to
Foundation and religious schools do perceive them to be a competitive threat, but this
apparent competition for pupils does not appear to translate into effort on the part
of neighbouring schools to increase exam performance. The only potentially positive
competition effect findings in this thesis are from the pupil fixed-effect regressions
in Chapter 8 that suggest areas with many religious schools perform better in some
subjects at GCSE, and that there are benefits to attending a non-religious school
located close to a religious school, rather than one located further away in the same
county. However, this second claim is based on within-area comparisons, so there is
a high risk that the estimates are confounded by pupil sorting. No spillover effects
of Foundation schools onto area-wide achievement are found in Chapter 7. Thus,
overall this thesis fails to lend support to the assumption underlying market reforms
that structures to encourage schools to compete for pupils are a route to improving
standards.
The lack of identifiable competition effects is broadly consistent with existing quanti-
tative literature on school competition in England, yet contrasts with positive compe-
tition effects that have been identified in other countries. This reflects the reality that
the effect of policies is highly contingent on the circumstances in which they operate. It
is also true that studies from the US and Sweden usually measure the short-run effect
of large changes to the schooling market through the introduction of new Charter or
state-funded private schools, compared to long-run effects analysed in this thesis. It
is possible that these large scale disruptions to pupil allocations do force schools to
compete for pupils, but as the new hierarchy of a local market is re-established on new
terms, it is possible that the incentive or imperative to compete for survival once again
subsides.
Variation in levels of school competition is hard to measure, and this could explain
the null results found in this thesis and elsewhere. However, there are more likely
to be real substantive reasons related to the institutional environment that explain
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why encouraging competition through policies of school autonomy is not an effective
route to raising standards. Regarding the null result found for religious schools, it is
likely that many religious and non-religious schools do not actually compete for pupils.
In other words, high levels of pupil mobility and sorting in an area is not sufficient
to suggest that competition between schools for pupils is actually taking place. This
is likely true for Catholic schools who may essentially operate in separate markets,
using feeder school admissions criteria to segment the system. However, this type of
non-competition explanation would not seem to be applicable to the former Grant-
Maintained schools.
The second explanation is that headteachers in Community schools do feel genuinely
threatened by the presence of local religious or Foundation schools, but they do not
(or cannot) respond to this threat. The most likely reason for this is that they do
not possess the means to significantly influence effort directed at test scores exerted
on the part of their classroom teachers. Alternatively, they may find that, although
the number and quality of pupils at their school is being affected by an autonomous
school’s presence, given little spare capacity in the system their school’s position is
sustainable, so no effort response is necessary for survival.
The final explanation is that competition is actually muted, rather than increased,
by the presence of religious (and to a lesser extent Foundation) schools, because they
allow the system to become stratified. This stratification then provides schools with
little incentive to focus effort on improving test scores because marginal changes in
effort cannot affect their league table position.
This thesis, as with most large-scale quantitative fixed-design research, fails to give an
account for why a competition effect cannot be found. It would now seem that this
literature is incapable of progressing through further quasi-experimental econometric
studies. What is lacking is a detailed institutional understanding of schools and of the
motivations and behaviours of headteachers, governors and classroom teachers. So,
this body of quantitative research on school competition should be supplemented with
surveys to try to identify why competition does not appear to be effective. The survey
of headteachers by Levacˇic´ (2004) is one direction of research that is undoubtably
helpful, but the collection of data on perceptions and practices of classroom teachers as
well as headteachers would be more beneficial, for it is their behaviour that ultimately
determines pupil achievement.
There are three types of policy interventions that might be successful at encouraging
schools to compete through greater effort focussed on pupil achievement. The first
would be policies aimed at incentivising classroom teachers to maximise pupil test
scores. A natural route to implementing this would be through a teacher performance
related pay scheme. However, these are political contentious and difficult to imple-
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ment because they require the measurement of teacher and school quality, without the
confounding influence of pupil background characteristics. Adnett and Davies (2005)
suggest a more effective policy would be to implement schemes to encourage teach-
ers or departments to compete for pupils within schools, possibly with additional pay
and resources directed at departments that are successful in attracting pupils to study
their subject. This type of scheme may be more effective in increasing effort, given
there exists more variation in quality within schools than between schools. However, it
suffers from similar problems to existing quasi-market policies, namely effort might be
re-directed towards borderline pupils and departments may engage in cream-skimming
of easier-to-teach pupils.
Secondly, admission policy reforms directed at lowering stratification might also be
successful in encouraging competition through school effort focussed on achievement.
Schools that are more closely matched in terms of pupil composition have more incen-
tive to increase marginal effort directed at test scores in order to attract parents to
the school. One of the key problems with operating a quasi-market appears to be a
tendency for schools to become stratified in the long-run. Indeed this might explain
why short-run competition effects can be found following the implementation of new
schemes in the US and Sweden. However, if these reform policies also allow the system
to stratify, even only slightly, efficiency is likely to fall back in the long-run.
Finally, an essential condition for competition to be an effective route to school im-
provement is the constant injection of new capacity at popular schools or new schools.
The current system in England does have spare capacity, but it always quickly settles
in the weakest schools in the local hierarchy, who present no competitive threat to
other schools. Capacity at the best schools does not expand because it is not in their
interests to allow the least popular schools to close. The introduction of new capacity
can be introduced via several means including forcing or incentivising existing popular
schools to expand, or opening new schools (whether maintained, independent not-for-
profit or for-profit schools funded by quasi-vouchers). However, regardless of how this
is done, the constant need to create new capacity means that true choice and com-
petition have a large financial cost, so that unless the reforms succeed in significantly
raising standards, they may lower the efficiency of the schooling system.
Without a deeper understanding of why competition is currently ineffective at raising
standards, there is no way to judge which reforms are likely to improve school qual-
ity at lowest cost. However, given the substantial costs associated with implementing
competition policies, they should be judged against policies that do not seek to encour-
age schools to compete. One problem with encouraging competition, particularly if it
leads to cream-skimming activities, is that it rules out the possibility of collaboration
between schools in the local market, which could lead to reductions in the speed of
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dissemination of good practice, less (potentially risky) innovation by schools at the top
of the hierarchy, and an inability to innovate by schools who are severely financially
constrained as a result of falling rolls (Adnett and Davies, 2003). Thus a policy choice
exists between promoting co-operation and promoting competition, which headteach-
ers see as mutually exclusive conditions (Ribchester and Edwards, 1998). Adnett and
Davies conclude that:
Competition is more likely to promote short-run efficiency and co-operation
is more likely to promote long-run dissemination. Whether competition or
co-operation is more likely to promote effective innovation depends on the
strength of market hierarchies, first-mover advantages, and the resources
required for successful innovation.
(Adnett and Davies, 2003, page 194)
However, the likely success of this alternative non-market strategy is entirely contin-
gent on our beliefs about whether teachers, as public servants, can be persuaded to
act as knights, innovating and collaborating in the interests of educational progress de-
spite an absence of threat to school resources and survival (Le Grand, 2003). Arguably
this perspective can be questioned, given that the period leading up to market-based
reforms in schooling was not associated with great educational innovations and ris-
ing standards. Given the motivations and qualities of teachers today, there may be
no alternative to making a system of school accountability, through published school
standards and the opportunities and threats of the quasi-market, work more effec-
tively.
9.6 Concluding remarks
The introduction of a quasi-market for school places has been central to government
aims to improve school standards in England for twenty years. However, the findings
of this thesis are rather equivocal on the social welfare benefits of quasi-market re-
forms. Choice does appear to be possible for many parents, and this can have value
in itself. However, ability to access high-performing schools continues to be unevenly
distributed by family background. This, combined with the continuing right of some
schools, particularly grammar and religious schools, to select pupils based on ability
and religious adherence has led to a system that appears to be more stratified than a
neighbourhood schooling system is likely to be.
The stratifying tendency of current secondary school admissions in England results
in a system that is inequitable, without measurable efficiency gains produced through
effort induced by competition between schools for pupils. However, this should not be
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taken as evidence that quasi-market reforms cannot benefit society; it simply reflects
the specific way that the English schooling system is currently managed. Devising
a more efficient and equitable system of school admissions for England is extremely
complex. However, there are clear policies to reform school admissions that should be
successful in lowering school stratification, thereby simultaneously increasing the extent
to which school effort is likely to be directly rewarded with greater demand for places
and also raising educational opportunities for children from socially disadvantaged
families.
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